Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAKU22
2009-01-13 13:00:00
SECRET
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

BAKU'S PERSPECTIVES ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Tags:  PREL PGOV AJ AM RU TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5669
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHKB #0022/01 0131300
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131300Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0596
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3204
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1242
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000022 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ AM RU TU
SUBJECT: BAKU'S PERSPECTIVES ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH

REF: A. (A) 08 BAKU 943 (NOTAL)

B. (B) 08 BAKU 1077 (NOTAL)

C. (C) 08 BAKU 1157

D. (D) INR ASSESSMENT DTD DEC 30 2008

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000022

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ AM RU TU
SUBJECT: BAKU'S PERSPECTIVES ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH

REF: A. (A) 08 BAKU 943 (NOTAL)

B. (B) 08 BAKU 1077 (NOTAL)

C. (C) 08 BAKU 1157

D. (D) INR ASSESSMENT DTD DEC 30 2008

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: One of the few positive effects of Russia's
war on Georgia in August 2008 was a reinvigoration of efforts
to solve the Caucasus' other frozen conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Many observers, and even officials at the
highest levels of both governments, felt that the stark
demonstration of the consequences of allowing a similar
frozen conflict to fester would provide the impetus for a
breakthrough. More cynically, the GOAJ also believed that
Armenia's harsh experience with its isolation during the war
would force it to reach out to Baku in hopes of ending its
questionable reliance on Iran as its only direct link to the
outside world (Reftel A). Four months on, we assess that
this hopeful attitude has largely dissipated in Azerbaijan.
In part, this is because the GOAJ feels that its objections
to the Madrid principles have gone unheeded, and that
insufficient international attention has been given to
resolution of the conflict. Uncertainty over Russian
motives, Turkish overtures to Armenia and the U.S. political
environment, as well as rhetorical oversteps by both
presidents, have also contributed to the general
deterioration of confidence. In the present atmosphere,
Azerbaijani posturing about the military option, while not
implying a present danger, needs to be taken as more than
mere rhetoric. The GOAJ will attach considerable importance
to intensified high-level interest from the new
Administration. End Summary.


Loss of Confidence in Madrid Principles
--------------


2. (C) A significant aspect of Azerbaijan's unwillingness to
move forward decisively on N-K within the current Minsk Group
context is rooted in its discomfort with the Madrid document.
The GOAJ feels that its reservations about the document have
never been taken seriously. Deputy FM Araz Azimov told EU
Ambassador Waddams bluntly on November 9: "We do not like the
Madrid document . . . and have never signed on." Baku

distrusts the "all-or-nothing" approach of Madrid and prefers
a phased approach that starts with the turnover of the
occupied territories. The government in Baku takes every
opportunity to stress its absolute position on territorial
integrity generally and Lachin in particular, as opposed to
Armenia,s focus on self-determination. The GOAJ may think
it can moot this issue through the opening of "all
communications" (Reftel B) across the international border
and will try to convert Russian desires to supply its bases
in Armenia through Azerbaijani territory into Russian
pressure on Armenia to achieve this.

The Russia Factor and U.S. Leadership
--------------


3. (C) A consistent theme from Azerbaijani interlocutors is
that Russia has gained the "upper hand" among the Minsk Group
co-chair countries, mainly because of the faster pace of its
N-K diplomacy and the personal involvement of President
Medvedev. President Aliyev,s foreign policy advisor Novruz
Mammadov told this directly to the Ambassador on November 6,
after the Moscow summit. At the same time, Azerbaijan is
frustrated with what is perceived to be a lack of U.S.
leadership and engagement on NK. According to a wide range
of contacts, Baku cannot understand why the USG will not
intervene on the side of Azerbaijan and, as Presidential
Apparat Chief Ramiz Mehdiyev said, "demand the aggressor to
leave our lands." Moreover, Baku wants the USG to make
statements on Azerbaijan's territorial integrity that match
the comprehensiveness of those that Washington has made on
Georgia in terms of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Baku blames
inaction on the Armenian lobby, with government officials and
leading analysts in Azerbaijan suggesting that Russia, as a
result, now "holds all of the cards." This notion of
Moscow,s "upper hand" does not necessarily imply that the
GOAJ is inclined to accept any Russian proposal; rather Baku

BAKU 00000022 002 OF 004


laments that the other international mediators are allowing
Moscow to set the agenda.

