Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU818
2009-10-15 07:08:00
SECRET
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

TEHRAN-BAKU TENSIONS HEAT UP

Tags:  PREL PTER SNAR ECON AJ IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0373
RR RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKB #0818/01 2880708
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 150708Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1890
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0073
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0167
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000818 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019
TAGS: PREL, PTER, SNAR, ECON, AJ, IR
SUBJECT: TEHRAN-BAKU TENSIONS HEAT UP

REF: A. BAKU 806
B. BAKU 139
C. BAKU 132
D. 2008 BAKU 1018
E. BAKU 175
F. BAKU 439
G. BAKU 282

Classified By: POLECON CHIEF ROB GARVERICK, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary
--------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000818

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019
TAGS: PREL, PTER, SNAR, ECON, AJ, IR
SUBJECT: TEHRAN-BAKU TENSIONS HEAT UP

REF: A. BAKU 806
B. BAKU 139
C. BAKU 132
D. 2008 BAKU 1018
E. BAKU 175
F. BAKU 439
G. BAKU 282

Classified By: POLECON CHIEF ROB GARVERICK, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary
--------------

1. (S) Azerbaijan's arms-length, frozen-smile political
relationship with Iran has combines firmness on issues of
sovereignty, avoidance of public confrontations, and
reluctance to engage Iran directly on certain "international"
(and some bilateral) issues. While concerned and even
alarmed about these issues, the GOAJ is reluctant to engage
Iran on its nuclear program, support for terrorism, Middle
East troublemaking, etc., because it sees the exercise as
pointless ("they don't care what we think"),and perhaps
leading to further strains in the bilateral relationship,
with potentially nasty repercussions. Azerbaijan's long
standing foreign policy is to maintain balanced and cordial
regional relations, not choosing sides or creating waves
among neighbors.

2. (S) The GOAJ is basically fatalistic about broader
international issues involving Iran, and looks to the West
and Russia to deal with them. It is more assertive with Iran
on bilateral issues, but even there its tendency is to
respond to all but the most egregious perceived pressures
quietly, and without public confrontation. Nonetheless, the
GOAJ acts forcefully when it feels necessary, e.g., in
rolling up massive Iranian influence-building networks in the
1990's, resisting Iranian pressure over its relations with
Israel, and intermittent highly publicized crackdowns on
purportedly "Iran-directed" gangs and plots. This cable
outlines recent bilateral flare-ups in the context of
submerged bilateral tension (Caspian delimitation and energy
aspects are discussed separately, see ref a). End Summary.

GOAJ-Iran October Shocks
--------------

3. (C) Bilateral GOAJ-Iran tensions, never far from the
surface, flared anew in early October 2009, after a series of
unusually harsh attacks on the GOAJ by pro-regime Iranian
media. The attacks appeared immediately after public claims
by the GOAJ that a recently-convicted group of terrorists
were working for Iran, and international speculation ab
out
possible future USG use (with Russia) of the Qabala radar
station to monitor Iran. The spat arose in the aftermath of
increasing Azerbaijani cooperation with Israel, reflected in
the Spring 2009 visit to Baku of Israeli President Peres, and
rumored weapons deals. The Iranian media attacks, which
included claims that the GOAJ is working to break up Iran,
depiction of the Azerbaijani flag upside down and with a star
of David in the center, resulted in a strong GOAJ diplomatic
protest. Whether these incidents signify a new chapter in
relations, or just another passing storm, remains to be seen.


Background
--------------

4. (SBU) Iran made a major economic and political
influence-building effort in Azerbaijan in the early 1990's.
These included subsidizing a pro-Iranian Islamist movement,
active pro-Iran proselytizing by Iranian religious bodies and
NGO fronts, and similar aggressive outreach activities (ref
c). Most Iranian NGOs were expelled and Iranian networks
mopped up in the 1990's by former President Heidar Aliyev,
and Tehran now pursues a lower-profile, longer-term influence
building strategy targeting rural notables and Shiite
villages (see paragraph #). Since the late 1990's bilateral
relations have generally gravitated between mildly surly to
smilingly correct (which is basically the current state).
Azerbaijan's relatively cool, arms-length posture towards
Iran contrasts with its much closer relations with Russia and

BAKU 00000818 002 OF 004


(at least until very recently) Turkey, with whom it
frequently exchanges high-level official visits.

