Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU326
2009-04-22 03:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZERBAIJAN: DEFMIN SIGNALS TEP INTEREST TO CG

Tags:  PREL PGOV AM AJ RU IR GE NATO MARR 
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VZCZCXRO5682
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #0326/01 1120341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220341Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1082
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3343
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000326 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC
DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY
EUCOM PLEASE PASS TO USAREUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AM AJ RU IR GE NATO MARR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: DEFMIN SIGNALS TEP INTEREST TO CG
USAREUR

REF: A. A) BAKU 229

B. B) BAKU 266

C. C) STATE 31102

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000326

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC
DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY
EUCOM PLEASE PASS TO USAREUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AM AJ RU IR GE NATO MARR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: DEFMIN SIGNALS TEP INTEREST TO CG
USAREUR

REF: A. A) BAKU 229

B. B) BAKU 266

C. C) STATE 31102

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. On April 17, Commander, USAREUR General
Carter Ham met with Azerbaijani Minister of Defense
General-Colonel Safar Abiyev on the eve of the combined
U.S.-Azerbaijan exercise REGIONAL RESPONSE 09 (RR09). During
the meeting Abiyev expressed interest in a Train and Equip
Program (TEP) for an additional Azerbaijani unit for OEF
(reftels). He also provided insights to Gen. Ham on the pace
of Russian military reforms as well as his country's evolving
approach to NATO. He repeated oft-expressed frustrations
with U.S. support to Armenia and legal restrictions on
military sales to Azerbaijan, which he said force his army to
rely on former Soviet equipment and increase Azerbaijan's
dependence on Russia and its allies for supplies. See action
request in paragraph 9 below. End Summary.

REGIONAL RESPONSE 09


2. (C) Both Gen. Ham and the Minister were enthusiastic about
the beginning of RR09, a combined exercise for U.S. forces
from the Utah Army National Guard and Azerbaijani army.
Abiyev also noted with satisfaction the number of foreign
officers and attaches who will be on hand to observe (Note:
the GOAJ went to great lengths to secure foreign presence at
the exercise to give it the appearance of a multilateral
event consistent with the NATO IPAP, rather than a bilateral
exercise - ref A. End Note.) He noted that Russia had even
been invited to send officers to observe, but had declined,
so "now they can't say anything."

RUSSIA AND ITS MILITARY


3. (C) Abiyev expressed his concerns to Gen. Ham about
Russia, from whom "you can expect anything," especially after
the war in Georgia. He repeated the claims Azerbaijan has
made since January that Russia had supplied some USD 800
million in weaponry to Armenia, and continues to deliver

weapons. He warned that Russia, like Iran, wants the United
States and its influence out of the South Caucasus. Gen. Ham
remarked that since the invasion of Georgia the U.S.
mil-to-mil relationship with Russia was frozen, and asked for
Abiyev's thoughts on the state of the Russian military.
Abiyev replied that he had met with Russian DefMin Serdyukov
in late January. There is a great deal of disagreement
within the Russian military about the future. Anyone looking
at the Russian military should also focus on the other power
ministries' armed formations, such as MVD (internal troops)
and MChS (Ministry of Emergency Situations troops).
Serdyukov told him that the financial crisis had hit the
Russian military hard, that MOD had effectively lost 30
percent of his budget "and in a few months, who knows?"

AFGHANISTAN AND NATO PERSPECTIVES


4. (C) Abiyev told Gen. Ham and the Ambassador that
Azerbaijan is willing to do a TEP to train additional forces
for Afghanistan but said he wished to avoid the outcome of
the last inconclusive discussions on the possibility of
establishing a TEP, which resulted in "conditions" that
Azerbaijan could not meet (Note: This is an apparent
reference to a mistaken GOAJ belief they might have to
conduct combat operations in connection with a TEP. GOAJ has
stated they wish to conduct only peacekeeping operations in
Afghanistan, such as the fixed site security they provided at
Haditha Dam in Iraq, not combat operations -- ref B. End
Note). Ambassador told Abiyev that President Aliyev had told
her that she should work the details with him and the Foreign
Minister, and that the FonMin had requested the USG send a
representative to Baku who can go over the details, a request
we are currently pursuing with Washington.

5. (C) Gen. Ham asked Abiyev his opinion on the state of
Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO. In beginning the
meeting, Abiyev had described the relationship with NATO as
one of two key relationships Azerbaijan needs to deepen, the
other being its bilateral ties with the U.S. Abiyev said that

BAKU 00000326 002 OF 002


Azerbaijan is ready to deepen practical cooperation with the
Alliance but is not interested in publicizing its NATO ties
as Georgia did, because of the regional reactions that would
follow. Azerbaijan's preferred approach is to "talk less,
and do more." The Minister said that after Georgia and
Ukraine join NATO, which Azerbaijan favors, Azerbaijan would
be next in line.

BILATERAL COOPERATION AND FMS


6. (C) Abiyev also emphasized the theme of "talking less and
doing more" as he addressed the bilateral military
relationship. His complaint was reducible to frustration
partly with offers of support over the years that he regards
as unfulfilled, but mostly with the legal restrictions in the
United States that prevent Azerbaijan from acquiring the
sophisticated weaponry it needs. The United States' lack of
ability or will to sell equipment to Azerbaijan increases the
latter's reliance on Russia and other ex-Soviet suppliers of
equipment, "and this is dangerous." For all the talk of
strategic partnership, the Azerbaijani military is operating
old Soviet equipment and has "not one bullet" from its
American partner. Abiyev noted crossly that a wish list of
equipment that he had provided at the USG's request following
former Vice-President Cheney's September 2008 visit to Baku
had gone essentially unanswered.

7. (C) Ambassador, DATT and ODC Chief explained to Abiyev
that first of all, the wish list the GOAJ provided (which
included several major systems including rocket artillery
that could not reasonably be considered defensive in nature),
would be difficult to fulfill for any FMS client, legal
strictures such as 907 notwithstanding. Ambassador added
that ODC had briefed MOD and the defense staff of the
Presidential Apparat on the FMS process. Ambassador and
Abiyev also agreed that the issue of FMS should be taken up
at upcoming bilateral defense consultations in Washington.

8. (C) General Ham told Abiyev that he recognized that there
are areas of less than full agreement in the
military-to-military relationship, but they should not be
allowed to overshadow the areas of common interest and the
good work done to forward them. "I can disagree with my
brother, but he's still my brother," he summarized, adding
that Azerbaijan's decision to host the RR09 exercise was a
"brave" one and a great step toward deepening cooperation.

9. (C) Comment and Action Request: The Minister was clearly
pleased that internal GOAJ hurdles had been overcome so RR 09
could go forward as planned. His agreement in principle that
an Azerbaijani battalion could be trained specifically "for
Afghanistan," which he said reflected his discussion with
President Aliyev after ref B demarche, is important, since in
the past, the Minister has resisted sending more troops
abroad. The next step is for a USG expert to come to Baku to
discuss the basics of a TEP (as proposed ref C) with the
Defense and Foreign Ministers, as President Aliyev requested.
Early June bilateral defense consultations in Washington
would be a good opportunity to follow up at lower levels.
Please advise when an expert will be available.

10. (U) General Ham did not have the opportunity to clear
this cable.

DERSE