Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU782
2009-09-30 13:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Tags:  ENRG PGOV PREL ARM TU AJ 
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FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1819
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3561
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000782 

SIPDIS

DEPT PASS TO DEPT OF ENERGY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2020
TAGS: ENRG PGOV PREL ARM TU AJ
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN'S VISIT TO BAKU, OCTOBER 4-5, 2009

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Don Lu for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000782

SIPDIS

DEPT PASS TO DEPT OF ENERGY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2020
TAGS: ENRG PGOV PREL ARM TU AJ
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DEPUTY SECRETARY PONEMAN'S VISIT TO BAKU, OCTOBER 4-5, 2009

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Don Lu for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Your visit to Baku comes on the heels of
successful visits by Department of State Deputy Secretary
Steinberg and U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Issues
Morningstar. The mood here remains skeptical about the new
U.S. Administration, fed by perceptions that the U.S. is
promoting Turkey-Armenia reconciliation without proper
attention to a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)
conflict. Moreover, Baku has loudly and repeatedly complained
that the rapprochement process potentially weakens
Azerbaijan's position in negotiations with Armenia, and
resists calls for de-linkage. At the same time, President
Aliyev has asked for help with repealing Section 907, sales
of military equipment and greater U.S. engagement on
Nagorno-Karabakh. The country is maintaining macroeconomic
and social stability in the face of the global financial
crisis, but has taken insufficient steps to reform its
economy and root out corruption to ensure longer term
sustainability. Nearly one million barrels of oil per day
move through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Democracy and
human rights remain problematic areas in the bilateral
relationship. End Summary.

Strategic Interests and Orientation
--------------


2. (C) Azerbaijan's strategic direction is deeply affected
by its physical security environment. Sandwiched between
Russia and Iran, and with the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict tying down 70 percent of its ground forces along the
Line of Contact, Azerbaijan recognizes the need for strong
allies. The August 2008 conflict in Georgia deepened
Azerbaijan's sense of insecurity, and caused the GOAJ to
re-examine Azerbaijan's strategic orientation. In the face of
increasing Russian pressure, and with nervousness about
Iran's intentions in the South, the GOAJ has asked the U.S.
for significantly greater tangible support, particularly in
terms of security cooperation. Azerbaijan,s strategic
priorities and relations with Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, Armenia and other nations in the region continues

to drive its energy agenda in a manner not always aligned
with its purely commercial interests.

Energy
--------------


3. (SBU) Azerbaijan's massive oil and gas reserves and
strategic location place the country at the epicenter of
Eurasia energy policy. This was highlighted June 2-5 with
the Baku's Caspian Oil and Gas Show and again on September 15
at the Celebration for 15th Anniversary of the Signing of the
"Contract of the Century", which reopened the Azeri, Chirag,
and Guneshli fields (ACG) to western energy companies for the
first time since the 1920s. As both a producing and a
transit country, Azerbaijan is critical to the development of
a Southern Corridor to transport Caspian hydrocarbons,
including Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas, to European and world
markets.

Energy Snapshot
--------------


4. (SBU) Azerbaijan currently exports about one million
barrels of oil per day through two non-Russian pipelines to
European markets -- Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Supsa
(Georgia/Black Sea)-- in addition to the Baku-Novorossiysk
(Russia/Black Sea) pipeline. It also produces natural gas
for export to Turkey and Georgia. As a producing and transit
country, Azerbaijan is critical to the development of a
Southern Corridor to transport Caspian hydrocarbons,
including Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas, to European and world
markets. BP is the operator for both the ACG oil fields
(through the Azerbaijan International Operating Company
(AIOC) Consortium) and the BTC Pipeline, and remains the
dominant player among the international oil companies (IOC)
in Azerbaijan. President Aliyev has stated that the Shah
Deniz Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) will be extended for
five years, but lacking a signed contract, BP has pushed back
to 2016 the likely operations start date for Shah Deniz,s
second phase. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is showing some evidence
of interest in courting new IOCs by granting an oil
exploration concession for the Absheron field to French
energy giant Total. On the transit front, IOCs are urging

BAKU 00000782 002 OF 004


Azerbaijan to conclude agreements with Kazakhstan to allow
oil to flow by tanker to BTC from the mammoth North Caspian
Kashagan field as part of the Kazakh Azerbaijan Caspian
Transport System (KACTS),which should come on line in 2013.

Political Impediments to Gas Transit
--------------


5. (C) Azerbaijan and President Aliyev recognize the
strategic imperative for Azerbaijan to market its gas via the
Southern Corridor. Nonetheless, disagreements between Turkey
and Azerbaijan over the price of Azerbaijani gas being sold
to Turkey and transit terms for future gas transit have been
major obstacles to the realization of a "Southern Corridor"
of energy exports. SOCAR representatives charge that
Turkey,s BOTAS is dragging out the transit negotiations in a
bid to force Azerbaijan to accept higher transit fees.
Azerbaijan remains frustrated with Turkey's efforts to
promote reconciliation with Armenia, and Baku's recent
decision to forge a deal with Moscow on gas sales to GazProm
is a result of this.


