Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU252
2009-04-02 08:50:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZERBAIJAN: WHAT FOLLOWS THE RAPPROCHEMENT?

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU AM AJ 
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RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3314
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000252 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS BRYZA
DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY, APIXTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU AM AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: WHAT FOLLOWS THE RAPPROCHEMENT?

REF: A. BAKU 158

B. BAKU 201

C. BAKU 222

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE E. DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000252

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS BRYZA
DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY, APIXTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU AM AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: WHAT FOLLOWS THE RAPPROCHEMENT?

REF: A. BAKU 158

B. BAKU 201

C. BAKU 222

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE E. DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (S/NF) Summary. As Turkey and Armenia head toward a
historic reconciliation, official Baku is in shock at what it
views as possible major abandonment by its closest cultural
and political partner. Foremost in the minds of Azerbaijani
leaders is the effect of renewed Turkey-Armenia relations on
the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) negotiation process, which they
fear implies a major loss of leverage on Yerevan. While
shuttle diplomacy by the United States has good prospects for
keeping that process alive, GOAJ leaders have made clear that
normalization between Turkey and Armenia without concrete
action on Nagorno-Karabakh would result in a serious rupture
in Azerbaijan-Turkish relations, with implications for United
States interests in the Caucasus and beyond.


2. (S/NF) Summary continued. Azerbaijan's likely policy
shifts in the aftermath of normalization without concurrent
progress on NK would affect U.S. Eurasian energy policy
goals, would possibly affect Azerbaijan's attitudes toward
cooperation with NATO, could tilt Azerbaijan's traditionally
balanced foreign policy more in favor of Russia, and over
time could change the internal GOAJ dynamic on NK for the
worse. The GOAJ has been careful to make clear that the
United States would not be the primary target of negative
policy changes, but U.S. interests would be at risk from the
fallout of Turkey-Azerbaijan rupture or a GOAJ determination
that the USG is not a committed partner in finding a solution
to NK. End Summary.


3. (S/NF) President Aliyev has made no secret to the United
States of his dissatisfaction with the trend toward
reconciliation between the two countries (Reftel A).
Azerbaijan's response to an opening of the border would
likely have a domestic component, seeking to limit Turkish
influence and undermine Turkish interests in Azerbaijan, as
well as a campaign of active measures to influence Turkish
domestic politics to the detriment of the AKP.


4. (S/NF) Azerbaijan's response at home could include
freezing new Turkish capital and businesses out of the
Azerbaijani market and a Russian-style legal assault on
prominent Turkish investors and companies. Aliyev would also
be very likely to curtail more rigorously what he already
views as negative religious influences emanating from Turkey,
which he has only tolerated up to now as a personal
concession to Erdogan (Reftel B). Turkish broadcasting,
especially programs depicting women in Muslim headscarves,
would be further frozen out and the GOAJ might take tough
action to curtail the educational and missionary activities
of the Fetullah Gulen movement, despite the organization's
network of influential supporters.

5. (S/NF) In Turkey, Azerbaijan would likely spend freely to
help political opponents of the AKP and sour Turkish public
opinion - which Baku believes to be ambivalent at best on the
issue - on the Armenian opening. Senior Azerbaijani
officials have hinted that Azerbaijan is able and willing to
cause political problems for the sitting Turkish government,
which it could do most effectively by pursuing an
across-the-board effort with overt and clandestine components
to deny Erdogan a parliamentary majority for ratification of
the agreement. However, it would be out of character for Baku
to go so far as to sever ties with Turkey or take any
irreversible steps.

Energy Consequences - Southern Corridor


6. (S/NF) The most obvious manifestation of Azerbaijan's
dissatisfaction with an Armenian opening would likely be seen
in its energy export policy. The natural gas transit
negotiations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are already
acrimonious, but the problem has largely been a combination
of pricing issues, market access and onward transit, business
issues that at least admit of solutions. President Aliyev's
bitter remark that after an opening to Armenia, Turkey could

BAKU 00000252 002 OF 003


"get gas from its new best friend, Russia" (Reftel A),and
Turkey's need to negotiate a new supply deal with Gazprom by
2011 could well mean that after a Turkey-Armenia opening the
possibility of establishing a "Southern Corridor" through
Turkey for Caspian gas to find its way to European markets
would be substantially more problematic. In this case the
logic for Azerbaijan to keep its gas in the ground, sell it
to Russia, or make a deal to ship its gas to European markets
using Russian infrastructure would be stronger than it is
today. Press reports allege that such deals are already in
the works, although the sources of information are dubious
(septel). At the same time, it is implausible that Baku
would move to disrupt oil transit through Turkey, as oil
exports through the BTC pipeline and corresponding revenue is
Azerbaijan,s economic life line.

