TALKS BETWEEN MALI AND TUAREG REBELS BREAK DOWN IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000012

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PINS ASEC ML
SUBJECT: TALKS BETWEEN MALI AND TUAREG REBELS BREAK DOWN IN
KIDAL

REF: A. BAMAKO 00003

B. 08 BAMAKO 00932

C. 08 BAMAKO 00968

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: Three days of Algerian brokered talks
between the Malian government and Tuareg rebel Alliance for
Democracy and Change (ADC) stalled on January 7 when the two
sides failed to agree on whether ADC fighters should disarm
before returning to their barracks in Kidal, or after. The
failure was particularly remarkable given that the ADC's
return to Kidal has been in the works for months and the
meeting between Malian and ADC leaders in Kidal was
originally promoted as a one-day, largely ceremonial symbol
of support for the Algiers Accords. Instead, Mali, Algeria,
and the ADC dealt a serious blow to the Accords framework and
likely strengthened the man the meeting was supposed to
isolate: dissident Tuareg rebel Ibrahim Bahanga. With
Bahanga's forces prowling along the outskirts of Kidal and
feelings of disillusionment - or worse - coursing through the
ADC, this latest failure has the potential to trigger a new
round of rebel attacks. On January 8 National Assembly
Deputy and ADC leader Alghabass ag Intallah told the Embassy
he had already spoken directly with President Amadou Toumani
Toure and received assurances that Mali was working to
resolve the impasse and reschedule the ADC's return to Kidal.
End Summary.

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A Failure to Communicate Leaves Accords in Doubt
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2.(C) A January 5 ceremony to welcome the ADC back to the
town of Kidal turned into three days of failed negotiations
between the Malian government and the Tuareg rebel ADC.
After several false starts in Bamako, Mali's Minister of
Territorial Administration, General Kafougouna Kone, and
Chief of Defense, General Gabriel Poudiougou, finally flew to
Kidal on the morning of January 5 aboard an Algerian aircraft
along with ADC leader Iyad ag Ghali and Algeria's Ambassador
to Mali (Ref. A). The Malian delegation and Algerian
mediator, however, found themselves embroiled in controversy
from the moment they touched down in Kidal due to a dispute
over whether the ADC should disarm before entering the city
or after settling into barracks within the city limits.

3.(C) The ADC left Kidal en masse in April 2008 following
the still unsolved April 11 executions of two fellow Tuareg
rebels. Its return to both Kidal and the Algiers Accords
framework has been in the works since mid-November 2008 (Ref.
B),if not earlier, and accelerated following Bahanga's
late-December foray into Mali's central region of Segou (Ref.
C). This renders the apparent confusion over the status of
ADC weaponry that much more remarkable as it genuinely
appears that no one noted the differences of opinion over
disarmament until the day of the actual return ceremony.

4.(C) As news of the impasse spread on January 5, an
estimated 300 ADC members who had been camped on the
outskirts of Kidal waiting for permission to enter the city
folded their tents and returned to the ADC's mountain
hide-out of Tegharghar. On January 6 the Algerian Ambassador
and several senior ADC leaders traveled to Tegharghar in a
last-ditch attempt to work out a compromise but returned to
Kidal empty handed. Minister Kone, General Poudiougou, the
Algerian Ambassador, and Iyad ag Ghali returned to Bamako on
January 7. A Malian military source told the DATT that
Minister Kone had been recalled due to concerns of a possible
attack on Kidal by Tuareg rebel Ibrahim Bahanga, who is
believed to be within 20 KM of the city. A Malian government
official close to Minister Kone said the delegation was
forced to return because Algeria wanted its aircraft back.

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Let the Blame Begin
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5.(U) In Bamako, the tone of even the more measured local
newspapers was noticeably sharper on January 8, often
equating the ADC with Bahanga. "For the nth time," wrote the
L'Independant, "Kidal's armed bandits have broken their word
to Malian authorities. Once again, they have just revealed
their bad faith. One more time, they have confirmed that
they are not trustworthy. . . President Toure must act as the
people hope he will. He needs to act to honor the army, to
avoid supreme humiliation. . .The only language the armed
bandits of Kidal understand is force. Go ahead, Mr.