5. (C) Following the return to power of Haidar Aliyev in the
early 1990's, the GOAJ and pro-government media dropped all
previous Pan-Azeri and Pan-Turkish rhetoric. In public, the
GOAJ has virtually ignored the recent domestic turmoil in
Iran and quickly recognized the election of Ahmedinejad to a
new term, and congratulated him. GOAJ comments and criticism
have been limited In private, in Baku to private
conversations, spoken to Embassy personnel and official
visitors at MFA meetings.

6. (C) Despite some recent Iranian media claims, the GOAJ
displays little interest in Iranian Azerbaijani cultural
aspirations and issues (although these are still covered by
Baku opposition media). However, Azerbaijan currently
provides refuge to a small number of largely inactive Iranian
regime opponents, including monarchists and
Iranian-Azerbaijani pan-Turks, autonomists, and separatists
(far more ethnic Azeris live in Iran than Azerbaijan). While
allowing these individuals residency, the GOAJ does not
tolerate overt anti-Iranian activities by them. In addition,
about 2,000 Iranian students are currently studying in Baku,
most from Iranian Azerbaijan. Unlike students in Armenia and
many other countries, these students are not entitled to GOI
loans or subsidies, and some reportedly experience
considerable harassment and red tape when they return to
Iran. Many Iranian students come from well heeled
regime-connected families. Ability to study in the Azeri
language, freer life style, and relatively easy cash-based
admissions policies at many Azerbaijani universities are
cited by Iranian students as key reasons for studying here.

Iran's Influence-Building Efforts...
--------------

7. (S) Iranian influence-building activities inside
Azerbaijan rest on a tripod of "social engagement"
organizations, including an "Iran Assistance Society" that
networks with rural notables and grants micro-loans to their
nominees; the Baku-based Iranian Culture House and its
affiliates, which proselytize and build clerical networks;
and the Iranian Red Crescent society, based in "Iranian
Clinics" in Baku and elsewhere. Important satellite
institutions, such as charitable foundations administered by
Iranians with Revolutionary Guard ties and Iranian-funded
mosques (one led by a son-in-law of the late hard-line head
of the Council of Experts, Ayatollah Meshkini),exist as de
facto sub-sets under these three categories (see refs (b) and
(c) for details).

8. (S) Iranian government and semi-official foundations
(some of which operate businesses in Azerbaijan) provide
material support to some FARSI language schools, and offers
selected village and lower-income Azerbaijani children with
all-expenses paid Iran study scholarships (some reportedly
including stipends for their families),and organize free
pilgrimages to Mashad. Several Iranians with allegedly close
ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Iranian
Intelligence, and/or other regime organizations also run
businesses or maintain investments here (see ref (e) and
septels on Iranian business activities and actors).

...And Propaganda Broadcasts
--------------

9. (C) In addition to these efforts, a nominally private,
pro-regime Iranian television station tied to the
Revolutionary Guard continues to make propagandistic Azeri
language TV broadcasts into the south of Azerbaijan. The
programs include a widely watched Azeri language current
events show that includes gossip and stories embarrassing to
the GOAJ, and often challenges the secular policies of the
government. What to do about these broadcasts is a matter of
debate within the GOAJ: the Ministry of Telecommunications
and other GOAJ elements downplay the issue, while security
personnel reportedly believe that some tangible counteraction
is necessary. Despite grumbling and periodically rumored
GOAJ acquisition of blocking equipment, the Iranian
broadcasts continue. Iran also allegedly uses financial

BAKU 00000818 003 OF 004


inducements to attract/corrupt key GOAJ officials and other
influential Azerbaijanis, and this may be a compounding
factor (ref d).

Baku Visit of President Peres
--------------

10. (SBU) The GOAJ and Azerbaijani political figures and
organizations from across the spectrum expressed deep
resentment over heavy-handed Iranian government efforts to
force the GOAJ to rescind its April, 2009 invitation to
Israeli President Peres to visit Baku (ref (e)). Public anger
was focused on a strong public condemnation of the GOAJ
invitation and implied threats by the Iranian Army Chief of
Staff, which was widely reported in the Iranian and local
press. The Iranian general's implicit threats were followed
by a furious series of demarches, during which the Iranian
Ambassador reportedly threatened the GOAJ with "very, very
grave consequences" if the invitation was not rescinded.

