HOW IRAN BUILDS INFLUENCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000132

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019
TAGS: PREL KISL ECON EAID AJ LE IZ IR
SUBJECT: HOW IRAN BUILDS INFLUENCE

REF: A) 2008 BAKU 1018 B) 2008 BAKU 1069 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POLECON COUNSELOR ROB GARVERICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary
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1. (S) Iranian outreach activities in Azerbaijan rest on a
tripod of "social engagement" organizations, including an
"Iran Assistance Society"; the Baku-based Iranian Culture
House and its affiliates; and the Iranian Red Crescent
society, based in "Iranian Clinics" in Baku and elsewhere.
Important satellite institutions, such as charitable
foundations administered by Iranians with Revolutionary Guard
ties and Iranian-funded mosques (one led by a son-in-law of
Ayatollah Meshkini),exist as de facto sub-sets under these
three categories.


2. (S) While geographic proximity and overlapping culture,
language, and religion make Azerbaijan a particularly
accessible target fo Iranian penetration and influence
building, thestructure outlined above suggests a model for
mehodologies of Iranian penetration in other Islamic
countries. Although the long-range implications and even
goals of this Iranian effort are unclear the immediate goal
appears to be the weaning awy of the Azerbaijani population
from a "Western" to a more explicitly Islamic and pro-Iranian
political and cultural orientation. While GOAJ policy change
may be an ultimate desired result, regime change does not
appear to be the short-term objective of these activities.
End Summary.

Iran's "Outreach" Goals
--------------


3. (S) Note: This cable is the first in a series of reports
delving into Iranian influence-building activities in
Azerbaijan; positioning and activities in Azerbaijan and the
region of Revolutionary Guard or other regime-connected
companies and individuals; related illicit trading
activities; and similar issues. End Note.


4. (S) The following information is based on discussions
with Iranian business figures, students, and academics based
in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis from several levels of
society. All sources claimed direct knowledge of at least
some aspects of these Iranian activities. In terms of broad
outreach, the main thrust of Iranian influence-building here
appears to be directed primarily towards influence and
network-building within the general population in an effort
to bring Azerbaijan's society and people into a non-Western,
"Islamic" cultural and political orbit sympathetic to Iran.
This, rather than fomenting short-term regime change, may be
Iran's immediate priority. While Azerbaijan is perhaps
unique among regional countries in sharing with Iran a large
degree of cultural, historic, religious, and linguistic
similarities, with minor revisions the practices discussed
below may serve as a model for Iranian influence-building
practices in the larger Middle East, and indeed the entire
Islamic world.

Iran's "Three-Pronged" Methodology
--------------


5. (S) Iran's influence-building and network-building
efforts in Azerbaijan are low-profile, but substantial.
Exempting the various diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic
activities of Iran's large Embassy (regarded by several
Azerbaijani interlocutors as increasingly ineffective
compared to earlier years),Iran's influence-building effort
inside Azerbaijan is largely three-pronged:

-- distribution of financial assistance and micro-loans to
Azerbaijanis via an "Iran Assistance Society," with offices
in provincial towns; other Iranian foundations also disburse
stipends or grants.

-- extra-cultural proselytizing, scholarship-granting,
pilgrimage-funding, and general networking activity centered
on the Iranian "House of Culture" in Baku, and loosely
related mosques and clerics; and

-- medical assistance and intelligence personnel positioning
by the Iranian Red Crescent and an associated "Iran Clinic" in Baku.

The information provided below focuses on Iran's micro-loans
and other financial assistance activities ("prong #1").
Information on the other two "prongs" will be provided in
Part II of this cable (septel).

Iranian Micro-Loans and Financial Grants
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6. (S) In the last several months many elite Azerbaijani's
have expressed concern to Iran watcher and other Baku EmbOffs
about allegedly spreading pro-Iranian Islamicization in Baku
and the provinces, partially fostered by Iranian financial
grants and other "outreach" activities (see reftels). While
emphasizing this issue rhetorically, these sources typically
have provided little beyond assertions to back up these
concerns. In the last few weeks Iran watcher has finally
received information from a number of "grass roots" sources
that provide some concrete information on what is occurring
in practice in Baku and at least some provincial centers
(though comprehensive information on Azerbaijan as a whole
remains to be assembled).

