Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU359
2009-05-01 09:50:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANCE SECRETARY OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON ENGR AJ 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000359 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DAS/RUE MARY WARLICK

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENGR AJ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANCE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE MARY WARLICK,S VISIT TO BAKU, MAY 4-6

Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000359

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DAS/RUE MARY WARLICK

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENGR AJ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANCE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE MARY WARLICK,S VISIT TO BAKU, MAY 4-6

Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) Your visit comes as Baku is abuzz with analysis,
sometimes speculative and alarming, of Turkey and Armenia,s
recent announcement of a "roadmap" to reconcile differences
over interpretation of events of 1915 and the eventual
reopening of borders, and implications of the deal on
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations. The news of Turkey-Armenia
"rapprochement" forced Baku into a diplomatic scramble to
ensure the protection of its equities, including on the
future of westward transit of Caspian hydrocarbons.
President Aliyev and other high-level officials, to
counter-balance Ankara's moves, have traveled repeatedly to
Moscow for energy and security discussions. Some officials,
at times, have been critical of U.S. actions. Through all of
this, though, the GOAJ's determination to contribute to the
international effort in Afghanistan remains unchanged, and
leaders want to engage with the United States in other
military/security spheres. Regional Response ,09, which
involved over 200 troops from the Utah National Guard, was a
resounding success. President Aliyev meanwhile has
consolidated his domestic political position through a
national referendum eliminating the two-term limit that would
have forced him to leave office in 2013. The country is
maintaining macroeconomic and social stability in the face of
the global financial crisis, but has taken insufficient steps
to reform its economy and root out corruption to ensure
longer term sustainability. End Summary.

Security Cooperation
--------------


2. (SBU) Azerbaijan's strategic direction is deeply affected
by its physical security environment. Sandwiched between
Russia and Iran, and with the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict tying down 70 percent of its ground forces along the
Line of Contact, Azerbaijan recognizes the need for strong
allies. The country has also increased its defense spending
tenfold in five years and now spends nearly 2 billion dollars
annually on defense. While this rate of growth may sound
alarming, it is tempered by the fact that it represents an
approximate 3 percent of GDP, the Azerbaijani Army is in need
of replacing or repairing many items and infrastructure, and

the sum of money is spread across multiple ministries, not
just the MoD. Your GOAJ interlocutors will be unequivocal
about Azerbaijan's orientation westward for its security
needs, but they will just as forcefully argue that they need
- and deserve - American weapons systems to build adequate
defenses. Azerbaijanis complain bitterly about the
restrictions of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, even
when the waiver provision is invoked, because of the "parity"
policy on assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan observed by
Congressional appropriators.


3. (SBU) Late last year Azerbaijan withdrew its 150-man
contingent from Iraq, at the request of the Iraqi Government.
Azerbaijan,s troops had partnered with U.S. Marines
guarding the Haditha Dam. Since then, Azerbaijan has
followed through on its commitment to double from 45 to 90
the size of its military contribution to Afghanistan, and is
awaiting the Afghan Government's response to its proposal of
increasing investment and civilian contributions such as
construction of schools and training Afghan diplomats as
police at its academies. Your interlocutors here,
particularly at the MFA, will be keen to discuss developments
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and may offer additional areas
for cooperation.


4. (SBU) Your visit is an opportunity to solidify further
Azerbaijan's cooperation on regional security issues and
counter-terrorism, and to build on Commander, USTRANSCOM
General McNabb,s efforts to develop a surface transport
corridor linking Europe and the CENTCOM operational theaters.
Baku has been a willing military participant in OEF and OIF
and already allows virtually unlimited transit of its

BAKU 00000359 002 OF 004


airspace and flexible refueling arrangements in support of
operations. Your visit is also an opportunity to gauge
Azerbaijan's level of willingness to allow wider access to
Heydar Aliyev airport as the U.S. interagency continues to
refine options. Particularly in light of recent events in
Turkey and Armenia, Azerbaijan is keen to reassure itself
that its interests and views are not being ignored, and your
pursuit of Azerbaijan's cooperation will be taken as a
reassuring signal that the partnership developed over the
past several years has real value to the United States and
will continue.

Regional Response 09
--------------


5. (SBU) Military exercise REGIONAL RESPONSE 2009 (RR09)
occurred from 15-28 April 2009. RR09 was an Afghanistan
peacekeeping scenario-based company-level field training
exercise consisting of platoon-level situational training
lanes. The lanes provided training in cordon and search,
quick reaction force operations, and patrolling. Overall, all
reports indicate the exercise itself was a success with both
sides benefitting from the experience. Over 700 personnel,
200 US and 500 Azerbaijani soldiers participated in RR09 at
the Qaraheybat Training Center about 40 minutes outside of
Baku. Although the negotiation phase for the RR09 Exercise
Support Agreement (ESA) was difficult and drawn out, for this
first-of-its-kind exercise, the execution phase went
extremely well. Not only did Azerbaijan provide two companies
from some of their best units (NATO OCC Battalion and
Peacekeeping Battalion) to participate in RR09, they also
spent tremendous energy in providing support to U.S.
personnel, i.e., housing, transportation, etc.


6. (SBU) During the ESA negotiations, the issues that caused
the greatest concern were criminal jurisdiction over U.S.
forces and taxation. Initially, there was very little
negotiating room with the relevant Azerbaijani Ministries on
these two crucial issues and the exercise looked to be in
jeopardy. Only once President Aliyev and the Foreign
Minister Mammadyarov both personally intervened to approve
the diplomatic notes and language required by the U.S. was
the exercise allowed to proceed. Once the political approval
was granted, all relevant ministries/agencies fell into line
and provided the required support, i.e., customs,
immigration, etc.

