Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO221
2009-04-10 10:56:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

TUAREG BOUNTY HUNTERS LOOKING FOR SECURITY AND

Tags:  PTER PINS PINR PREL ML 
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VZCZCXRO5195
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0221 1001056
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 101056Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0221
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0618
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0336
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T BAMAKO 000221 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

RABAT FOR LEGAL ATTACHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR PREL ML
SUBJECT: TUAREG BOUNTY HUNTERS LOOKING FOR SECURITY AND
INCENTIVES

REF: BAMAKO 00186

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T BAMAKO 000221

NOFORN
SIPDIS

RABAT FOR LEGAL ATTACHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR PREL ML
SUBJECT: TUAREG BOUNTY HUNTERS LOOKING FOR SECURITY AND
INCENTIVES

REF: BAMAKO 00186

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary: On April 6 Kidal Chamber of Commerce
president Abdousalam ag Assalat and Tuareg trafficker Merzouk
ag Acherif told the Embassy that they could no longer bear
the personal and financial risks of tracking terrorism
suspects in northern Mali without outside support in the form
of "gas" money and assurances that those captured will not be
released a few months later by Malian authorities. Ag
Assalat said he and Merzouk believed it was too risky to
pursue other high-profile kidnapping suspects - including
Asultan ould Badi, Alassane ould Mohamed (aka Cheibani),and
other unspecified AQIM leaders - without first resolving
these issues. Ag Assalat indicated that he and Merzouk
continued, however, to track both ould Badi and Cheibani's
whereabouts, stating that Cheibani was in the northern Malian
town of Menaka as recently as last week. End Summary.

2.(S/NF) Ag Assalat and Merzouk have already led Malian
security forces to hideouts of two Tuaregs implicated in the
January 22 kidnappings of four European tourists in northern
Mali. The subsequent arrest raids, one outside of Gao and a
second on March 23 in In-Khalil, netted two kidnapping
suspects: Sidamar ag Ilaste and Inteweka ag Ahmayed (aka
Ousmane) (Ref. A). Ag Assalat was back in Bamako, briefly,
to conduct Chamber of Commerce business before returning to
Kidal to campaign for Mali's upcoming April 26 local
elections. Merzouk, who appears to speak only Tamachek and
Arabic, was likely in Bamako to meet with the Director
General of State Security (DGSE),Col. Mamy Coulibaly. On
April 3 the British Embassy's political officer told the
Embassy that Col. Coulibaly had confirmed that two Tuareg
traffickers allegedly involved in the January 22 kidnappings
were now in custody, but complained that Col. Coulibaly was
providing only extremely limited information.

3.(S/NF) Ag Assalat originally told the Embassy that Merzouk
had missed the primary target of the raid in In-Khalil, the
ethnic Arab AQIM facilitator Asultan ould Badi, by only five
minutes. On April 6, however, ag Assalat's story changed
somewhat as he claimed that he had instructed Merzouk to
leave Asultan just moments before the raid and focus instead
on Inteweka. Ag Assalat cited ould Badi's status as a Malian
Arab as one reason for this decision. As Tuaregs, ag Assalat
and Merzouk claimed they could manage "social pressures" from
their own Tuareg community stemming from the arrest of fellow
Tuaregs like Inteweka and Sidamar. Ag Assalat said pressure
from the Arab community following the capture of an Arab like
Asultan would be much worse, entailing personal risks that he
and Merzouk were currently unwilling to run - without help.

4.(S/NF) Describing his need for "gas" money and other
expenses, ag Assalat said he and Merzouk had personally
financed the capture of Sidamar and Inteweka. Ag Assalat
also stressed the personal risks he and Merzouk were running,
repeatedly asking rhetorically, "What's the point" of
capturing kidnapping suspects if Mali is just going to
release them a few months later. He faulted Malian
authorities not only for their delinquency in detaining and
prosecuting terrorism suspects, but for their inability to
keep tabs on specific individuals with terrorism links. Ag
Assalat noted that no one in the Malian government, for
instance, knew that Cheibani was in the northern Malian town
of Menaka as recently as last week.

5.(S/NF) Assuming their financing and security concerns are
resolved, ag Assalat and Merzouk said it would be relatively
easy for them to also corral senior AQIM leaders based in
Mali as these individuals frequently traverse the northern
Malian desert in convoys of just one or two vehicles with
only limited security.
MILOVANOVIC