(S) TUAREGS LOOKING TO ARREST KIDNAPPING SUSPECTS;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000135

SIPDIS

RABAT FOR DAVID ARCHEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR ML
SUBJECT: (S) TUAREGS LOOKING TO ARREST KIDNAPPING SUSPECTS;
SHOULD OTHERS DO THE SAME?

REF: A. BAMAKO 00106

B. BAMAKO 00052

C. BAMAKO 00063

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

1.(S) Summary: Kidal Chamber of Commerce president
Abdousalam ag Assalat and Tessalit based trafficker Merzouk
ag Acherif contacted the Embassy on February 26 to provide
further information on individuals they suspect of kidnapping
two Canadian diplomats in December in Niger and four European
tourists near the Malian town of Anderamboukane in January.
Ag Assalat and Merzouk said they each learned of Alassane
ould Mohamed's (aka "Cheibani") alleged involvement in the
Canadian case independently from different sources. Cheibani
is the primary suspect in the December 2000 murder of Defense
Department civilian employee William Bultemeier (Ref. A).
They also provided the name of the third individual suspected
of playing a role in the kidnappings of the four European
tourists - this individual was previously identified only as
"Mohamed" but is now believed to be Mahama ag Assarid, a
Chamanamas Tuareg from the Menaka area. Ag Assalat and
Merzouk said a group of Kidal Tuaregs was working on a plan
to capture several of the Malian traffickers so far linked to
the kidnappings. It was unclear whether Tuaregs were
coordinating on this scheme with Malian authorities. Ag
Assalat and Merzouk claimed that negotiations for the
Canadian diplomats were progressing but warned that "many
more hostages will be taken" if the Canadians or Europeans
delivered a ransom payment to AQIM. Merzouk also said AQIM
had a long standing policy to unleash suicide attacks against
Malian and western interests in Mali if the Malians or others
took military action against AQIM positions in northern Mali.
We briefly discussed the arrest of a foreign Islamic
preacher in Anderamboukane and the still unknown whereabouts
of Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim Bahanga.

2.(S) Summary Continued: Tuareg plans to perform what
seemingly resembles a northern Malian citizen's arrest raises
questions about why others have not formally asked Mali to
arrest those suspected of being involved in the Canadian and
European kidnappings. Prior to news of Chiebani's alleged
involvement, this remained a Canadian and European decision.
On March 3 British officials here in Bamako told the Embassy
that they had not previously considered asking Mali to arrest
those allegedly involved in the European kidnappings, but
indicated that the British team would begin discussing this
now. On With Cheibani back on our radar screen, it is now
something we should consider as well. On March 2 the Malian
Minister of Justice told the Ambassador that if the U.S. had
information regarding Cheibani's whereabouts, Mali would act
rapidly to bring him back into custody. End Summary.

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Canadian Kidnapping Suspects
--------------

3.(S) The Embassy met with Abdousalam ag Assalat and Merzouk
ag Acherif on February 26 in Bamako. Ag Assalat was in
Bamako for meetings with the Malian Chamber of Commerce.
Merzouk is a well-known "economic operator" and probable
smuggler who was linked to some attacks on Malian military
forces near Tessalit in 2007. He apparently tagged along
with ag Assalat from Tessalit to visit family members in the
Malian capitol. The fact that Merzouk is in Bamako at all,
circulating freely, is notable and suggests that he may have
some meetings with Malian officials of which we are unaware.

4.(S) As often occurs during meetings with Tuaregs from
Kidal, both ag Assalat and Merzouk juggled several GSM and
satellite telephones during the course of our discussion. Ag
Assalat and Merzouk told the Embassy they learned of
Cheibani's alleged involvement in the December 2008
kidnappings of the Canadian diplomats independently from
different sources. Ag Assalat said he learned of Cheibani's
role from a Malian Arab contact living in Menaka. He did not
share the name of this individual. Merzouk said he first
heard of Cheibani's involvement directly from Asultan ould
Badi, a half-Arab half-Tuareg Malian AQIM facilitator. Both

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ag Assalat and Merzouk said they knew of a third individual,
whom they described simply as a "cousin", who had heard of
Cheibani's involvement from yet another source. Asultan ould
Badi has also been linked to the Canadian kidnappings. Ag
Assalat said he was convinced that Asultan was involved due,
in large part, to recent behavior ag Assalat described as
unusual. This includes Asultan's systematic changing of
telephone numbers and what ag Assalat described as a
concerted effort to lie low.

