Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO268
2009-04-30 14:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

MORE TUAREG PESSIMISM OVER ACCORDS AND AQIM

Tags:  PTER PINS PINR ASEC PGOV PREL ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0268/01 1201453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301453Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0287
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0634
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0342
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000268 

SIPDIS

RABAT FOR LEGAL ATTACHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR ASEC PGOV PREL ML
SUBJECT: MORE TUAREG PESSIMISM OVER ACCORDS AND AQIM

REF: A. BAMAKO 00257

B. BAMAKO 00107

C. BAMAKO 00186

D. BAMAKO 00245

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000268

SIPDIS

RABAT FOR LEGAL ATTACHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR ASEC PGOV PREL ML
SUBJECT: MORE TUAREG PESSIMISM OVER ACCORDS AND AQIM

REF: A. BAMAKO 00257

B. BAMAKO 00107

C. BAMAKO 00186

D. BAMAKO 00245

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: Tuareg trafficker turned National Assembly
Deputy Deity ag Sidamou said those who believe Mali will ever
create mixed military units were "fooling themselves" and
predicted a calamity "even worse" than what northern Mali has
experienced so far if Mali fails to respect its Algiers
Accords commitments. Ag Sidamou also shared his
understanding of Arab and Tuareg involvement in the
kidnappings of Canadian diplomats and European tourists by
AQIM, and complained that none of the funds designated by the
international community to combat terrorism in Mali ever make
their way to those who are actually ready to combat
terrorists. Unfortunately an important way to support Tuareg
fighters ready to do battle with AQIM is via the very mixed
military units ag Sidamou believes will never materialize.
End Summary.

--------------
Ag Sidamou: On the Outside Looking In
--------------

2.(C) Ag Sidamou is an Idnane Tuareg from Tessalit (see bio
notes in Ref. A). Although he is one of the Tuareg rebel
Alliance for Democracy and Change's (ADC) founders, the rebel
movement is dominated by Ifoghas Tuaregs, and Idnane leaders
like ag Sidamou have been steadily sidelined from the Algiers
Accords. In February ag Sidamou helped orchestrate, with
Libyan financing, the disarmament of Idnane rebel factions
separate from the disarmament of the primarily Ifoghas
dominated ADC (Ref. B). Ag Sidamou's view of the Algiers
Accords is therefore one of a Tuareg rebel leader who finds
himself looking in from the edge of the Algiers Accords
process.

--------------
A Divided Northern Mali
--------------

3.(C) Ag Sidamou's vision of northern Mali's future is
bleak. Noting the profundity of the conflict in northern
Mali, which dates back to Malian independence in 1960, ag

Sidamou complained that every time violence flared Mali
focused on prescribing aspirin as opposed to cures. He
warned that those who still believe Mali and Algeria have any
intention of creating mixed military units as stipulated by
the Algiers Accords were "fooling themselves" and said Mali
was more interested in pitting Tuareg groups against one
another. Ag Sidamou said high rates of illiteracy and
poverty render Kidal Tuaregs particularly susceptible to this
kind of victimization.

4.(C) Internal divisions among Malian Tuareg are already
evident. In addition to the loyalist Imghad Tuareg militia
created by Col. Gamou in 2008 to combat Tuareg rebels, rebel
movements themselves are divided between Ifergoumessens
generally loyal to Ibrahim Bahanga, Ifoghas primarily
belonging to the ADC, Taghat Melets, and Idnanes like ag
Sidamou who decided to disarm separately from the ADC and no
longer appear to be part of the Algiers Accords process.

5.(C) The creation of ethnic Arab militias seems to have
exacerbated this situation. Ag Sidamou said Mali faced
significant obstacles in attempting to dissolve the primarily
ethnic based militias it helped create. According to ag
Sidamou, the Malian government is now trying to recruit some
militia members into the regular army and pay off certain
militia leaders with cash. The involvement of senior
military officers allegedly with personal and financial
interests in keeping their respective militias alive,
however, is complicating this initiative. Ag Sidamou said
Col. Abderahmane ould Meydou and Col. Lamana ould Bdou were
busy running interference to protect their own Arab
militiamen in order to preserve revenues from drugs and
weapons trafficking. He alleged that Col. Gamou was running
a similar operation on the Tuareg side.