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President. The people are with you in this fight." And from
another newspaper, Le Malien: "Today more than ever, we know
that they want neither peace nor the development of Kidal.
They proved it on Monday afternoon (January 5),by refusing
to accept the regular procedures for the return of a rebel or
ex-rebel." Another article in Le Malien accused "western
secret services, especially the French" of supporting
Bahanga's Paris-based father-in-law Hama ag Sid'Ahmed.
"While countries like Libya and Algeria encourage the peace
process," wrote Le Malien, "it's the West that is sowing
disorder."

6.(C) The Malian government, the Algerian mediators and some
ADC leaders have tried to put a positive spin on what appears
to be a major setback for the Algiers Accords process. Local
and international press outlets have quoted various, mostly
unnamed, officials as stating that the Accords steering
committee continues to work toward the ADC's "immediate"
return to Kidal and that both Mali and the ADC remain
committed to a peaceful, negotiated resolution. Privately,
however, Malian officials have questioned the ADC's
commitment to peace. On January 7 a Malian government source
told the Embassy that Mali thought ADC members had agreed to
disarm prior to entering Kidal but that the ADC experienced a
change of heart after forces aligned with dissident Tuareg
rebel Ibrahim Bahanga materialized not far from Kidal.
Bahanga's presence may have also altered Malian calculations,
leading Mali to wonder if it would effectively be placing its
own army between Bahanga on one side and ADC rebels on the
other were it to let an armed ADC enter Kidal.

7.(C) A Tuareg source provided a different account, stating
that no discussion of disarming outside of Kidal ever took
place and that the Malian government had moved the proverbial
goal posts by demanding that the ADC disarm before entering
Kidal. The same source noted that the last time Tuareg
rebels returned to barracks in Kidal - on March 9, 2007, in
advance of the 2007 Kidal Forum - disarmament did not occur
until two days later, on March 11. The ADC was also
apparently unsettled by the number of Malian military patrols
around Kidal during the first week of January. It is unclear
whether ADC members expected disarmament to occur within days
after their return to Kidal as it did in March 2007, or
whether the ADC intended to hold on to its weaponry until
rebels were reintegrated into existing Malian army units or
newly created mixed ones.

8.(C) On January 8 National Assembly Deputy and newly
emergent ADC leader Alghabass ag Intallah told the Embassy
that he had telephoned President Toure directly from Kidal
following Minister Kone's departure. According to ag
Intallah, President Toure attributed the flap over
disarmament to a miscommunication and asked ag Intallah to
inform the ADC's rank and file that Mali remained committed
to the Accords and was working to resolve the situation as
quickly as possible. Ag Intallah indicated that he
personally believed the confusion over the ADC's weaponry was
the product of an internal dispute within the Malian military
over whether to allow armed Tuaregs back into Kidal. Ag
Intallah, ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi, and Kidal Regional
Assembly president Intahmadou ag Albachir left Kidal shortly
after speaking with the Embassy to meet with the rest of the
ADC in Tegharghar.

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Comment: One Step Closer to Rebellion
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9.(C) The January 5 ceremony was intended as an unequivocal
statement of Mali and the ADC's support for peace and the
Algiers Accords. Had the ADC's return to Kidal proceeded as
planned, it would have helped re-establish the ADC's role as
the legitimate representative of Tuareg rebels, re-asserted
the ADC's commitment to a peaceful settlement, and further
isolated Bahanga. Instead, Mali, Algeria, and the ADC's
joint failure conveyed the exact opposition message, with
Mali questioning the ADC's commitment to peace and the ADC
accusing Mali of once again moving the goal posts at the last
moment. Given the stakes and the amount of time that went
into planning this meeting, it is difficult to fathom how
participants could have simply overlooked the question of ADC
disarmament. The upshot is that by refusing to let the ADC
enter Kidal, Mali may have just pushed the ADC closer to
Bahanga. Meanwhile, by refusing to lay down their arms just
a few kilometers outside of Kidal and enter the city, the ADC
just blurred the lines between Tuareg rebels who remain
dedicated to seeking peace, and those who do not. The
apparent winner, unfortunately, is the one person who refused
to participate at all: Ibrahim Bahanga.

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