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European Kidnapping Suspects
--------------

5.(S) In the days following the January 22 kidnappings of
four European tourists near the Malian town of
Anderamboukane, Tuaregs relayed the names of three Tuareg
traffickers reportedly seen with the Europeans at a well on
January 23. These included Inteweka ag Ahmayed (aka
Ousmane),Tibla ag Tinfane, and an individual known only as
Mohamed (Refs. B and C). On February 26 Merzouk said the
third individual was actually named Mahama ag Assarid and is
a Chamanamas Tuareg trafficker from the Menaka area. Ag
Assalat added that ag Assarid had called an associate in
Bamako just days after the Europeans' kidnapping to order an
unusual quantity of weapons. Ag Assarid reportedly justified
the request by stating that he was expecting to receive a
large amount of money over the next few days.

--------------
A Tuareg Citizens' Arrest?
--------------

6.(S) Merzouk and ag Assalat said several Kidal based
Tuaregs were in the process of hatching a plan to arrest
Asultan ould Badi, the Tamanrasset based Inteweka ag Ahmayed,
and perhaps Asultan's brother Man. It was not clear whether
this plan also involved the capture of Tibla ag Tinfane,
Cheibani, and ag Assarid. Neither Merzouk nor ag Assalat
were comfortable providing details, although the plan seemed
closer to a sting operation than a raid. Merzouk and ag
Assalat were also vague on whether this plan entailed the
involvement of Malian officials.

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AQIM Negotiations and Threats
--------------

7.(S) Merzouk and ag Assalat said they believed negotiations
for the release of the two Canadian diplomats were
progressing rapidly through two intermediaries: National
Assembly Deputy Ibrahim ag Mohamed Assalah and Almoustrat
Mayor Baba ould Chouakh (or ould Shaykh). Ag Assalat said he
believed negotiations could be concluded shortly - a
perspective which may be somewhat overly optimistic in light
of conversations with our Canadian colleagues, although on
March 2 one Canadian described the liberation effort as
entering the "end game" phase. Merzouk and ag Assalat said
they had been approached by an unnamed individual - the same
person who was providing updates on ag Assalah and ould
Shaykh's dealings - to ask whether they would be interested
in serving as an impartial go between for the European
hostages. Merzouk and ag Assalat said they declined this
offer as they preferred not to be involved in anything
involving AQIM. Both warned that any ransom payment, by
either the Canadians or the Europeans, would spark a whole
new wave of kidnappings orchestrated by Tuareg and Arab
traffickers looking to turn a quick profit.

8.(S) Using ag Assalat to translate from Tamachek into
French, Merzouk also discussed what he described as a
long-standing AQIM plan to unleash suicide attackers -
translated by ag Assalat as "kamikazes" - to hit Malian and
Western interests, including American interests, in Bamako
and elsewhere within Mali were Mali or any other nation to
attack AQIM's camps in northern Mali. Ag Assalat said that
AQIM's firepower was actually quite limited but that no one,
specifically Mali, Algeria or the U.S., was concerned enough
to commit the forces needed to remove AQIM from Malian soil.
Merzouk said that local Tuaregs could do this if they were

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only better organized and equipped.

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Arrested Islamic Preacher
--------------

9.(C) On February 24 local media reported the arrest of an
Islamic preacher around Anderamboukane. Ag Assalat and
Merzouk said the individual was of Asian origin, but not
Pakistani, and that he was known for inciting violence and
preaching militant Islam. Ag Assalat wondered if the
individual had been transported to Bamako. Both said they did
not believe the individual had any connection to the Canadian
and European kidnappings.

