Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU746
2009-09-18 10:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:
AZERBAIJAN'S REACTION TO MISSILE DEFENSE ALL ABOUT
how-toVZCZCXRO8902 OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHKB #0746/01 2611011 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 181011Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY BAKU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1763 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3542 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0930 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1461 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0339
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000746
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS KAIDANOW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL EZ RU IR PL CZ AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S REACTION TO MISSILE DEFENSE ALL ABOUT
GABALA
REF: A. SECSTATE 47392
B. BAKU 595
C. SECSTATE 96526
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000746
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS KAIDANOW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL EZ RU IR PL CZ AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S REACTION TO MISSILE DEFENSE ALL ABOUT
GABALA
REF: A. SECSTATE 47392
B. BAKU 595
C. SECSTATE 96526
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Summary. Charge briefed Foreign Minister Mammadyarov
on the United States' new approach to missile defense in
Europe on September 18. The Minister focused on the
relevance of Gabala radar station in the new architecture,
and maintained the line the GOAJ has followed since the
missile defense issue emerged in 2007: they are willing to
consider U.S.-Russia joint use of the facility, but want to
be informed every step of the way (Reftels A, B). The news
of the Administration's decisions on European missile defense
has played prominently in Baku. Media and chattering-class
reactions vary. The issue is generally viewed through the
prism of U.S.-Russian relations, with much commentary
suggesting that Russia gained from the U.S. decision, but
media attention focused more heavily on implications for
Gabala. End Summary.
2. (C) Charge briefed Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov
using Reftel C talking points. Mammadyarov immediately
steered the discussion to Gabala. Charge explained that
while the United States was open to considering cooperation
with Russia at the Gabala (Azerbaijan) and/or Armavir
(Krasnodar, Russia) bases; there is no agreement between the
U.S. and Russia in this regard, and the United States would
keep Azerbaijan apprised of any steps taken with respect to
Gabala. Mammadyarov appreciated this, adding that he had
recently made the point to Russian FM Lavrov that Azerbaijan
needs to be part of that conversation. Mammadyarov then
mentioned that discussion of Gabala also had to take into
account the expiry of the Russian lease in September 2012
(Note: The President and the Foreign and Defense Ministers
have not hesitated to tell us of their dissatisfaction with
the terms of the current lease. End Note.) The Foreign
Minister also noted that his government appreciates the U.S.
recognition of the threat posed to Iran's neighbors of its
short and medium-range missiles. He added that Azerbaijan is
deeply interested in purchasing sensors and defensive weapons
to protect itself from ballistic missile attack, saying "(w)e
are ready to sign a check."
3. (SBU) Azerbaijani press reaction was arrayed along the
usual spectrum from neutral to conspiratorial. Official
media reported the story by quoting wire service reports from
Washington. Some opposition papers portrayed the U.S. policy
shift as a betrayal of the Czech Republic and Poland. More
informed commentary focused on the implications for the
Gabala radar station, with noted political scientist Rasim
Musabeyov offering the most balanced commentary, speculating
that the radar might be an avenue for cooperation but opining
further that the question is far from decided. Political
scientist Vafa Guluzade, famous for his Russophobic views,
said that the U.S. policy shift was likely the result of a
promise by President Obama to President Medvedev at the
Moscow summit in July.
4. (C) Comment: While Azerbaijan is a peripheral (and
hypothetical) player in missile defense at this stage, it is
important to note that expectations are high here that the
Gabala station is in play in U.S. missile defense plans. The
GOAJ would likely jump at the chance to be part of the
architecture, especially if it is done in the context of
cooperation with Russia. However, the issue is complicated
by the apparent gap in understanding here that use of Gabala
would have more to do with the political symbolism of
U.S.-Russian cooperation than the radar station's
capabilities on the one hand, and further because the GOAJ
will not be able to resist the urge to use U.S. interest in
the site as leverage on the Russians as they negotiate the
renewal of Moscow's lease, which will expire in September
2012. The Azerbaijanis also have big hopes for purchases of
U.S. weapons, and may see U.S. interest in Gabala as a lever
BAKU 00000746 002 OF 002
for achieving those aims. Expectation management will be key
here. End Comment.
