Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO141
2009-03-06 11:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

AQIM TACTICS FORCE RED CROSS TO RECONSIDER

Tags:  PHUM PTER PINS PINR ASEC ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1949
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0141/01 0651120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061120Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0105
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0586
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000141 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: PHUM PTER PINS PINR ASEC ML
SUBJECT: AQIM TACTICS FORCE RED CROSS TO RECONSIDER
PRESENCE IN NORTHERN MALI

REF: A. 08 BAMAKO 00942

B. BAMAKO 00024

C. BAMAKO 00071

D. BAMAKO 00037

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000141

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: PHUM PTER PINS PINR ASEC ML
SUBJECT: AQIM TACTICS FORCE RED CROSS TO RECONSIDER
PRESENCE IN NORTHERN MALI

REF: A. 08 BAMAKO 00942

B. BAMAKO 00024

C. BAMAKO 00071

D. BAMAKO 00037

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: On March 4, Juan Coderque, the Dakar-based
regional Director of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC),told the Ambassador that the ICRC was reviewing
its operations in north-east Mali following the recent
kidnappings of two Canadian diplomats and four European
tourists by AQIM. Coderque said he intended to ask the
Malian government to allow the ICRC to visit "Islamic
radicals" captured by Mali - a reference to the two
Mauritanian AQIM operatives captured by Malian security
forces in the northern town of Gao in 2008. One of these
prisoners is reliably reported to have died following a
February 26 vehicle accident that occurred while the Malians
were transferring the two Mauritanians from Gao to Bamako.
Coderque suggested he would argue that granting the ICRC
access to captured "Islamic radicals" could result in
improved treatment of the western hostages currently held by
AQIM. Coderque asked if the U.S. would support the ICRC's
request to visit imprisoned "Islamic extremists." The ICRC
has made moderate progress in its pursuit for approval to
visit captured Tuareg rebels. Malian officials who previously
claimed that a Tuareg rebel who died in Malian custody on
January 15 had succumbed to illness recently recanted,
telling the Embassy that the individual had been severely
beaten by Malian paramilitary members following his capture
on January 12. The ICRC was unable to shed light on the
death of this individual. The ICRC's message to the Malian
government - no security in northern Mali means no ICRC - is
unlikely to spur Malian officials to action, yet serves as
another sad example of the consequences for civilian
populations living in proximity to AQIM. End Summary.

--------------
Northern Mali May Be Too Risky for ICRC
--------------

2.(C) On March 4 visiting ICRC Regional Director Juan
Coderque told the Ambassador that the ICRC was reviewing

operations in north-eastern Mali in light of AQIM's new
strategy of capturing westerners for ransom. The ICRC
increased its presence in Mali and Niger in 2008 in response
to heightened Tuareg unrest and large numbers of civilians
displaced by fighting between Tuareg rebel groups and
government forces. In Mali, this led to the permanent
assignment of one ICRC representative in Bamako and another
representative in the northern town of Gao. Over the past
year, the ICRC has been extremely active in providing
humanitarian support to local populations displaced by
fighting in the region of Kidal and to several hundred
non-Malian migrants deported by Algerian authorities to the
northern Malian town of Tinzawaten. The ICRC has also
visited Malian soldiers held prisoner by Tuareg rebel groups
and Tuareg rebels captured by Malian forces.

3.(C) Coderque noted that security concerns have always been
an issue in northern Mali. The key concerns include chronic
banditry, Tuareg rebel movements, and AQIM. Although
banditry is a serious problem, previous incidents have been
limited to non-violent carjackings. The ICRC fell victim to
this in October 2008 when it lost two landcruisers, both
carrying the ICRC's trademark red cross emblem, to bandits
outside of Kidal (Ref. A). The vehicles' occupants, who
included the ICRC's resident representative in Bamako, Sabine
Manetta, were detained by the bandits for several hours
before being let go. They were rescued a few hours later.
The missing landcrusiers were never found.

4.(C) We briefed Coderque that since the February
disarmament of the Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and
Change, and the military defeat - at least for now - of rogue
Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim Bahanga, security on this front
has shown a marked improvement. Coderque said the recent
outbreak of peace between Tuareg rebels and the Malian
government meant the ICRC was needed in Kidal more than ever
to help displaced Tuareg civilian populations return to
normality. The threat of kidnapping by AQIM, however, is
effectively preventing the ICRC from playing this role.

5.(C) Coderque said that in light of AQIM's new strategy of
seeking to acquire and hold westerners for ransom, the ICRC
was no longer inclined to be present in northern Mali. He
acknowledged that such a decision posed a serious dilemma for

BAMAKO 00000141 002 OF 003


the ICRC, which is expected to operate in environments where
governments or other international organizations are unable
to tread. He indicated that the ICRC was looking for
innovative ways of mitigating the evident security concerns,
but seemed less than optimistic about the probability of
locating an acceptable solution. Coderque told the
Ambassador that he intended to speak very frankly about these
concerns with the Secretary General of the Malian Presidency,
Django Sissoko, and the influential Minister of Territorial
Administration, General Kafougouna Kone. Coderque said he
would pointedly inquire of the officials: "If the ICRC cannot
work in north east Mali, then who can?"

6.(C) The Ambassador noted that security within the city
limits of large towns like Gao and Kidal seemed to be
relatively manageable. Coderque agreed with this assessment
and said the ICRC has in fact recently taken to ferrying
representatives by air up to Kidal in order to avoid
traveling overland from Gao. Apart from the evident costs
involved, Coderque said the ICRC still needed to visit remote
towns like Tinzawaten and Abeibara which can only be reached
by road.