6.(C) Ag Sidamou went on to accuse the Malian government and
ethnic Arabs of conniving to use AQIM to disadvantage Malian
Tuaregs. Ag Sidamou said Mali wanted AQIM to stay in Tuareg
controlled areas in order to further tarnish the Tuaregs'

BAMAKO 00000268 002 OF 003


international image. He also alleged that certain Malian
officials and local Arab leaders had an informal arrangement
enabling Arabs like Tarkint Mayor Baba ould Chieouk to
negotiate ransom payments for western hostages on behalf of
AQIM and then divide the proceeds between Arab leaders and
corrupted government officials.

7.(C) Ag Sidamou described Mali's Tuareg population as
"blockaded" by the Malian military, local Arab populations,
and AQIM. He said this blockade deprived Tuaregs of access
to potable water, education, and health services and
complained that every time he and other Tuareg leaders ask
the international donor community for help, donors respond by
explaining why they can't go to Kidal because of Salafists
and other security concerns. He then complained that he and
other Tuareg political leaders cannot raise this issue in
Bamako without being accused of rebellion - a rather ironic
statement given ag Sidamou's recent efforts to foment exactly
that.

--------------
AQIM, Arabs, and Western Hostages
--------------

8.(C) Ag Sidamou cited many of same names previously
reported in connection with the kidnappings of two Canadian
diplomats in Niger and four European tourists along the
Mali-Niger border. Ag Sidamou said he believed only one
Tuareg was involved in the European kidnappings - Inteweka ag
Ahmayed (aka Ousmane) - and stressed that Ousmane had been
captured by fellow Tuaregs, as opposed to Malian forces, on
March 23 in the northern Malian town of In-Khalil (Ref. C).
Ag Sidamou speculated that Malian authorities were blocking
outside nations from visiting Ousmane in prison or obtaining
details about his capture in order to prevent Ousmane from
revealing information about Malian officials complicit with
the kidnappings or trafficking in northern Mali.

9.(C) Ag Sidamou said four Arabs were involved in the
Canadian and European kidnappings, but only provided the
names of two: Asultan ould Badi and Alhassane ould Mohamed
(aka Cheibani). Ag Sidamou referred to ould Mohamed as
"Cheibani ould Inawaye". Chiebani's father was Mohamed ould
Inawaye (Mohamed the son of Inawaye). Ag Sidamou could have
been confused by Cheibani's parentage or perhaps Cheibani has
resorted to using the family name Inawaye to further mask his
identity. Ag Sidamou also reported that Cheibani was related
to Tarkint Mayor Baba ould Choueich, who played an
instrumental role behind the liberation of the two Canadians
and their Nigerien driver.

10.(C) Ag Sidamou alleged that the two unnamed Arab
kidnappers were relations of Col. ould Meydou and Col. Lamana
and that they had received messages from Col. Lamana
following the transfer of the hostages to AQIM instructing
one to leave Mali and the other to enlist in an Arab militia
to avoid detection by Malian authorities.

11.(C) Referring back to the ADC's October 2006 battles with
what was then the GSPC and is now AQIM, ag Sidamou recounted
his disappointment with the international community's failure
to help the Tuaregs pursue their vendetta against Algerian
Salafists. He noted that the widows and children of Tuaregs
who died fighting AQIM in 2006 never received any assistance.
He also faulted the U.S. and other nations for wasting
counterterrorism resources, saying he and other Tuaregs
frequently heard about money set aside to combat terrorism in
Mali but that these funds never went to those actually ready
to combat terrorists.

--------------
Comment: Again the Mixed Units
--------------

12.(C) Mali could respond to the increasing levels of
skepticism expressed by ag Sidamou and other Tuaregs about
Malian commitment to the Algiers Accords by taking the leap
of faith required to constitute actual mixed military. On
April 14 Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane once again told the
assembled diplomatic corps in Bamako that Mali remained
committed to the "rapid" constitution of these units (Ref.
D). Unfortunately, Minister Ouane and the Malian government
has already said as much many times before. Ag Sidamou has
his own interest in ensuring the success of these mixed units
as they present the best, and only, way for western
counterterrorism dollars to reach rehabilitated and
reintegrated former members of the Tuareg rebellion ready and

BAMAKO 00000268 003 OF 003


willing to cross swords with AQIM.
MILOVANOVIC