AZERBAIJAN: A SHIFT IN GAS EXPORT STRATEGY?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000337

SIPDIS

SOFIA FOR SE MORNINGSTAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ TK RU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: A SHIFT IN GAS EXPORT STRATEGY?

REF: ANKARA 553

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In the face of President Aliyev's recent high
profile, energy-focused trip to Russia, SOCAR continues to
insist that the goal of its gas export strategy remains
export to Europe via Turkey. However, SOCAR now states that
due to continued inability to find a mutually acceptable gas
transit solution with Turkey, Azerbaijan's fallback position
will be to export its gas to Europe through Russia, possibly
via swap deals with Gazprom. Although SOCAR Is not
currently considering selling any of the projected 13 to 16
billion cubic meters annually of Shah Deniz Phase Two gas to
Russia when it comes on line no earlier than late 2016, it
might sell some of its own (SOCAR-produced, non Shah-Deniz)
gas to Russia in the shorter term. SOCAR contends that
Turkey still refuses to offer it commercially viable prices
for either the Shah Deniz Phase One gas it is currently
receiving or the Shah Deniz Phase Two gas it is seeking to
purchase. According to SOCAR, President Aliyev is not going
to the Sofia Energy Summit. END SUMMARY.

2.(C) On April 21 SOCAR Marketing Vice-President Elshad
Nasirov, the SOCAR official primarily responsible for gas
marketing decisions, told EnergyOff that despite President
Aliyev's recent press statements from Russia, Azerbaijan's
gas export strategy remains the same: to export its gas to
European markets. Azerbaijan's first choice as gas transit
country is Turkey, but if Turkey continues to refuse to grant
viable transit conditions for Caspian gas, Azerbaijan will
seek to export the 13-16 billion cubic meters annually
(bcm/a) of Shah Deniz Phase Two (SD2) gas scheduled to come
on line no earlier than late 2016 to Europe via Russia,
possibly via swap deals with Gazprom. Nasirov said that it
is possible that SOCAR will sell some non-Shah Deniz gas
volumes to Russia in the shorter-term, but insisted that
SOCAR is not currently considering selling any SD2 gas to
Russia (COMMENT: A Shah Deniz Consortium member confirmed to
EnergyOff that it made 'good economic sense' for Azerbaijan
to sell at least some volumes to Russia, especially if it can
work out satisfactory swap arrangements such that it can sell
Gazprom gas in European markets as its own).


3. (C) Nasirov said that discussions with Turkey over Shah
Deniz gas are still moribund. Turkey is still seeking to
de-link the low price it is currently paying for Shah Deniz
Phase One (SD1) gas and the putatively higher price it says
it would pay for SD2 gas. SOCAR opposes this de-linkage,
since it is "the same gas from the same field traveling via
the same pipeline over the same distance to the same market."
Nasirov flatly denied rumors that Turkey had offered USD 350
per thousand cubic meters (tcm) for SD2 gas (ref). In the
formal negotiations between Botas and the Azerbaijan Gas
Supply Company (AGSC - the special purpose venture led by
StatoilHydro to sell SD1 gas to Turkey),Botas is still
offering a three-year phased increase to USD 180/tcm, a price
SOCAR feels is insultingly low. In informal discussions,
Nasirov said Turkish officials have "joked" about paying 'as
much as' USD 250/tcm, which SOCAR has pointed out is still
way below the price Turkey pays Gazprom and Iran for gas.


4. (C) Nasirov denied that Azerbaijan was seeking to use gas
sales to Russia as leverage for Russian help on
Nagorno-Karabagh, saying that "no one in Azerbaijan is nave
enough to think the Russians will give up territories for
gas."


5. (C) Nassirov said the recent announcement of RWE Midstream
gas cooperation with Turkmenistan was "an encouraging
development," and added that SOCAR President Rovnaq
Abdullayev would be traveling to Ashgabat shortly (Ashgabat
is hosting a pipeline security conference April 23-24.).


6. (C) Nasirov said that President Aliyev would not be
traveling to the Sofia Energy Summit, but that Energy
Minister Natiq Aliyev would be attending. Nasirov said that
Azerbaijan would seek to invite Turkish officials to
Azerbaijan before the end of April in another attempt to
break the gas deadlock. (The Turkish Ambassador had earlier
told the Ambassador that Energy Minister Guler had invited
SOCAR and Energy Minster Natiq Aliyev to Ankara April 28.)

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7. (C) COMMENT: In talks with USG officials SOCAR continues
to stress that the goal of Azerbaijan's gas export strategy
-- to sell gas directly to Europe -- hasn't changed, and
that the primary reason for its increased focus on gas
cooperation with Russia is to "increase leverage on the
government of Turkey" to secure transparent commercial
transit terms and arrangements. But we believe there has
been an important shift in the GOAJ position, at least as
enunciated by Nasirov: if transit through Turkey continues
to be denied, Azerbaijan will seek export routes to Europe
through Russia for Shah Deniz gas, quite possibly via swap
deals (Nasirov has previously told Embassy that Russia had
agreed to allow its territory to be used purely for transit).
The other energy companies in the Shah Deniz Consortium are
all seeking primarily to find a viable customer for SD2 gas
so they can monitize their investment, as the clock ticks on
their Production Sharing Agreement with Azerbaijan.
According to at least one SD Consortium gas executive, none
of the Consortium members (with the obvious exception of
TPAO) "has any problem" selling SD2 volumes to Europe through
Russia, or even selling gas to Russia. Resolving the
transit issue with Turkey remains essential to achieving USG
goals of diversifying not just sources, but routes, of gas
supply to Europe.


8. (C) COMMENT (CONT): As for a putative signing of the
Nabucco IGA in early May in Prague, conversations with SOCAR
and other SD Consortium members indicate their view that
while any IGA incorporating commercially viable and 'clean'
transit principles through Turkey (i.e. without linking gas
transit through Turkey to gas sales to Turkey) would be seen
as welcome recogition of market realities, SOCAR and the Shah
Deniz Consortium's optimal solution is one where Turkey
allows provides a transparent and commercially viable transit
regime for any/all upstream gas, irresepective of pipeline
project or final consumer. This way, SOCAR and the SD
Consortium could calculate netbacks for various pipeline
projects vying for SD2 gas in order to decide which pipeline
project (Nabucco, TGI, TAP) to support with its SD2 volumes.
As such, SOCAR requests to the USG and EU have been to not
champion specific pipeline projects, but rather to bring
about viable transit through Turkey so that commercial
factors can then determine which pipeline(s) get sanctioned.
END COMMENT.
DERSE