7.(C) Coderque asked if one could reliably assume, based on
AQIM's recent insistence that the two Canadian diplomats and
four European tourists were captured in Niger rather than in
Mali, that the terrorist group would refrain from kidnapping
westerners on Malian soil. We noted that the frontiers
dividing Mali from its neighbors were highly theoretical in
many places, meaning that traffickers could capture someone
in Mali and claim that the incident occurred elsewhere. We
also opined that AQIM members are not necessarily all equally
committed to the apparent "official" AQIM position that
hostages should not be captured in Mali (as distinct from
being transferred here). The Ambassador said the best way to
prevent new hostage crises was to not pay ransoms for the
release of those already in captivity.

8.(C) Coderque also asked for the Embassy's assessment of
security in Gao, where the ICRC has an official delegate,
noting that Gao was the site of several hand grenade
incidents during in early January 2009. We explained that
the city of Gao is not part of our travel warning and travel
to the town itself does not require Chief of Mission
approval. Travel to other parts of the Gao region, on the
other hand, are included in our travel restrictions.
Regarding the hand grenade incidents, we stated our belief
that these incidents were the product of internal political
rivalries which at the moment posed no threat to outsiders
and were in no way linked to AQIM (Refs. B and C).

--------------
Visiting Captured AQIM Suspects
--------------

9.(C) Coderque said the second objective of his visit to
Mali was to request permission for the ICRC to visit "Islamic
radicals" imprisoned by Malian authorities. Coderque
acknowledge that the question of captured Islamic radicals
was a delicate one, but argued that it also presented an
opportunity. Noting that the ICRC visits terrorism detainees
in Guantanamo and elsewhere, Coderque said that an ICRC visit
to captured AQIM members in Mali, and an attempt to perhaps
but those detainees in touch with family members in
Mauritania or elsewhere, could produce a reciprocal
improvement in the living conditions of the six westerners
currently held by AQIM.

10.(C) The ICRC asked if the Embassy would support a request
to visit Islamic radicals arrested by the Malian government.
The Ambassador said that the U.S. supported ICRC activities
and that visiting detainees in Mali fell within the realm of
responsibility of the ICRC. The Ambassador noted, however,
that U.S. support for the ICRC request would likely not
impact Mali's internal decision making processes. NOTE: The
two Mauritanian AQIM suspects were transferred from Gao to
Bamako on February 26. During the 14 hour drive, however,
the State Security (DGSE) vehicle transporting the prisoners
crashed, killing four DGSE officers and seriously wounding a
fifth. Two Malian newspapers have reported the accident,
minus the details of who was being transported to Bamako from
Gao and by whom. Both prisoners were injured, with one later
having succumbed to his injuries at a hospital in Bamako.
The death of this individual was reported by Radio France on
March 6. END NOTE.

--------------
Visiting Captured Tuareg Rebels
--------------

BAMAKO 00000141 003 OF 003



11.(C) The ICRC is still struggling to obtain access to all
Tuareg rebel detainees in Mali. In January the ICRC
representative in Bamako told the Embassy that the ICRC had
been unable to visit eight Tuareg rebels captured by the
Malians on January 12. One member of this group of captured
rebels died on January 15, one day after being transferred to
Bamako from Kidal. On January 28 the ICRC's Niger based
Director for the Sahel, Nicolai Panke, asked for the
Embassy's help in convincing the Malians to allow ICRC access
to captured Tuareg rebels. On February 25, the local ICRC
representative told the Embassy that the ICRC had made
moderate progress and managed to see some Tuareg prisoners in
Bamako, but said the number of Tuareg prisoners in Malian
custody remained unclear. The representative also said the
ICRC was unable to determine whether any of the prisoners it
visited were among those captured on January 12. Coderque
reiterated these concerns, stating that the ICRC had made
some progress in visiting Tuareg prisoners but that it was
unclear just how many prisoners there were and which
individuals had been captured when.

12.(C) Coderque said he had no information regarding the
January 15 death of the Tuareg rebel prisoner noted above.
On February 18 presidential insider Kader Bah told the
Embassy that the dead Tuareg prisoner had been severely
beaten by the Malian forces that captured him on January 12.
It was unclear whether those responsible were regular Malian
military units or members of para-military militias. Bah had
previously told the Embassy that the individual had been ill
and that Mali had given the body to Algeria for an
independent autopsy (Ref. D). We have heard nothing
regarding this autopsy since mid-January. On February 19
presidential advisor Acherif ag Mohamed told the Embassy that
he too believed that the captured Tuareg's death had been the
result of wounds inflicted by those responsible for his
capture on January 12. Acherif said he believed the Arab
militia led by Malian military officer, Col. Abderahmane ould
Meydou, was responsible.

--------------
Comment: No Security, No ICRC
--------------

13.(C) Since Tuareg unrest resumed in May 2006, a standard
refrain among Mali's development partners has been: no
security, no development. This has spawned a chicken and egg
type debate involving Malian officials and northern leaders
over which comes first, security or development. For the
international community, the answer is clear: security. The
disarmament of Tuareg rebels in February in Kidal and the
military defeat of rogue rebel leader Ibrahim Bahanga seemed
to indicate, for the first time in months, that things were
finally looking up in northern Mali and that security
concerns could be once again scaled back to the random
hold-up by bandits looking for 4x4 vehicles and cash. AQIM's
new strategy of paying traffickers and bandits for captured
westerners, however, has added an entirely new dimension that
trumps anything served up by Tuareg rebel groups. While the
ICRC's message to the Malian government - no security, no
ICRC - is unlikely to spark the Malians to action, it serves
as yet another example of the negative consequences that
befall civilian populations which have the misfortune of
living in proximity to AQIM.
MILOVANOVIC