Tensions May Rise on the LOC


7. (S/NF) Azerbaijan's general receptiveness to United States
shuttle diplomacy aimed at producing a breakthrough on NK as
the Turkey-Armenia process continues is a hopeful sign
reflecting a pragmatic acceptance of the inevitable and a
decision to pursue the best deal possible under the
circumstances. However, the GOAJ has signaled serious
concerns that the result of even an initialed accord - not
yet signed, ratified or implemented - will result in a
strong domestic reaction in Azerbaijan and an increasingly
intransigent Armenian position in negotiations over NK. If
that assessment is correct, it will undoubtedly strengthen
the hand of those in Azerbaijan's ruling circles who distrust
the Minsk Group process and advocate a more belligerent
approach to NK. Increased tensions, as we have seen before,
could have destabilizing consequences along the Line of
Contact.

Turning to Moscow?


9. (S/NF) Although the GOAJ deeply resents Russia's support
for Armenia, the loss of Turkey as a reliable ally would
force Baku to look more to Moscow for support as the country
with the most real influence on Yerevan. Moscow's recent
behavior elsewhere in the post-Soviet space gives a fair idea
of Russia's price for assisting its former possessions, which
has possible negative implications for Azerbaijan's level of
cooperation in such high-priority areas as OEF logistics. It
is also an open question whether Azerbaijan would leave its
troops in Afghanistan integrated into Turkish units in the
event of a Turkey-Armenia opening.

10. (S/NF) While it is unclear that Russia coul deliver the
Armenian concessions it would need o cement Azerbaijan's
re-orientation toward the Kremlin, Turkey-Armenian
normalization without progress on Nagorno-Karabakh will give
Russia a new opening and new grist for its argument that the
West applies double standards in its relations with
Azerbaijan and is not a committed partner. This will further
fuel the sharp debate that has been underway in the GOAJ for
some time about the extent to which Azerbaijan has seen
support from the West on its key national issue in exchange
for Azerbaijan's cooperation with the West on security and
energy.

Azerbaijani Reaction


11. (C) Azerbaijan has been active since the GOAJ began to
suspect that a Turkey-Armenia deal was at hand. After
directly raising concerns with us, (Ref A),Azerbaijan
engaged the Turks at the highest levels, using the
opportunity afforded by the Economic Cooperation Organization
(ECO) Summit in Teheran March 10-11 for bilateral meetings at
the (foreign) ministerial and presidential levels. Foreign
Minister Mammadyarov also told the Ambassador on March 13
that he was dispatching his deputy Araz Azimov to Ankara to
continue lobbying the GOT (Ref C),and told EUR DAS Bryza on
March 26 that Azimov would be sent again to Ankara to ensure
the Turks understand "what they'll win and what they'll lose"
from premature steps with Armenia.


12. (C) In recent conversations with the Foreign Minister and

BAKU 00000252 003 OF 003


Turkish interlocutors, it has become apparent that Azerbaijan
is preparing itself for an agreement that does not explicitly
link N-K to reconciliation, but somehow preserves the
leverage of the normalization process on the NK negotiations,
with a step in one process followed by a step in the other --
as Foreign Minister Mammadyarov termed it, "inter-binding
parallel." A Turkish diplomat described a similar idea, using
the same hand motions as the Minister to illustrate it, and
suggested that the time lag required for full ratification
and implementation of an agreement might preserve leverage on
Yerevan.


13. (C) The Foreign Minister and others have made clear that
they view skeptically the idea that the intermediate steps to
implementing the agreement will actually provide much
leverage over Yerevan. The FonMin, however, told DAS Bryza
that if the right formula could be found to extract enough
progress on NK in conjunction with normalization, the result
could be a "win-win win" in which "Armenia, Turkey and the US
get normalization, Azerbaijan gets a paper sealed (i.e., a
signed agreement on the Basic Principles and troop withdrawal
from the occupied territories) and Russia will get railroad
access to their bases in Armenia." In this scenario, "only
Iran loses."

Comment


13. (S/NF) Baku is seriously alarmed that it will lose
important leverage with respect to resolving Nagorno-Karabakh
through Turkey-Armenian normalization. The government is
pulling out all the stops to ensure we and the Turks know it,
and is gauging carefully our response. Many in Azerbaijan
are also deeply emotional about Turkish "betrayal." While it
would be uncharacteristic of Azerbaijan to let emotion drive
matters of hard national interest, on NK, this factor could
play a larger and more unpredictable role.
Characteristically, the GOAJ is also scrambling to try to
turn the (apparently) inevitable to some good effect.

14. (S/NF) There are two key risks to US interests in this
scenario: the degree to which the GOAJ believes we are
willing to "sell out" Azerbaijan on it most critical national
issue, which would seriously set back our efforts to maintain
existing and secure new GOAJ cooperation on key US interests;
and the blowback on our interests from what could be strong
negative steps against Turkey. The best course to managing
both is sustained, intensified engagement with Azerbaijan, at
senior levels, underscoring our commitment to produce results
on NK as normalization goes forward -- and to produce the
"win-win-win" scenario that the FonMin described.
DERSE