TUAREG LEADER: FORGET THE ACCORDS, JUST GIVE US

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000211

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019
TAGS: PHUM PINS PINR PREL ASEC PTER ML
SUBJECT: TUAREG LEADER: FORGET THE ACCORDS, JUST GIVE US
OUR GUYS BACK

REF: A. BAMAKO 00107

B. BAMAKO 00141

C. BAMAKO 00003

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: On March 31 National Assembly Deputy and
Tuareg leader Alghabass ag Intallah described the Algiers
Accords as increasingly irrelevant; accused the Malian
government of mistreating Tuareg rebel prisoners; and warned
that restive Tuaregs in Kidal were on the point of capturing
a handful of Malian soldiers of their own. Recent attempts
by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and
Tuareg leaders to visit captured rebels have been deflected
by Malian officials, prompting both the ICRC and ag Intallah
to wonder what the Malians are hiding and question why
captured Tuaregs are in the custody of the General
Directorate of State Security (DGSE) as opposed to regular
military or judicial authorities. Ag Intallah said ethnic
Arab militias constituted in January in northern Mali were
bands of Arab smugglers operating under the command not of
Malian army Col. Abderahmane ould Meydou but DGSE Col. Lamana
ould Bdou, and said these militia units never engaged with
rogue Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim Bahanga. Ag Intallah also
questioned Malian and Algerian motivations regarding AQIM's
use of northern Mali as a safe haven, and said President
Amadou Toure personally forced him to rescind a request for
the Ministers of Defense and Security to appear before the
Assembly to answer questions on Mali's policy toward AQIM
during the last National Assembly session. End Summary.

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Alghabass: The Quiet Tuareg
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2.(C) At about 6 feet 6 inches tall in full Tuareg regalia
and maybe 6 foot 4 without, Alghabass ag Intallah strikes a
gangling yet imposing figure. This is due partly to his
quiet countenance, and partly to what he symbolizes. As the
middle son of Kidal's aged traditional leader, Alghabass
represents the past and the future of Mali's ruling Tuareg
hierarchy. No more than 35 years old, Alghabass also
represents the growing numbers of restive Tuareg youth who,
unemployed and without prospects, are testing the limits of
Kidal's traditional governing structures and the modern
Malian state's ability to maintain order. It is perhaps
these contradictions - his conflicted status as the most
capable yet second son of Kidal's ailing traditional Tuareg
leader; his position as a senior but youthful elected
official from Kidal; and his dual role as a quiet,
level-headed advisor to both the Malian government and the
Tuareg rebellion - that make Alghabass such a compelling, and
credible, narrator for the northern region of Kidal.

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The Desertification of the Algiers Accords
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3.(C) On March 31 Alghabass told the Embassy that the 2006
Algiers Accords were rapidly sinking into the northern Malian
sand. There has been no public discussion of the Algiers
Accords or their implementation since Tuareg rebel groups
disarmed in February. Alghabass indicated that no private
discussions were on going either. "Military withdrawal,
special units, development," said Alghabass, "no one is
talking about it." He accused the Malian and Algerian
governments of trying to "cover the Accords with sand" by
declaring the implementation process complete and moving on.
"They do not want to implement anything," observed Alghabass.
He then noted that the Malian military was still openly
driving through Kidal in vehicles commandeered several months
earlier from local Tuareg civilians and rebels. Instead of
downgrading its military footprint as stipulated by the
Accords, Alghabass said Mali was fortifying its positions in
the north and cited as evidence Mali's recent decision to
designate Kidal as a separate military district. Kidal was
previously part of the First military region headquartered in
Gao.

4.(C) Alghabass said Tuaregs harbored no illusions about
Mali's commitment to reducing its military footprint in the
north or constituting mixed military units and were no longer
thinking about portions of the Accords dealing with
development and the "economic reinsertion" of former rebels.
Alghabass downplayed concerns over the exclusion of other
Tuareg groups from the nine-person Algiers Accords steering
committee - the three Tuareg members of this committee are
all Ifoghas - by claiming that Taghat Melet and Idnane

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Tuaregs had chosen to follow their own, parallel peace
process. Taghat Melet and Idnane Tuareg rebel groups
disarmed separately from the primarily Ifoghas dominated
Alliance for Democracy and Change's (ADC) February 17
disarmament ceremony (Ref. A).

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Tuareg Rebel Prisoners
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5.(C) Alghabass said the most pressing - and potentially
explosive - issue for Kidal Tuaregs was no longer the
implementation of the Accords but the continued detention of
as many as 23 supsected Tuareg rebels captured by Malian
forces in January and February 2009. While some of these
individuals are certainly former rebels, Alghabass claimed
others were Tuareg civilians picked up by Malian military
patrols simply because they happened to be in the wrong place
at the wrong time. "People can talk about reconciliation,"
said Alghabass of the peace process in the north, "but
without liberation, there will be no reconciliation."
Alghabass warned that restive Tuareg youth could capture 30
Malian soldiers "at any moment" to speed the release of the
Tuaregs currently imprisoned in Bamako, and described the
situation as a "war of nerves" between Tuaregs and those
holding the prisoners.