Baku,s Take on Moscow,s Role
--------------


4. (S) Baku's appreciation of Moscow's role is both strategic
and tactical. On the strategic level, the GOAJ sees Moscow's
maneuvering on N-K as part and parcel of a plan to exert
decisive influence over the South Caucasus as a whole, and
believes the Russians are trying to link a solution of the
territorial problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia to an
opportunity to secure transit rights for supplies to its
forward bases in Armenia, this being a reflection of the
Defense Ministry's considerable influence over Russian
Caucasus policy (Reftel B) (Note: Russia, denied passage
through Azerbaijan and Georgia, has to rely on an expensive
and underdeveloped land route through Iran. End Note).
Russian involvement might also be motivated by a desire to
secure additional Azerbaijani gas supplies for Gazprom's
over-promised and under-supplied pipeline projects. Finally,
Russia may be seeking to bolster its military presence in
Azerbaijan ) at the Qabala radar site ) or station its
troops as peacekeepers in N-K.


5. (C) The tactical consideration is that Azerbaijan
considers Russia to be more sympathetic to Armenia and feels
its own position to be stronger when there is another large
power (i.e. the U.S. or EU) involved. In this sense,
Azerbaijan's warnings about Russia's advantages in the
process can be viewed partially as a gambit to spur increased
American involvement so that Russia's offered conditions to
Azerbaijan improve. Doubts about Turkey,s reliability in
light of its diplomatic approach to Armenia add urgency to
Azerbaijan,s need for U.S. involvement.


6. (S) At some point Russia may negotiate a price it can
"charge" for restoring Azerbaijan's territory, assuming that
they can bring the Armenians along. This could pose a direct
threat to U.S. interests in the region. For example, the
price may include a gas deal that would essentially sink the
Southern Corridor, undercut U.S. influence in the region or
weaken Georgian sovereignty. From Baku's perspective, Russia
has little interest in solving the conflict, except as a
readily-exploitable lever to influence on both Yerevan and
Baku. OSCE Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office
Amb. Andrzej Kasprzyk repeated these views in private on
October 21, October 30 and December 15.

A Quick Deal Unlikely
--------------


7. (S) Azerbaijan's basic mistrust of Russia and natural
bias towards maximalism in N-K negotiations make the quick
realization such a deal unlikely but not impossible. The
limits, as well as the possibilities, of Russia's power were
shown at the November 2 summit in Moscow between Presidents
Medvedev, Aliyev and Sargsian. Temporarily at least, the
summit gave Russia the initiative and control of the process;
and at its conclusion Russia could point to the bland joint
declaration it produced as a success )- the first document
co-signed by the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents since

1994.


8. (S) However, President Aliyev also told the Ambassador at
his inauguration October 29 that he had to be coaxed into
attending by a personal telephone appeal from Medvedev and
that his decision to go came at the last minute. He also
told the Ambassador then that he rejected out of hand the
first Russian proposal for a communique, rewriting it
himself. Foreign Minister Mammadyarov told us on November 10
that Russia also attempted to insinuate the concept of
introducing its peacekeepers at the summit (Reftel B),which
he told us Aliyev rejected forcefully. Russia's efforts to
dominate and grandstand were on full display during the
summit as it kept its Minsk Group co-chairs as far from the
meeting and the presidents as possible.


9. (C) While much has been made of the spirit of the
declaration and the commitment to a political solution, the
rhetoric of both sides since the meeting )- notably

BAKU 00000022 003 OF 004


Armenia,s discussion of self-determination and Azerbaijan,s
insistence on territorial integrity, with an occasional
threat of the use of military force )- seems to us to
indicate that rather little progress has really been made.
Aliyev's top foreign policy aide Novruz Mammadov made this
point to the Ambassador and EUR/CARC office director Hunt on
December 3 (Reftel C). Baku remains apprehensive about
including NK Armenians, who unilaterally have declared
independence, into official talks, and fears that Moscow,s
support for independence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
combined with a Western-led &Kosovo precedent,8 will spur
Armenia officially to recognize NK independence. For all
this, Russia's recent diplomacy )- the clumsiness of the
November 2 summit notwithstanding )- raises the real
possibility that it may be able to upend the Minsk Group and
impose a settlement much to its advantage if it can find the
right formula. Baku,s alienation from the Madrid principles
increases the chance of this occurring.

