AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH ATT: MALI'S SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAMAKO 000288


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2024
TAGS: PREL PTER ML
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH ATT: MALI'S SECURITY
NEEDS IN AN ERA OF UNHELPFUL NEIGHBORS

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with President Amadou
Toumani Toure (ATT) on May 8 to inquire about Mali's plans
for addressing northern security in a theoretical
post-hostage situation future and his views of how the U.S.
might best assist these efforts. ATT spoke of the dynamics
surrounding the ongoing hostage crises, rejecting "financial
transactions" to secure hostage releases, but nevertheless
questioning the efficacy of "trapping oneself in useless
principles." Referring to his oft-renewed attempts to hold a
Sahel regional summit on security and counter-terrorism
cooperation, ATT expressed disappointment at the continued
unavailability of various regional leaders which suggested a
lack of commitment on their part. He claimed to have largely
resigned himself to the fact that Mali would have to address
these problems alone despite them being clearly regional
problems with regional solutions. He outlined a list,
consistent with previous requests, of training, equipment,
intelligence, and infrastructure requirements to increase
Malian capacity and facilitate any such actions. What he
outlined was capacity building over the medium term to
re-establish the government's presence and authority in the
North and reduce the freedom to maneuver of traffickers,
criminal bands, and AQIM, rather than a near-term strategy to
pursue AQIM. ATT welcomed news of a DOD/NASA plane to produce
better maps of northern Mali. End summary.


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The Troubled North - and No Help from the Neighbors
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2. (C) Recalling earlier requests at various levels for
help in being better able to view their own country as a
first step to better exercise national control, particularly
in Mali's undermapped north, the Ambassador shared recent
news passed earlier to the Minister of Defense, that we had
been able to secure the services of a NASA plane leased by
the Department of Defense that will overfly Mali to produce
maps that we can share with the GOM. ATT welcomed this news,
and began a discussion of the still-fragile nature of Mali's
northern zones. Calling the Tuareg rebellion distressing and
continued stability uncertain given ever-present banditry and
contraband flows, ATT wished aloud for rapid development
projects to reassure people of better prospects. He lamented
the continuing presence of terrorists, and his inability to
organize regional cooperation among a group of neighbors who
all viewed instilling better security as someone else's job.


3. (C) Reacting to recent vitriolic exchanges in Algerian
and Malian media, he was particularly harsh on Algeria. He
said the Algerians had taken neither responsibility for a
problem that originated in Algeria nor action. For example,
they had done nothing with information Mali had gleaned from
the Canadian hostages' Nigerien chauffeur, despite possessing
both the military means to do so and Malian permission for
Algerian cross-border hot pursuit "even to Timbuktu." He
concluded that while Mali would continue to talk to its
neighbors, Sahelian cooperation was not going to produce
anything effective, so Mali needed to be able to act alone on
its own behalf. Before turning to that list of requirements,
he recalled that Mali had arrested four terrorists including
a significant cache of materiel and computers. The detainees
included AQIM's chief of operations in the zone. He observed
that the composition of the group, including a Ghanaian in
addition to the more expected one Algerian and two
Mauritanians, underscored the frighteningly expanding reach
of AQIM in West Africa.


4. (C) ATT said that as Mali attempted to navigate the
hostage situation the scope of the terrorism problem had
become more apparent. A group that formerly numbered fewer
than 30 now seemed closer to 100. He said he had warned
Mali's neighbors that if they didn't act to solve this
problem, "others would do it for us," another theme from his
recent interview in Algerian media. He summarized Mali's
needs as training, logistic support, equipment and
intelligence. He linked these first three elements to the
daunting vastness and harsh terrain of northern Mali,
observing that Malian security forces could not succeed
without the same mobility - and security - enjoyed by AQIM.
This required not only training and equipment, including
items such as adapted vehicles for the punishing desert
environment, but the establishment/reinforcement of small
strategic locations in the north from which Malian forces
could patrol into the farther flung interior. He cited the
need to set up a few small remote outposts and to
rehabilitate the base and air field at Tessalit(including its
3000 meter runway) toward those ends. Currently, forces
deployed in the north work only from 4 am to 10 am, forced by
the lack of the most rudimentary shelter to spend sunlight
hours in the shade of their vehicles.


