Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU302
2009-04-15 08:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZERBAIJAN: AZIMOV ON TURKEY-ARMENIA PROCESS

Tags:  PREL PGOV AM AJ TU 
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P 150853Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1053
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3335
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000302 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958:DECL: 04/15/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AM AJ TU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: AZIMOV ON TURKEY-ARMENIA PROCESS

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000302

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958:DECL: 04/15/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AM AJ TU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: AZIMOV ON TURKEY-ARMENIA PROCESS

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Deputy Foreign Minister and Special
Presidetial Envoy on Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) Araz Azimov
addressed an exclusive group of diplomats, academics,
parliamentarians and commentators on the Turkey-Armenia
situation at MFA's Diplomatic Academy on Friday, April 10.
In a nearly three-hour meeting with limited give-and-take,
Azimov went well beyond the GOAJ's canned talking points in
his analysis and hit consistently on these themes: that an
"uncontrolled process," i.e., one that does not coordinate
steps on N-K with the border opening, will place at risk all
that Turkey, the United States and Azerbaijan have achieved
over the years and have unpredictable social consequences in
Azerbaijan; that Russia gains standing in the region whether
the Turkey-Armenia initiative succeeds or fails, and that
Azerbaijan could abide by the border opening if it were
coordinated with the withdrawal of Armenian troops from five
of the seven occupied territories, and other conditions (see
paragraph 5.) Azimov and other speakers were certain that
POTUS will not unilaterally recognize Armenia's genocide
claim this year. End Summary.


2. (C) Azimov argued that Turkey's apparent decision to
de-link its normalization process from its support for
Azerbaijan on N-K places the Turkey-Azerbaijan historic
partnership - on which a significant portion of European and
American interests in the region rely - at serious risk.
Turkey - and by extension the United States - should not
forget their allies in Baku. He warned that the social
consequences if Azerbaijanis perceive that Turkey has sold
them out would be difficult to predict or control.


3. (C) However, Azimov in this private setting was more
moderate than the one-dimensional presentation of the GOAJ's
position in the media would lead one to expect, buoyed by
recent statements by PM Erdogan and President Gul that
suggested that Turkey would not open its border without a
resolution to N-K, and (in the case of Gul) that Turkey
expects Armenia to agree to a withdrawal from five
territories in conjunction with the Turkish border opening.

(Note: This was a reference to a report indirectly quoting
Gul in the Turkish paper Milliyet. When Ambassador Derse met
her Turkish counterpart the same afternoon as this event, he
claimed not to have heard of this statement. End Note.) The
senior Turkish Embassy representative, a counselor from the
political section, repeated when he was called upon for a
response Erdogan's statement that Turkey would neither open
the border nor open diplomatic relations with Armenia until
N-K is dealt with.


4. (C) Azimov was backed up in his assertion that the
Turkey-Armenia situation played to Russia's advantage, no
matter what its result, by Samad Seyidov, a member of
parliament and chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation to
PACE. Azimov believed that Russia would benefit from open
Armenian borders because of the depth of its penetration of
the Armenian economy and because it opens new potential lines
of communication to its military outposts in Armenia.
Conversely, a failure in the process of normalization would
also benefit Russia because it would cement its position as
the protector of Armenia. Seyidov concurred, saying that it
is inconceivable that Armenia would proceed without Russia's
"invisible permission," and pointedly remarking that Russia
is playing the situation much more cleverly than is the
United States. Other speakers speculated that Russia could
use the situation eventually to insinuate its troops as
peacekeepers under a final arrangement, if Turkey needed
Moscow's influence in Yerevan to guarantee an Armenian
concession to put out the political fires in Azerbaijan.


5. (C) Although he avoided the question when it was put to
him directly by Norwegian Ambassador Jon Ramberg, Azimov's
bottom line seemed to be that Azerbaijan would consider that
Turkey had properly looked after Baku's interests if
Armenia's withdrawal from five of the seven occupied
territories, Armenian withdrawal from southern Kelbajar and a
definition of the Lachin corridor were guaranteed.


6. (C) Comment. Azimov is a hardliner on NK who often stakes
out maximalist GOAJ positions, almost certainly with
President Aliyev's tacit approval. His position on
liberation of five territories is not surprising, given that
Aliyev has told EUR DAS Matthew Bryza that liberation of the
five territories should remain "an option," as we pursue a 3
plus one deal on the outstanding four points in the Basic
Principles. Azimov clearly recognizes that for Azerbaijan to
seek more would be excessive, because even before the Turkish
situation arose the GOAJ had planned to open its own border
with Armenia once the latter withdrew from five territories -
it could hardly insist that Turkey do more.


7. (C) Comment continued. Azimov cautioned about the
"unpredictable" public response to the Turkey-Armenia
situation. To date the signs of pressure on Turkish
interests are easy to detect but also easy to trace to the
GOAJ. Turkish Ambassador Kilic told Ambassador Derse, also
on April 10, that Turkish businessmen were being called in to
the Ministry of Taxes to "discuss their views" on the
Armenian situation, and that university students - some 5,000
Turks study in Azerbaijan - were under pressure to sign
petitions denouncing the border opening. The Presidential
Apparat is also organizing NGOs of all stripes to circulate
and deliver petitions to the Turkish Embassy. On April 13,
the first demonstration took place at the Turkish Embassy,
although it was small and peaceful. It appears that up to
now the GOAJ is calibrating its response to show the Turks a
sample of what it is capable of (independent of public
outrage that could also follow an actual opening of the
border) without overplaying its hand as it leans on Turkey to
deliver on N-K while it reaches out to Armenia.

DERSE