11. (S) In the end, the visit went forward smoothly, and
some modest cooperation agreements were signed. The strong
Iranian reaction may have mitigated against a decision to
open an Azerbaijani Embassy in Tel Aviv (an action long
sought by the Israelis),but has not otherwise deterred
warming Israeli-Azerbaijan relations. In a new development
likely to anger Iran, an Israeli firm known for manufacturing
aircraft drones opened a Baku branch on October 6, amidst
speculation that joint Azerbaijan-Israeli drone production is
planned.

Harsh Iranian Press Attacks
--------------

12. (C) In early October 2009, after a closed trial, an
Azerbaijani court sentenced the group of alleged terrorists
arrested the previous spring, and supposedly connected to
Lebanese Hezbollah plot to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Baku
AND the Qabala radar station in northern Azerbaijan. (FYI:
This was the first time the radar station (and not just the
Embassy) had been publicly named as an intended target of the
gang. The Qabala radar station is currently being used by
Russia to monitor the greater Middle East and Indian Ocean
region, and has been raised by Russia for consideration by
the USG or others as a possible missile defense post. End
FYI). In a public statement the state prosecutor repeated
earlier claims that the entire plot was an operation of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

13. (C) In another development likely to anger Iran, on
October 4 an Israeli military equipment company opened a
branch office in Baku, amidst speculation that joint
Azerbaijani-Israeli aircraft drone production may soon begin.
The opening occurred in the midst of a spate of recent harsh
Iranian press attacks on Azerbaijan, including claims by an
Iranian Press TV journalist that the GOAJ wants to annex
Iranian Azerbaijan, and a depiction by Iranian Sahar TV
(nominally private) of the Azerbaijani flag upside down, and
emblazoned with a star of David.

...Evokes GOAJ Protest
--------------

14. (C) The Iranian media attacks led to a highly unusual
publicized protest by the GOAJ to the Iranian Ambassador and
Foreign Ministry on October 7, in which the GOAJ complained
about "the insulting of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani flag."
Comment: The long term significance of the Iranian press
offensive against the GOAJ remains unclear. The recent press
attacks have not yet been echoed by Iranian officials, and it
remains to be seen if these tensions over Israel and other
issues will be papered over by the two sides, or mark the
beginnings of increased tension in relations, in which
Iranian sensitivity over possible USG-Russian use of the
Qabala radar station, and increased GOAJ cooperation with
Israel, are new elements. End Comment.

GOAJ Accusations on Heroin Smuggling
--------------

15. (S) Though relatively unpublicized compared to the above

BAKU 00000818 004 OF 004


issues, GOAJ concern over the skyrocketing of
Iranian-processed heroin and other narcotics in Azerbaijan is
also a potential source of tension. Several senior GOAJ
officials have even privately accused the Iranian government
and/or security services of deliberately "flooding"
Azerbaijan with narcotics in order to undermine its
stability. During a meeting with Ambassador (ref g),Deputy
Foreign Minister Khalafov also asserted that:

-- The Iranian government has repeatedly released convicted
Iranian drug smugglers handed over by the GOAJ under the
terms of a treaty allowing respective nationals to serve out
their terms in their home nation's jails: "in several cases
we have even caught again Iranian drug smugglers that we had
previously handed over to them."

-- Senior Afghan government authorities have told the GOAJ
that Iranian security forces are actively collaborating with
selected groups of Afghan drug smugglers;

-- Interrogations of Iranian smugglers arrested in
Azerbaijan over the past year have elicited claims of active
Iranian security personnel collaboration in transit traffic
and in the operation of heroin processing laboratories in
Tabriz and elsewhere in Iran.

Comment
--------------

16. (S) GOAJ leaders, from President Aliyev on down, have
made it very clear that they consider Iran a major source of
potential instability, and are deeply concerned by its
nuclear program, promotion of terrorism, and similar issues.
At the same time, the GOAJ is highly cognizant of the fact
that Azerbaijan is a small and vulnerable player in a very
tough neighborhood. For this reason, the GOAJ is highly risk
averse when it comes to confrontations with neighbors, even
on many bilateral issues. As a practical matter, this
translates into a desire to stay out of the picture on many
sensitive multilateral issues, while privately encouraging
others to do the heavy lifting. Although the longer
implications of the latest bilateral contretemps with Iran
are unclear, its likely impact in the short term will be to
reinforce this attitude. End Comment.


LU