5. (C) To illustrate his point about the difficulty of
maneuvering successfully in these zones, ATT cited the
struggle against the Tuareg rebel bandit Bahanga. The Malian
armed forces had been unable to best him until they brought
in irregulars used to, equipped for, and effective in the
desert environment. ATT praised the importance of
intelligence cooperation, and stressed that he had asked
Mali's director for external security to share any and all
information related to the four new detainees. The
Ambassador thanked ATT for that information and cooperation,
and recalled that there is an anti-terrorism judicial track
in addition to the intelligence one. She noted that the FBI
would like to have access to, or at least pose questions to,
the four detainees in hopes that their information might
bolster the legal case for U.S. indictments or extradition
requests for specific AQIM members. ATT accepted this
suggestion, without further comment on how such access would
be facilitated. He was equally supportive but non-specific
in response to the Ambassador's reference to her discussions
with the Minister of Internal Security on beginning to
develop police capacity.

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How to Handle Hostages?
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6. (C) Turning to the remaining hostages, ATT said that
Mali was "not naive" about various parties' preferred
strategies. Even as he said that Mali found it difficult to
refuse a donor's request for assistance, he said that Mali
opposed any financial exchange for hostages, a position the
Ambassador said we strongly shared. The ambassador added
that we hoped the four detainees would not wind up as...
which ATT himself completed with the words "bargaining
chips." ATT expanded on the hostage subject, saying he hoped
to be in a situation to prevent the future taking of
hostages, which put Mali and others in a situation of being
trapped in "useless principles" while there were human
concerns at stake. Military action was too risky, leaving
the exchange of money or people. He expressed concern that
the British hostage would be killed, calling the hostage
takers crazed and eager to show off and prove their
franchise's worth to central Al Qaeda figures. Meanwhile,
Mali would continue patrols and look into the information
seized from the detainees to see what it contributed. The
Ambassador stressed that although Mali's situation is quite
complicated, the ceding of important principles will only
embolden AQIM and incite others to take even more hostages in
a rapidly developing cottage industry. Picking up her
reference to the petty bandits who had faciliated the
transfer of the four Europeans to AQIM, ATT said Mali had
arrested some of them, and would prosecute them.


7. (C) As ATT again reiterated the cycle of Mali's needs
for mapping, intelligence, training/logistics, and
infrastructure, he drew a picture of a more medium than short
term process. The Ambassador used this opportunity to
discuss current training in connection with JCETs,
highlighting that these exercises represent a substantial
U.S. financial and personnel investment. A core of Malian
military personnel needed to be made available for successive
JCETS, subsequent exercises needed to again focus on those
previously trained, and a means needed to be devised between
engagements to keep skills honed as well as share acquired
knowledge with other Malian elements. ATT agreed continuity
was important, although he added that substitutions were
sometimes inevitable as forces were deployed on maneuvers.
He undertook to talk with the Minister of Defense to ensure
the maximum reasonable number of Malian soldiers would be
repeat participants.


8. (C) ATT's parting messages for the Ambassador were
threefold. First, he greatly appreciates our training,
which is very important to his largely young and
inexperienced military. Second, Mali realizes it can no
longer rely on its neighbors on counter-terrorism, and thus
needs to improve its own forces and capacities with our help.
Third, ATT renewed his expression of friendship with the U.S.
He acknowledged the embarassment of the ongoing hostage
crises in Mali's north, and while he recognized the
correctness of the principles governing these situations, he
said he could not ignore the human dimension involved.

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Comment
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9. (C) ATT's basic list of requests for empowering Malian
forces to better patrol the north is not new. This is not
surprising since the needs remain unchanged and there has
been no significant injection of equipment or tailored
systematic training in response to these earlier requests.
The list, including intelligence, vehicles, equipment, and
physical reinforcement of northern outpost bases dates at
least to mid-2007. We hope that our long-delayed delivery of
vehicles, communications equipment, and physical barriers can
be brought to fruition soon. While the Algiers Accords
contain some reservations about increased militarization of
the north, the scope of his proposed reinforcements is in
fact within the boundaries of the agreement which calls for
the refurbishment of airports in Tessalit, Gao, and Kidal and
instructs Mali to relocate military bases away from urbanized
areas. While we have seen ATT frustrated with Algeria and
other neighbors before, the intensity of his reaction was
new. Where ATT previously saw regional consultation as
preceding concerted regional action, his plans now, if not
necessarily in a short term, are more solitary.


MILOVANOVIC