IMPROVING COORDINATION: SCIENTIAL GLOBAL STUDY ON

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000969

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IZ ECON PGOV PREL EAID
SUBJECT: IMPROVING COORDINATION: SCIENTIAL GLOBAL STUDY ON
IRAQI MINISTERIAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT


1. Summary: The recently completed assessment of U.S.
capacity development (CD) programs in Iraq by the independent
consultant Scientia Global, Inc. calls for stronger
coordination among the ministerial advisors, a comprehensive
strategic framework, metrics for measuring progress, support
for sustainment and transition plans, and reinforcement of
Iraqi buy-in. We have been implementing many of the changes
recommended in this post-initiated study for some time and
have begun work on others. Among them is improving
coordination and planning by organizing ministerial working
groups, preparing work plans to guide their efforts, and
ensuring their work supports the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP)
and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). One of the
report's main recommendations we do not go along with is the
proposal to develop an overarching CD strategic plan and a
new management structure to carry it out. While such an
approach may have had merit when we were pursuing a variety
of CD programs, it has less to commend itself now that many
of these programs are phasing out and the remaining ones are
implemented almost entirely through USAID. In our view,
stronger coordination using our existing frameworks offers a
better way forward. Our internal working groups to support
implementation of the Strategic Framework Agreement will
support these efforts. We believe the approach outlined here
offers a feasible and effective way to assist efforts aimed
at building the capacity of Iraq's ministries to manage
projects, execute budgets, and deliver services to the Iraqi
people. End Summary.

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Assessing Capacity Development
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2. In a report issued January 30, 2007, the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) concluded there was a
need for more effective support for capacity development
(CD). In response to these concerns and our ongoing efforts
to improve coordination among our wide-ranging CD program,
post commissioned Scientia Global, Inc. to carry out a
five-month Iraq Ministerial Capacity Development Assessment.
Starting its work in September, Scientia looked at various CD
programs aimed at improving both public administration
(training, mentoring) and technical support (operations and
maintenance). It assessed more than 125 CD programs and
projects in ten targeted ministries. It determined that over
$600 million had been spent on these activities since 2004.
Scientia conducted a comprehensive survey soliciting USG and
Iraqi opinions.

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Coordination and Metrics
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3. Scientia noted overall improvement in operations of
various ministries between 2006-2008, including increased
power generation output at power plants supported by USG O&M
and improvements in budget execution. It also recognized
that while USG CD programs have been well received and
valued, it is beyond our means to satisfy all CD needs of the
Iraqi government. Communication and coordination among USG
agencies were cited as "primary concern" and "overriding
theme" of the assessment. It criticized the lack of impact
indicator metrics at the overall program level and concluded
that metrics for advisor activities were poorly documented.
Scientia called for a unified set of metrics, including
baselines, tied to a single interagency CD strategy
independent of project metrics. For example, it commended
the efforts of USAID's Tatweer program in its use of metrics
at the output and outcome levels, but noted that these
Qat the output and outcome levels, but noted that these
metrics did not capture all USG CD efforts. While
acknowledging that coordinating bodies do exist, Scientia
concluded that the USG CD efforts lack an entity with the
requisite authority to direct the efforts of multiple USG
agencies.

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Single Interagency Strategy Needed
--------------


4. A key conclusion in Scientia's report is that CD programs
need clear strategic CD goals. It did not believe that the
mission's Joint Campaign Plan or the bilateral Strategic
Framework Agreement adequately defines those goals. While
noting that the JCP includes metrics for measuring success
and identifying targets, it determined that it does not link
these metrics to agency-specific strategies. It argued
instead for a single strategic planning framework to direct
all CD activities.


5. Scientia also urged putting in place a stronger
coordination process. It saw the Embassy's Ministerial
Engagement Coordination Committee (MECC) as a valuable forum

for general inter-ministerial information sharing, but argued
for a more formal mechanism to manage intra-ministerial
coordination. It noted that the MECC establishes indices and
baseline data, but does not tie them to tasks required to
support a broader CD strategy. Scientia called for
restructuring the MECC to direct policy, strategic direction,
and management of all CD programs.


6. Other recommendations in Scientia's report included
preparing a transition plan for "sunset organizations" and a
common definition for CD; formalizing Iraqi ownership and
involvement; developing sustainment plans, including details
on training follow-up; nurturing professional ties with Iraqi
ministries; encouraging Iraqi engagement of international
consulting firms or establishment of joint ventures; and
compiling an inventory of ministerial engagement projects.
Finally, Scientia urged that sufficient resources be made
available to implement its recommendations.