LU
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS KAIDANOW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL EZ RU IR PL CZ AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S REACTION TO MISSILE DEFENSE ALL ABOUT
GABALA
REF: A. SECSTATE 47392
B. BAKU 595
C. SECSTATE 96526
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Summary. Charge briefed Foreign Minister Mammadyarov
on the United States' new approach to missile defense in
Europe on September 18. The Minister focused on the
relevance of Gabala radar station in the new architecture,
and maintained the line the GOAJ has followed since the
missile defense issue emerged in 2007: they are willing to
consider U.S.-Russia joint use of the facility, but want to
be informed every step of the way (Reftels A, B). The news
of the Administration's decisions on European missile defense
has played prominently in Baku. Media and chattering-class
reactions vary. The issue is generally viewed through the
prism of U.S.-Russian relations, with much commentary
suggesting that Russia gained from the U.S. decision, but
media attention focused more heavily on implications for
Gabala. End Summary.
2. (C) Charge briefed Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov
using Reftel C talking points. Mammadyarov immediately
steered the discussion to Gabala. Charge explained that
while the United States was open to considering cooperation
with Russia at the Gabala (Azerbaijan) and/or Armavir
(Krasnodar, Russia) bases; there is no agreement between the
U.S. and Russia in this regard, and the United States would
keep Azerbaijan apprised of any steps taken with respect to
Gabala. Mammadyarov appreciated this, adding that he had
recently made the point to Russian FM Lavrov that Azerbaijan
needs to be part of that conversation. Mammadyarov then
mentioned that discussion of Gabala also had to take into
account the expiry of the Russian lease in September 2012
(Note: The President and the Foreign and Defense Ministers
have not hesitated to tell us of their dissatisfaction with
the terms of the current lease. End Note.) The Foreign
Minister also noted that his government appreciates the U.S.
recognition of the threat posed to Iran's neighbors of its
short and medium-range missiles. He added that Azerbaijan is
deeply interested in purchasing sensors and defensive weapons
to protect itself from ballistic missile attack, saying "(w)e
are ready to sign a check."
3. (SBU) Azerbaijani press reaction was arrayed along the
usual spectrum from neutral to conspiratorial. Official
media reported the story by quoting wire service reports from
Washington. Some opposition papers portrayed the U.S. policy
shift as a betrayal of the Czech Republic and Poland. More
informed commentary focused on the implications for the
Gabala radar station, with noted political scientist Rasim
Musabeyov offering the most balanced commentary, speculating
that the radar might be an avenue for cooperation but opining
further that the question is far from decided. Political
scientist Vafa Guluzade, famous for his Russophobic views,
said that the U.S. policy shift was likely the result of a
promise by President Obama to President Medvedev at the
Moscow summit in July.
4. (C) Comment: While Azerbaijan is a peripheral (and
hypothetical) player in missile defense at this stage, it is
important to note that expectations are high here that the
Gabala station is in play in U.S. missile defense plans. The
GOAJ would likely jump at the chance to be part of the
architecture, especially if it is done in the context of
cooperation with Russia. However, the issue is complicated
by the apparent gap in understanding here that use of Gabala
would have more to do with the political symbolism of
U.S.-Russian cooperation than the radar station's
capabilities on the one hand, and further because the GOAJ
will not be able to resist the urge to use U.S. interest in
the site as leverage on the Russians as they negotiate the
renewal of Moscow's lease, which will expire in September
2012. The Azerbaijanis also have big hopes for purchases of
U.S. weapons, and may see U.S. interest in Gabala as a lever
BAKU 00000746 002 OF 002
for achieving those aims. Expectation management will be key
here. End Comment.
LU