Turkey and Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------


7. (SBU) GOAJ officials from the President down are
unanimous that Nagorno-Karabakh is "issue number one" for the
President's second term. Beyond the obvious territorial and
security concerns stemming from the conflict, the issue is
the one question that unites the Azerbaijani public on a
visceral level. Azerbaijan is willing to pursue the
political track to solve the matter; however any solution
that does not guarantee the territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan is anathema. Azerbaijanis' views on this issue
have intensified in the context of Turkish-Armenian moves
toward opening the border. If the issue is raised in your
meetings, we recommend that you emphasize that the United
States views the Turkey-Armenia process and Nagorno-Karabakh
as processes that both need to move forward - a point
recognized by POTUS during his address to the Turkish
Parliament - and strongly reiterate the commitment of the
United States to the Minsk Group peace process. Presidents
Aliyev and Sargsian last met in Zurich on the sidelines of
the World Economic Forum, and are expected to do so next
during the summit on the EU Eastern Partnership in Prague in
early May.

Energy
--------------


8. (SBU) Energy is one of the three essential areas of

BAKU 00000359 003 OF 004


United States engagement with Azerbaijan, along with security
and political and economic reform. Azerbaijan's massive oil
and gas reserves and strategic location place the country at
the epicenter of Eurasia energy policy. Azerbaijan currently
exports oil through two non-Russian pipelines to European
markets (Baku-Supsa (Georgia/Black Sea) and
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan),in addition to the Baku-Novorossiysk
(Russia/Black Sea) pipeline, and produces natural gas for
export via Georgia and Turkey. As a producing and transit
country, Azerbaijan is key to the development of a Southern
Corridor to transport Caspian hydrocarbons to European and
world markets, including Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas. The 1
million barrel per day BTC pipeline was disrupted during the
August crisis by an explosion in Turkey unrelated to the
Russian invasion of Georgia, but Russian bombing near Tbilisi
did destroy a rail crossing vital to Baku's back-up transport
plan. For this reason, the USG has conveyed to the GOAJ the
United States' interest in cooperating on critical energy
infrastructure protection.


9. (SBU) Bilateral difficulties centering on the price of
Azerbaijani gas now being sold to Turkey and the
unwillingness of Turkey to grant transit to Azerbaijani gas
that would be exported in the futue to European markets are
the major obstacles tothe success of the "Southern Corridor"
project, which seeks to diversify routes for Caspian gas to
European markets. Azerbaijan's diplomatic difficulties with
Turkey at the moment intensify this problem.


10. (SBU) Azerbaijan's oil production at offshore fields,
which are mainly operated by a consortium led by British
Petroleum (BP),have the capacity of 1 million barrels per
day; however technical disruptions in the fall and winter
reduced that output. Meanwhile, international oil companies
are urging Azerbaijan to conclude agreements with Kazakhstan
to allow oil to flow by tanker to BTC from the mammoth North
Caspian Kashagan field, which should come on line in 2013.
Chevron has already begun shipping small volumes of oil from
Kazakhstan's Tengiz field to BTC. In this connection, we are
noting to the GOAJ that the goals of transparency, security
and safety will be e best served by including the
International Energy Companies who are partners in the
Kashagan and Tengiz fields in any cross-Caspian
transportation arrangements.


Democracy and Reform
--------------


11. (SBU) Generally speaking, the October 2008 presidential
election and the hastily conducted March 2009 referendum that
amended the Constitution, inter alia, to lift the two-term
restriction on the President were not positive moments in
Azerbaijan's democratic transition. The referendum in
particular was arranged with lightning speed by the ruling
party, with parliamentary approval, and Embassy observers
reported widespread fraud during voting. However, the fraud
appeared to be directed at padding the vote totals, and we
assessed that especially considering the low bar that
Azerbaijani law sets for the adoption of referendum measures,
the Government would have succeeded in any event. The main
opposition parties boycotted the October election and the
referendum.


12. (SBU) Many observers believed that once he was secure in
another five-year term, President Ilham Aliyev would make
conciliatory gestures to the opposition and tack back on to a
moderate course on democratization. This has not yet
happened to a large extent, but there are some minor and
encouraging indicators. One prominent imprisoned journalist
benefited from an amnesty and was released, and the President
recently intervened to overturn the convictions of two other
journalists who had been sentenced to prison and hard labor
under a criminal libel statute. We are also informed that
the GOAJ is coordinating the drafting of implementing
legislation for the constitutional changes approved by the

BAKU 00000359 004 OF 004


referendum with the Venice Commission of the Council of
Europe. However, the media environment is still far from
free and the Council of Europe has appointed a Special
Rapporteur on Political Prisoners, a German parliamentarian
who is expected to visit the country in June.


13. (SBU) Should your Azerbaijani interlocutors raise any of
these issues, you are certain to hear complaints that
Azerbaijan is treated unfairly by the United States and
Europe on human rights and democracy compared to Armenia. A
consistent message that the United States has no double
standards on human rights and that security and stability are
enhanced by, and indeed depend on, the development of
democracy and respect for human rights will reinforce the
unwavering message that the United States delivers to
Azerbaijan on the key reform issues.

Comment
--------------


14. (SBU) Your visit provides an opportunity to engage with
key GOAJ decision makers and demonstrate the strategic
importance of the United States' relations with Azerbaijan at
a moment of important regional change. Your visit also
affords an opportunity to brief the Azerbaijanis on the Obama
Administration,s approach to relations with Russia. At the
NATO/IPAP conference, our willingness to participate at such
a senior level will be well received and timely, as well as a
positive sign of the United States' intentions, with
Nagorno-Karabakh and elsewhere, in light of the
Turkey-Armenia process. End comment.
LU