Turkish Maneuvers Have Baku on Edge
--------------


10. (C) Turkey,s diplomatic approaches to Armenia also
complicate Baku,s appraisal of the N-K situation.
Azerbaijan fears that Ankara,s longstanding linkage of N-K
to any normalization with Armenia is in jeopardy (Reftel A).
The GOAJ worries the Turks will sell them out if it leads to
an opening of the border and other prospective benefits, such
as preferential market access and the end of the genocide
resolution threats. Turkey, of course, has to balance the
advantages it believes it can gain from settling with Armenia
against the disruption of relations with its most political
and cultural ally and a valued energy supplier. The effect
of this issue on Baku,s perception of the U.S. as an N-K
mediator is that United States support for Turkish-Armenian
reconciliation is interpreted locally as support for whatever
betrayal of Azerbaijani interests the GOAJ suspects Ankara of
perpetrating.

Military Option is not Foreclosed
--------------


11. (C) The most visible sense in which the Moscow
Declaration has already broken down is the disconnect over
whether it truly committed the sides to the rejection of a
military solution. The text of the declaration commits them
to the use of political means, and allegedly President Aliyev
told Sargsian in Moscow that he considered the military
option to be nonexistent. However, within a month of the
meeting, Aliyev was telling Italian RAI television the
opposite. One possible reason for Aliyev's apparent
turnabout was Sargsian,s commentary shortly after the Moscow
meeting ) words that were seen by some as indelicate and
over-confident in Baku. Part of the dynamic between the
countries since the peace process began was to maintain
uncompromising public faces while conducting diplomacy in
private. Both leaders acutely feel the need to maintain
tough public facades and each often appreciates the other's
need to do this.


12. (C) However, Aliyev's rhetoric should not be interpreted
in this light alone. INR observed in its assessment of
December 30, 2008 (Reference D) that Aliyev,s use of a
foreign platform for that statement suggests that it was
intended for a much broader audience than Azerbaijani
domestic opinion. Also, Amb. Kasprzyk told the Embassy that
Aliyev repeated this sentiment to him in private December 11,
following the OSCE Helsinki Ministerial. Embassy discussions
with others -) notably (but certainly not only) Presidential
Apparat chief Ramiz Mehdiyev and Defense Minister Safar
Abiyev -- suggest that the idea of rejecting ab initio the
military option has no support.


13. (C) President Aliyev,s 2009 New Year's Day address to
the nation set a new standard for bellicosity ) he said that
"we live in a state of war," only "the first phase of the
war" is over, and "we must be ready at any moment to liberate
our native lands from the occupier." Outside observers
recognize that Azerbaijan presently has no chance of
succeeding if it tries to retake N-K and the occupied
territories by force. We see no evidence to suggest that

BAKU 00000022 004 OF 004


Azerbaijan accepts this as reality or intends to give up the
leverage it believes it gains by retaining the war option.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) An additional reason for Baku's (and probably
Yerevan's) reluctance to move forward after the Moscow summit
is the desire of both sides to take the measure of the
incoming U.S. Administration before committing to anything.
The changing of the guard in Washington provides an
opportunity to reset the process. The most effective way for
the United States to encourage a settlement that will address
the fundamental issues while advancing broad U.S. interests
is to invigorate the Minsk Group with sustained attention
from the highest levels of the Administration. The goal
would not be so much to change the co-chairs' process, which
is the only forum with any hope of crafting an intelligent
settlement; rather, it would be to counterbalance the
authoritative appearance that Medvedev's personal attention
brings to Russia's position. The highly positive Azeri
responses that the Vice President,s and Deputy Secretary,s
recent comments on N-K and the territorial intergrity issue
engendered demonstrates the efficacy of this approach.


15. (C) The good offices of the Secretary or the Deputy
Secretary, for example, could also conceivably be used to lay
the groundwork for confidence-building measures independent
of the technical aspects of the negotiations, such as by
inducing the AJ and AM presidents to adopt understandings on
the rhetoric they employ in public. Elevation of the U.S.
profile in the Minsk Group will reinvigorate that process and
discourage non-transparent deals extraneous to its structure.
Again, these are deals that largely serve Russian interests
and are not consistent with U.S. goals of durable peace and
stability between independent and peacefully-coexisting
Caucasian states.
LU