--------------
Anyone Seen Bahanga?
--------------

10.(C) Ag Assalat and Merzouk both said the Tuareg rebellion
was over, for now, and that the disarmament of various Tuareg
rebel factions was indeed sincere. Merzouk said he could not
confirm Bahanga's whereabouts, that Bahanga may be in Libya
as reported by French media outlets, or he could be in Niger,
or Chad, or still someplace in northern Mali. Ag Assalat
said Bahanga was still traveling around with a few of his
most trusted lieutenants.

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Comment: Better Late Than Never?
--------------

11.(S) In reviewing the files from the Bultemeier murder
case, it is clear that Malian security forces have the
ability to act quickly and effectively when so inclined.
According to the US Diplomatic Security investigation report
on the Bultemeier murder, the Nigerien government sent a
general alert regarding Mr. Bultemeier's stolen vehicle to
roadway checkpoints within 25 minutes of the shooting,
enabling Republican Guard members in the northern Nigerien
town of Tillaberi to give chase, albeit briefly, to the
perpetrators and the stolen car. Border posts on the Malian
side of the frontier were notified within 3 hours of the
shooting, in time to stop the stolen vehicle had the
assailants stuck to established roads. Later that same day,
Nigerien gendarmes identified vehicle tracks near Ayorou,
just south of the Malian border. This find enabled Nigerien
and Malian security forces to effectively retrace the
assailants' path into Mali by working with locals who
observed the passing vehicle. According to the DS report,
coordination with Nigerien and Malian officials ranged from
the presidencies in Niamey and Bamako down to local camel
herders. Malian authorities followed Mr. Bultemeier's vehicle
as it was sold and resold from Gao to Timbuktu. Names of the
alleged assailants, including Cheibani, were provided by
Nigerien officials, who passed them to the U.S, which in turn
passed them to the Malians. Close coordination between U.S.,
Nigerien, and Malian officials at multiple levels enabled
Mali to arrest Cheibani and others on December 27, 2000, four
days after Mr. Bultemeier's murder.

12.(S) In addition to providing a successful model for
inter-government cooperation on a security issue in the
Sahel, the Bultemeier files also offer an interesting point
of comparison when one considers the evident lack of any
mobilization, at least on the Malian side, following the
December 2008 and January 2009 disappearances of the Canadian
diplomats and European tourists. While an attempt to arrest
those suspected of being involved in the Canadian and
European kidnappings will do little to help the individuals
now in the hands of AQIM, it could have other important
benefits. The successful apprehension of kidnapping suspects
will send a clear message to other would-be kidnappers that
capturing westerners and selling them off to AQIM for cash is
not as easy as its seems and could prove hazardous to one's
long term well-being. Ag Assalat and Merzouk's warning of
copy cat kidnappers is serious as there are currently few
evident disincentives - beyond the moral ones to which
individuals who fall into this category are not bound - for
those contemplating the capture of more westerners for

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resale. Capturing some of those suspected of orchestrating
the Canadian and European kidnappings may lead some potential
copy cat kidnappers to think twice. On March 3 we asked
British representatives currently in Bamako if the U.K. had
any plans to request the arrest of those suspected of being
involved in the European kidnappings. The British stated
that this idea had not previously occurred to them but that
it was something they would now discuss, particularly in
light of the potential disincentives it could have for future
kidnappers.

13.(S) Given the potential involvement of at least one
individual - Cheibani - in the Canadian case, it could also
provide a means for restarting the Bultemeier murder inquiry
which has been stalled since Cheibani escaped from Malian
custody in April 2002. On March 2 Minister of Justice
Maharafa Traore told the Ambassador that the Bultemeier case
remained open, and the warrant for Cheibani's arrest valid.
Minister Traore added that if the Embassy had any clues
regarding Cheibani's current whereabouts and could let the
Malians know, Mali would move to capture Cheibani
immediately. Presumably this also holds for other persons of
interest who have been implicated in the Canadian and
European kidnappings.
MILOVANOVIC