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Capacity Development: Next Steps
--------------


7. We concur with many of Scientia's recommendations and are
already implementing many of them. We are developing
transition plans for "sunset programs." We are working to
reinforce Iraqi buy-in and consolidate strong professional
relationships with Iraqi ministries. We are supporting
efforts to hire international legal and consulting services
for Iraqi ministries (e.g., by retaining on the Ministry of
Electricity's behalf the services of a leading international
law firm to negotiate a variety of rehabilitation
transactions and provide legal mentoring). We will continue
our efforts on these fronts and aim to implement best
practices across all ministries.


8. We also agree on the need to avoid stove piping and to
clearly link CD programs to broader goals of the mission.
However, rather than attempting to devise a single,
overarching strategic framework with difficult-to-define
metrics, we believe a better approach lies in improving
planning and coordination among our teams of advisors in
individual ministries and ensuring their work supports the
strategy defined in the JCP and SFA. We want to avoid a
laborious effort to design and impose a new bureaucratic
structure and instead focus on ensuring that work plans are
cross-referenced and support our broader strategies.


9. Another concern we have with Scientia's proposal for a
new centrally directed planning and management framework is
that it is not needed. In the past, our CD efforts consisted
of many different programs implemented by various agencies
represented within the mission. USAID handled Tatweer, the
largest of them, but also was responsible for others. The
Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) implemented the
Ministry of Electricity's Operations, Maintenance and
Sustainability (OMS) program and had many advisors providing
technical assistance in various ministries. DOD's Task Force
on Business Stability Operations runs the Procurement
Assistance Program. Until recently, six 3161 advisors were
attached to the Economic Section.


10. But this situation is changing. ITAO's OMS program has
already been transferred to the Ministry of Electricity.
With the exception of USAID's programs, the rest are due to
be phased out or transformed into Iraqi-led efforts within
the next year or two. We are seeking funding to continue
substantial support for CD programs, at least through fiscal
year 2010. For the most part, implementation will be in the
hands of USAID, which already has effective procedures in
Qhands of USAID, which already has effective procedures in
place for planning, metrics, and management control.


11. Still, we believe we need to improve our planning and
coordination of our existing CD programs, but that a less
centrally directed and more collaborative approach is
warranted. To achieve this, we are moving to implement a
three-track approach. First, we are following through on a
new initiative to improve coordination among the advisors
working with the individual ministries. Under the direction
of the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, we are
convening advisors within each ministry to discuss strategic
goals and develop work plans. The Embassy's Agriculture
Working Group and Public Finance Management Action Group
(PFMAG) are already in place. Advisors working on oil issues
have expanded their existing weekly meeting to coordinate
their work. The advisors to the Ministry of Electricity are
now meeting regularly. Initial meetings have taken place
bringing advisors together working with the Ministry of
Planning and the National Investment Commission. In the
future, the agenda of the PFMAG will be expanded to include
coordination on issues involving advisors to the planning
ministry.



12. Second, we will continue to use the larger MECC forum to
facilitate inter-ministerial coordination. The MECC will
continue to play an important role in exchanging information
and sharing lessons learned and best practices on
cross-cutting issues. The MECC can also be used to identify
programmatic gaps and duplications.


13. Third, a small group of MECC principals will meet
regularly as needed. Participants will be the section heads
responsible for CD programs (USAID, ITAO, Treasury, etc).
They will oversee the coordination of the individual
ministerial teams, ensure consistency in plans prepared by
their program units, and provide overall guidance.


14. Our new internal SFA working groups under the Joint
Coordinating Committees for Economics and Energy and for
Essential Services and IT will support our CD efforts. Work
plans for these groups will encourage coordination and
information-sharing among the advisors in individual
ministries. The plans will outline deliverables, assign
roles and responsibilities for advisors, provide for more
effective communication with Iraqi counterparts, and ensure
consistency with the JCP and SFA.


15. CD encompasses broad issues of technical training,
mentoring, and institution-building; it is the means and not
the ends to achieving our goals. By implementing this
three-track approach and using the structure of the SFA to
strengthen internal coordination, we will improve delivery of
CD assistance, thus enabling Iraq's ministries more
effectively to manage and sustain their programs.
BUTENIS