6.(C) Malian officials have refused repeated requests by
Alghabass and other Tuareg leaders to visit these prisoners.
Alghabass said his only entry point to these prisoners was
through DGSE Director, Col. Mamy Coulibaly, but that Col.
Coulibaly had given him the run around for more than a month,
telling Alghabass to first call one day, then the next, and
then wait one week more. This week Col. Coulibaly told
Alghabass he was traveling and referred the matter to Lt.
Col. Didier Dacko, who subsequently instructed Alghabass to
wait a few more days. "Why is this?" asked Alghabass in
reference to both the involvement of the DGSE and his
inability to get a straight answer from either Col. Coulibaly
or Lt. Col. Dacko. "Where are these prisoners?"

7.(C) On March 4 the ICRC told the Embassy that it had also
been unable to visit Tuaregs captured in January and
February. On April 1 the local ICRC delegate said the ICRC
was "still a bit stuck on this issue" and equally uncertain
of exactly how many Tuareg prisoners are in custody or just
who is holding them. The ICRC described the question of who
was responsible for the prisoners as "complicated" due to the
apparent involvement of the DGSE (septel).

8.(C) Both Alghabass and another Tuareg contact in Bamako
speculated that Malian authorities were refusing to grant
access to the Tuareg prisoners to hide signs of abuse, and
unwilling to release them for fear of what they will reveal
about their confinement. Alghabass said the Tuareg prisoner
who died on January 15, just one day after being transferred
to Bamako, was beaten to death by the contingent of Malian
soldiers, reportedly led by Col. Abderahmane ould Meydou, who
captured him and seven other Tuaregs on January 12 in
northern Mali. Two other Malian officials have reported that
this prisoner succumbed not to illness, as previously claimed
by the Malians, but wounds inflicted after his capture (Ref.
B). No one, however, has provided evidence to support this
contention. As a result, we are currently unable to discern
the accuracy of this claim.

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Arab Militias Not Really Militias
--------------

9.(C) There has been considerable confusion over the role
and composition of ethnic Arab militias in northern Mali
since they materialized in January. Some have reported that
the militias were under the command of Malian army Col. ould
Meydou and helped oust rogue Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim
Bahanga from northern Mali in early February. Alghabass said
the Arab militias are led not by Col. ould Meydou but by DGSE
Col. Lamana, and specified that these militias never actually
engaged with Bahanga's followers. According to Alghabass, a
combination of regular army forces led by Col. ould Meydou
and Imghad Tuareg paramilitary units led by Col. Elhedj Gamou
forced Bahanga from northern Mali. Alghabass said Col. ould
Meydou's regular army units were composed primarily of ethnic
Arab and Tuareg enlisted men as opposed to newly constituted
militia members. In contrast, Alghabass described Col.
Lamana's Arab militias as nothing more than bands of Arab
smugglers and bandits now based in the northern frontier town
of In-Khalil. Col. Lamana told the Embassy he was forming
Arab militias in December 2008 (Ref. C).

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Mali and AQIM
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10.(C) Alghabass briefly acknowledged the recent arrests of
three Tuaregs allegedly implicated in the January 22
kidnapping of four European tourists. He placed much of the
blame for the current round of hostage taking by AQIM on what
he described as Mali and Algeria's unwillingness to confront
AQIM, and accused Mali of using AQIM as an excuse for
harassing local Tuareg populations. Alghabass said he
suspected there was some complicity on the part of the Malian
government which enabled AQIM to remain in northern Mali for
so long. "It wouldn't be hard," he said, "for Mali or Algeria
to fight AQIM."

11.(C) Alghabass said he tried, during the last National
Assembly session, to compel the Ministers of Defense and
Security to appear before the Assembly to answer questions
about Mali's efforts to combat AQIM but that President Toure
personally instructed Alghabass to withdraw this request.
Alghabass complied.

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Comment: Turbulence Ahead
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12.(C) Alghabass was pessimistic about the future prospects
of the Algiers Accords, at times openly conflating the
agreement with the 1991 Tamanrasset Accords - a nearly
identical never-implemented peace deal, also negotiated with
Algerian mediation. Alghabass indicated that Ibrahim
Bahanga's relocation to Libya may have improved stability
somewhat, but that there are still many Tuareg rebels in the
north ready to restart hostilities against the Malian
military. The prolonged detention of Tuareg prisoners under
unclear circumstances in Bamako may be enough to spark some
to action. Either way, the mixture of Tuareg prisoners held
incommunicado in Bamako, armed but unhappy former rebels in
the north, an expanded military presence around Kidal, newly
empowered bands of Arab traffickers, and pro-government
Tuareg paramilitary units with nothing much to do is not a
winning combination.
MILOVANOVIC