AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT ALIYEV REASONABLE ON N-K

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000270

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2034
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU AM AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT ALIYEV REASONABLE ON N-K
OPTIONS, STILL FURIOUS WITH TURKEY

Classified By: Ambassador Anne Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: EUR DAS Matthew Brzya and Ambassador
Derse met with President Aliyev and FonMin Mammadyarov for
over an hour on April 3 to discuss Azerbaijan's concern with
respect to the impact of the Turkey-Armenia normalization
process on the negotiations to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict (NK). Aliyev hid none of his outrage at Turkey's
apparent disregard for Azerbaijan's interests, and the
intensity of his display seemed calculated to underscore the
seriousness of the repercussions for Turkey if Azerbaijan's
interests in NK are sacrificed for the sake of the Armenian
accord. Nevertheless, when presented with a reasonable
formula for ensuring progress on NK concurrently with the
normalization process, he agreed readily to cooperate. End
Summary.

2. (S/NF) Bryza told Aliyev that Secretary Clinton had sent
him to Baku because the USG understands that Azerbaijan is
concerned that Turkey-Armenia normalization may make the
Armenians less constructive on NK. He asked Aliyev if
Azerbaijan would be more comfortable with the Turkey-Armenia
process if we could achieve a breakthrough on NK. He
underscored the Secretary's personal commitment to work to
this end, and President Obama's interest in meeting with
Aliyev in Istanbul at April 6-7.

Resentment at Ankara's Betrayal...
--------------


3. (S/NF) Aliyev responded with a lengthy and bitter
indictment of Turkey as a "liar, cheat and betrayer" of
Azerbaijan. Noting that the consequences of the current
volatile situation in the region are unpredictable, he
complained that Azerbaijan had quietly supported the recent
improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations, including
President Sargsian's "football diplomacy," never dreaming
that Turkey "would cheat us" by delinking progress on NK from
that process. President Gul had promised that there would be
no doors or borders opened for Armenia without progress on
NK, Aliyev asserted. "He lied, I no longer trust him."

4. (S/NF) Aliyev noted that when he met PM Erdogan in Davos
this January, Erdogan had said nothing about the steps Turkey
was contemplating with Armenia. Erdogan was dismissive when
Aliyev tried to raise the difficult issue of Turkish transit
for Azerbaijani gas. After Davos, Erdogan had sent FonMin
Babacan to Baku to explain what was occurring with Armenia
with respect to re-establishing relations. "Babacan asked
for my support, saying we should try to make progress "in
parallel" on NK," but without linkage, Aliyev said
incredulously. Aliyev told Babacan Azerbaijan would not
support Turkey's steps with Armenia without progress on NK
and outlined "all the possible consequences for Turkey and
this region" if Turkey pursued this course. The Turks asked
that Aliyev keep the conversation confidential. Aliyev
agreed, he said, but shortly thereafter, RFE/RL's Armenian
service reported that NK was "no longer an obstacle" to
improvement in Turkish-Armenia relations. This had sparked a
press campaign in Azerbaijan which continues to this day,
Aliyev added.

5. (S/NF) Aliyev said he had twice sent Deputy FonMin Araz
Azimov to Turkey to outline for the Turks what they would win
and what they would lose from normalization without
resolution or progress on NK, and to propose a joint
Turkish-Azerbaijani statement on the matter. Azimov returned
without results, and Azerbaijan now confronts "the reality"
that Turkey will initial, sign and ratify an agreement with
Armenia to open the border and establish diplomatic
relations.

6. (S/NF) If NK is part of the package, Azerbaijan would
positively accept this, Aliyev said. Azerbaijan needs
"something substantive," such as agreement on the Basic
Principles "as we understand them;" or, a confidence building
measure like the liberation of five Azerbaijani territories,
which would still leave Kelbajar and Lachin in Armenia's
hands as leverage in the NK talks. "If that can happen, it
would be a solution," Aliyev said. Simply securing Armenia's
agreement on the outstanding issue of the width of the Lachin
corridor is not enough, as earlier proposed, would not be
enough.

7. (S/NF) Azerbaijan also can no longer maintain its posture
of "patient silence" about the Turkish-Armenia process,

BAKU 00000270 002 OF 003


Aliyev said. He noted that given Erdogan's political
weakness going into the recent Turkish elections, Azerbaijan
had refrained from public statements to avoid impact on the
vote. But "silence was a sign of friendship the Turks do not
deserve." Turkey is manipulating public opinion, portraying
Azerbaijan as acquiescent in its process with Armenia, so
Azerbaijan must now clarify, publicly, its position.