6. (C) Azerbaijan has lost some of its faith in the future
of "Southern Corridor" transit since the Nabucco
inter-governmental agreement was signed in Turkey on July 13.
In an August 27 meeting with SE Morningstar, President
Aliyev, referred to recent talks with the Turks as a failure
and lamented a loss of momentum in negotiations on transit
and gas pricing. Additionally, it remains unclear that
Turkmenistan is prepared to commit gas volumes much needed by
the Nabucco project, and Turkmenistan President
Berdimuhammedov,s July declaration to seek arbitration on a
Turkmen claim to the ACG field could present a further
impediment. Finally, prospects for utilizing Iraqi gas for
Nabucco remain in doubt due to continued disagreements
between the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan
Regional government. Many industry observers and some in
SOCAR,s leadership believe that focusing on the Italy Turkey
Greece Interconnector (ITGI) project is a more realistic
option for Azerbaijan at this stage.

Renewable Energy
--------------


7. (SBU) The government of Azerbaijan appears to be
demonstrating modest interest in renewable and alternative
energy. Since 2001, the government has had a small task
force on the issue. In July, President Aliyev ordered the
creation for a State Agency for Alternative and Renewable
Energy. To date, no concrete steps have occurred, and these
issues remain the purview of Minister of Energy and Industry
Natiq Aliyev. Azerbaijan recently became the 93rd member of
the International Agency for Alternative Energy, and Minister
Aliyev recently announced the creation of pilot projects for
renewable energy, primarily focused in rural areas. The
government has announced plans to build several small
hydroelectric plants, and has a burgeoning wind farm on the
Absheron Peninsula.

Economy Still Strong
--------------


8. (SBU) The business climate, particularly outside the oil
sector, is challenging. Corruption and institutionalized
monopolies remain serious roadblocks to further investment.
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (as
well as anecdotal evidence from American business contacts in
Baku) confirms that Azerbaijan still has a long way to go in
stamping out corruption. The WTO accession process could
help bring about the legislative and regulatory changes
needed to reform Azerbaijan's economy and introduce
transparent, market-driven practices; but seems to have
stalled, despite President Aliyev's pledged support.


9. (SBU) The GOAJ believes that it is withstanding the
difficulties of the global economic crisis, particularly in
comparison to its neighbors. High oil export receipts led to
extremely rapid economic growth in prior years, and, with oil
hovering USD 70 per barrel, Central Bank and State Oil Fund
reserves are mounting once again. Baku has also benefited
from relatively low levels of foreign debt exposure and has
not had to devalue its currency. Azerbaijan, which has
roughly a USD 44 billion economy, held about 18 billion manat
in net reserves as of December 2008.

BAKU 00000782 003 OF 004



Turkey and Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------


10. (C) Azerbaijan is willing to pursue a political track to
solve the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict with Armenia;
however, any solution that does not guarantee the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan is anathema. Azerbaijani views on
this issue have intensified in the context of
Turkish-Armenian moves toward opening borders, especially in
terms of efforts to "de-link" these plans from withdrawal of
Armenian forces from Azerbaijan's seven occupied territories.
Immediately after the April 22 initialing of
Turkish-Armenian "roadmap," Azerbaijan voiced concerns about
reconciliation, complaining that Turkey and the United States
failed to consult Baku and did not take into account the
effect of border opening on prospects for the negotiations to
resolve NK. President Aliyev's line on the Turkey-Armenia
process is that he is deeply disappointed at Turkish
behavior, but Turkey is a sovereign country that can make its
own decisions. He adds, however, that Turkey will face the
consequences if it de-links reconciliation with Armenia from
the NK process, and routinely points to the energy sector.
This will likely be heavy on his mind as the Turkish and
Armenian Presidents are slated to meet later this month to
sign joint protocols on the rapprochement.

Security Cooperation
--------------


11. (C) Azerbaijan has increased its defense spending
tenfold in five years and now spends about 2 billion dollars
annually, or about three percent of GDP. GOAJ officials are
unequivocal about Azerbaijan's orientation westward for its
security needs, but they argue just as forcefully that they
need American weapons systems to build adequate defenses.
Azerbaijanis complain bitterly about the restrictions of
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act even though the waiver
provision is applied, because of the "parity" policy on
assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan observed by
Congressional appropriators.