Iranian Loans in Practice: Generous Terms...
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7. (S) An Azerbaijani XXXXXXXXXXXX from a leading
family in the (majority-Sh'ia) village of Lahej in North
Central Azerbaijan, and his father, both of whom have been
known well by Iran watcher for more than seven years. These
sources provided Iran watcher with details about several
hundred thousand dollars in micro-loans and grants given
recently by Iranians to Lahej residents. They described
these as loans and charitable grants given by a regional body
known as the 'Iran Assistance Society (Iran Yardim Jamiati),"
operating out of an office in the provincial capital of
Ismaili (where the source's family also maintains a house).
They claimed that over the last few months this organization
has caused a stir in Lahej and the greater region by
providing small shopkeepers, craftsmen, and other residents
(including several of their relatives) with "business
development" loans of up to 4,000 Manats (about $4300).

8. (S) They described these as no-interest loans, with
phased repayment delayed until two years after the date of
the loan. Noting that neither the GOAJ nor any other
organization offers such assistance loans to broad numbers of
local people, they asserted (somewhat cynically) that as a
result of its generous micro-credits and charitable grants
"Iran is becoming very popular in Lahej now." The sources
said that loan applicants are not asked explicitly about
their politics or religious activities, but claimed that
prominent local religious conservatives and Hajjis (including
the father's half-uncle) are frequently consulted about
applicants from their area before loan decisions are made.
They also opined that some of these conservatives have access
to larger funds from the Iranians, citing improved houses,
new cars, and other "circumstantial evidence." Comment: We
have heard widespread assertions that conservative Islamic
networking "pays" in the provinces, with Sh'ia close to Iran
gaining income as a result, while conservative Sunnis obtain
benefits from Turkish or Saudi sources. As articulated, the
attitude echoes the Soviet-era belief that becoming a
"professional communist" could be a lucrative career path.
End Comment.


9. (S) The father added that the loan officers commonly ask
applicants informally about conditions in their area, who the
leading/most respected people are, whether they have made any
pilgrimages, and similar questions, but did not give specific
examples. The student reported that he had been advised by
his great-uncle to approach the Iranians for funding for a
notional pilgrimage to a famous Iranian religious shrine in
Mashad. Comment: Much of this information coincides with
claims provided separately to Iran watcher by Iranian
students and other residents in Baku unknown to this source
(see paras #11 - #13 below). End Comment.

...But No "Easy Touch"
--------------


10. (S) Implying that grants are not given to all
conservative comers, the XXXXXXXXXXXX related that a religiously
conservative relative recently put a hejab (head covering) on
his elderly sister, and submitted a request from her for a
charitable grant. The student said that grant was denied
because the woman has four adult sons. He added that many
women who apply for assistance put on hejabs specifically for
the purpose of their application (Note: hejabs are not
traditionally worn in Lahej, though social practices are
conservative in other respects. End Note).

Other Sources on Iranian Social Loans
--------------


11. (S) An Iranian student activist, a well-connected
Iranian business figure, a former Azerbaijani Ambassador to
Iran (Nasib Nassibili),and a former Iranian political
journalist, separately commented on alleged Iranian regime
affiliated activity in Azerbaijan. According to these
sources, the "Komiteh Imam Khomeini" (specified by the
student) and other major Iranian foundations help poor
families in Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and
elsewhere, with the help of on-budget government grants as
well as profits from commercial and real estate assets. All
asserted that (apart from being notionally subject to audits)
these organizations have little constraint on their
activities, and frequently works closely with the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian security services.


12. (S) All sources claimed that these organizations
typically give no-interest credit to low-income Azerbaijanis,
including Azerbaijani refugees resulting from the
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict with Armenia, and other types of
financial or in-kind assistance. Two sources cited in
passing the large Iranian Foundation of the Oppressed
("Baniyadeh Mustazafan") that owns a soap detergent factory
in Baku (and many enterprises in Iran),and provides stipends
to eligible Iranian residents in Azerbaijan and other
disbursements. The sources claimed that the head of this
Foundation in Azerbaijan is a retired senior officer in the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard (septel).


13. (S) Gathering information on local issues, elites and
religious figures was mentioned by virtually all sources as
an important activity of these organizations. Sources
claimed that the organizations also seek to develop
relationships with religiously conservative figures by
offering them assistance and/or influence in granting
assistance to others; scholarships for their children in Iran
(or in Baku at the large Iranian-funded private school);
funds for pilgrimages; employment or business opportunities
with Iranians or Azerbaijani Iranophiles; etc.


14. (S) Several sources explicitly depicted the
organizations as clearing houses for identifying individuals
amenable to training in Iran, who might become a future
"vanguard" Iran-sympathetic/anti-Western political or
religious cadres. Valeh Aleskarov, Deputy Speaker of the
Azerbaijan Majlis, and a figure well known to the USG,
observed to Iran watcher that "it doesn't take many committed
people to become an effective vanguard," and asserted that if
even ten percent of those assisted by Iran became politicized
Iranophiles "this wil be dangerous for us" as a politically
secular country.

DERSE