8. (S/NF) Turkey is about to commit "a serious historical
mistake that will never be forgotten," Aliyev asserted. Our
relations will never be the same. We are not one nation and
we never will be. Our relations will be damaged, it will be a
disaster on all issues, security, economy, energy," Aliyev
continued. Turkey has to decide what it will gain and what
it will lose. It will lose Azerbaijan, certainly; Central
Asia as well, and end Turkic solidarity, he continued. There
will be consequences for Georgia if Turkey and Azerbaijan
split. Energy negotiations will end. "They did everything to
ruin energy cooperation," Aliyev said heatedly. He added
later that Turkey underestimates the degree to which
Azerbaijan can influence its domestic politics. Azerbaijan
has never interfered in Turkish internal politics before,
"but this is matter of national concern," he warned.

9. (S/NF) Saying he felt "personally betrayed" by Gul and
Erdogan, Aliyev said he saw no sense in going to Istanbul.

...But Moderation on N-K
--------------


10. (S/NF) Bryza responded that the Secretary had sent him to
Baku because the USG has a deep strategic interest in its
relations with Azerbaijan, and in making Azerbaijan
comfortable with the Turkish-Armenia normalization process.
The Turks know this too; the USG has told them they must deal
with Azerbaijan on gas transit. He told Aliyev that the
Turks have underscored that they are willing and able to
"stop the process" if there is no progress on NK.

11. (S/NF) Underscoring again that "if there is a substantial
contribution for us, then border opening would be normal,"
Aliyev argued again for liberation of five territories as a
confidence-building measure while NK talks continue. Bryza
explained why this would be a non-starter, and pressed Aliyev
to take advantage of the willingness of senior USG leaders to
engage to force progress in the ongoing negotiations, by
securing agreement to the four outstanding issues in the
Basic Principles including the width of the Lachin corridor.
He said that he understood President Sargsian was now
prepared to discuss the corridor, and might agree to define
its width using the range of small arms and light weapons.

12. (S/NF) Aliyev argued that border opening and
establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and
Armenia without "a resolution or commitment" on NK would be
a diplomatic victory for Armenia that would result in a loss
of incentive for Armenia to agree on the four points,
damaging the NK negotiations. Bryza responded that the
Turkey-Armenia process of initialing, signing, ratifying and
implementing border opening would take months, that it was
possible to get agreement on the four points in that
timeframe, and that the Turks had assured the USG that they
would stop the process if Armenia is not constructive in the
negotiations.

13. (S/NF) Bryza proposed to Aliyev that Aliyev and President
Sargsian seek to agree during their meeting in Prague or
Brussels on May 7 on the first three points, discuss the
Lachin Corridor at their meeting in Moscow in June, and
perhaps come to closure on all four points at a meeting on
the margins of the G-8 summit in July. He asked if that
would give Aliyev enough confidence for the Turkey Armenia
process to continue. Aliyev replied "in this case, yes, if
we agree with Armenia on the four points, Turkey will open
the border."

14. (S/NF) Bryza asked if he could relay this to the Turks,
urging them to manage their process so pressure stays on
Armenia as the NK process proceeds in parallel with
normalization. Again lambasting Turkish perfidy, Aliyev
insisted Bryza tell the Turks that they "should not
disconnect" the NK process from their normalization process,
and that they should tell Sargsian they had not disconnected
the two. Noting that when the Azerbaijanis had asked the
Turks point blank whether they had agreed to normalize with
Turkey and open the border without progress on NK, the Turks
"had not responded," Aliyev exploded "Silence means

BAKU 00000270 003 OF 003


yes...they did it! They will be on the black list always."

15. (S/NF) Bryza urged that Aliyev reconsider going to
Istanbul; Aliyev, strongly seconded by Mammadyarov,
demurred, saying that would convey "silent agreement" to what
the Turks are doing.

16. (S/NF) Bryza again pressed Aliyev as to whether he was
prepared to "do the 3 1 deal" on the timetable Bryza had
proposed, with agreement by mid-summer. Aliyev agreed, adding
that if the four outstanding issues cannot be agreed, the
option of immediately liberating five territories, with
Armenia retaining two as leverage in the negotiations,
"should be an option." He said he needed to think through
whether he would want a "signed" agreement on the four.

17. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable.
DERSE