12. (C) DoD has conducted several engagement events with
Azerbaijan Navy and Coast Guard officers with the purpose of
building capacity for critical energy infrastructure
protection. The events have been well received by Coast
Guard and Navy leadership, but have limited value in the
overall maritime security posture. Only significant
investment in new surveillance and response capabilities -
including infrastructure, radar, intelligence, ships, and
aircraft - will meet the security challenges faced here. The
GOAJ has little appetite to embark on new, expensive projects
which it may perceive as unnecessary or problematic to
managing its complex relations with Iran and Russia.


13. (C) For the past two years, President Aliyev and other
senior ministers have continually asked to purchase U.S.
military equipment. Last year the Ministry of Defense
provided a list of requested "defensive equipment," that
included Patriot missiles, self-propelled mortars, Multiple
Launch Rocket Systems, Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger
missiles and UAV aircraft. EUCOM reviewed the entire list
and did not believe any of the items would be approved for
sale. We have encouraged the Ministry of Defense to put
together a Foreign Military Sale request that we could use to
begin incrementally a relationship on military sales. For
example, President Aliyev has mentioned air defense and yet
their initial equipment list lacked an air defense radar
system. Offering enhanced cooperation on security to
Azerbaijan, particularly in terms of access to U.S. defense
technology, may be the best tool we have to mollify Baku's
concerns about Turkey-Armenia rapprochement and patch up
souring relations.

Department of Energy Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program
-------------- --


14. (SBU) Embassy Baku hosts a Department of Energy-led
Second Line of Defense (SLD) program. The mission of SLD
programs is to strengthen the capability of foreign
governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit
trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials across
international borders and through the global maritime
shipping industry. The goal is to reduce the probability of

BAKU 00000782 004 OF 004


these materials being fashioned into a weapon of mass
destruction or a radiological dispersal device to be used
against the United States or its key allies and international
partners.


15. (SBU) The Department of Energy initiated the SLD program
in Azerbaijan in 2005, with an implementing Agreement between
the DOE,s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),
and the Azerbaijan State Border Service (SBS). Construction
upgrades to 9 sites, predominantly border crossings,
commenced in 2006; a total of 11 will be completed by
November 2009. Upgrades to the Baku Seaport and the Turkan
Training Center, a training institute for the State Border
Service, have already been completed. The SLD program
expects 13 land border crossing upgrades to be completed by
the end of FY2010, with a total of 17 sites eventually
scheduled for upgrades.


16. (SBU) The Department of Energy has maintained one
contract staffer at Embassy Baku as the SLD Baku
Representative since September 2008. The SLD program works
in close cooperation with the Mission's Defense Threat
Reduction program (DTRO) and Export Control and Border
Security Programs (EXBS).

Democracy and Reform
--------------


17. (C) The flawed October 2008 presidential election and
especially the hastily conducted March 2009 referendum that
made 41 changes to the Constitution including, inter alia,
lifting the two-term restriction on the President,
underscored the slowing of Azerbaijan's democratic
transition. Likewise, Azerbaijan's parliament unwisely moved
this summer to place further restrictions on NGO activities.
Intervention from the highest levels of government, as well
as a well coordinated response from civil society, prohibited
the most egregious changes. Simultaneously, the GOAJ has
taken measures to stifle free media, including the removal of
FM-band broadcasting rights from Voice of America and Radio
Liberty, and has limited the practice of Islam in some cases,
pointing to threats of radicalism. The opposition in
Azerbaijan remains relatively uncoordinated, lacking in
popular support as well as having a tendency towards
infighting. Lack of freedom of assembly is a large problem;
nearly 100 young people were arrested on May 10 during
several small events mourning the 13 victims of an April 30
shooting at the State Oil Academy. Several prominent
journalists remain in jail and the now-famous case of the
jailed youth-activist "bloggers" continues to drag on.


18. (C) Should any of these issues arise, you are certain to
hear complaints that Azerbaijan is treated unfairly by the
United States and Europe on human rights and democracy
compared to Armenia and others. In particular, President
Obama's statement on May 3 World Press Freedom Day, which
placed Azerbaijan in the same phrase as Zimbabwe,
particularly irked some GOAJ leaders including the President,
especially as Russia and Iran, other egregious violators of
media freedom, were not mentioned. It is important to stress
that the U.S. has only one set of standards when evaluating
democracy and human rights and that political and economic
reform is an equal pillar, along with security and energy, of
our bilateral relationship.

Comment
--------------


19. (C) A visit this early in your tenure demonstrates the
strategic importance of the United States' relations with
Azerbaijan at a moment of regional turbulence, and will help
set the tone for our future engagement. The Azerbaijanis may
want to discuss the Obama Administration's approach to
regional foreign relations, and in particular the
Administration's views of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey-Armenia
rapprochement, and Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act.
Enhanced security cooperation and energy sector development
are the two most likely areas for improving relations, and on
these fronts the President, Foreign Minister and others are
prepared to talk.
LU