UNAMI'S DIBS REPORT ROLLOUT STRATEGY: SRSG DE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000963

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: UNAMI'S DIBS REPORT ROLLOUT STRATEGY: SRSG DE
MISTURA LAYS OUT THE PLAN

Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reason 1.4 (d).


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Summary
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1. (C) In an April 6 meeting with Charge and poloffs, SRSG
De Mistura laid out his strategy and the specific steps he
intends to take in the next ten days to roll out UNAMI's
Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) reports. De Mistura and
his team have thought through possible reactions and
strategies to keep all players engaged in a political
process. De Mistura assessed that while PM Maliki, KRG
President Barzani and others may well seek to distance
themselves from the reports, in the end they all have an
interest in beginning a political dialogue and the UN process
provides an "alibi." The current Arab-Kurd dispute, De
Mistura stressed, is fraught with danger. Violence could
erupt at any time, if only because of human miscalculation in
areas where Arab and Kurdish forces face off. To avoid what
de Mistura called this "nightmare scenario," or simply seeing
the DIBs reports die on the vine upon release, will require a
carefully choreographed set of steps in which, he stressed,
U.S. support and persuasion will be essential. We underlined
the U.S. would seek to be strongly helpful behind a UN lead.
De Mistura requested that the UN, U.S. and EU jointly go to
Irbil April 16-17 to persuade Massoud Barzani to seize the
opportunity represented by the DIBs reports to begin a
political dialogue. UNAMI has a good plan for the immediate
rollout. Its thinking for the next phase is shallower, and
few Iraqis have thought of how to establish mechanisms and
agendas for discussions about DIBs, much less negotiations.
We will be gently prodding UNAMI and Iraqis to start thinking
ahead to those issues too. End Summary.

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Maliki -- Postpone, and if that Doesn't Work, Avoid
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2. (C) On April 6, Charge and poloffs met with UN SRSG
Staffan De Mistura in his office. De Mistura opened by
asking PMIN, who had recently had a series of meetings with
various Iraqi leaders, including the Barzanis in Irbil, for
his assessment of the situation. De Mistura then provided
his own analysis of the motivations and political
calculations of the key players. Maliki, he said, just wants
to "postpone, postpone, postpone....he believes time is on
his side," both for his own political future and for the Arab
position in Kirkuk and other DIBs. Maliki had tried to
persuade De Mistura several months ago not to get involved in
the DIBs issue; Maliki said that he would take care of
"handling his Kurdish friends." De Mistura said that that
option has now been closed by the support of UN Security
Council members, as well as Iraq's own Ambassador in New
York, for UNAMI's work on DIBs. De Mistura expects Maliki --
knowing the reports are coming -- will "shrewdly" do all he
can to personally avoid receiving them, and instead will
delegate the issue to someone else on his team. Beginning a
negotiation, to Maliki, inevitably means "yielding part of
the Arab world to the Kurdish world," whereas standing aloof
both insulates the PM from criticism and allows him to
intervene as needed without being bogged down as a
negotiator. In addition, De Mistura commented, maintaining a
tough stand frames Maliki as the steadfast defender of Arab
rights and strengthens his hand in the run-up to
parliamentary elections. PMIN responded that Maliki is
miscalculating if he believes Iraqi Sunni Arabs will support
him in national elections.

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Q --------------
Barzani -- Caught between Iraqi Real Politic
and Internal Kurdish Political Pressures
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3. (C) Turning to what he called the other key player in
the disputed boundaries issue, Massoud Barzani, De Mistura
opined that Barzani understands that "this is not the time to
take over Kirkuk." However, internal Kurdish politics
require Barzani to push nonetheless, De Mistura noted. This
tension is compounded by Barzani's distrust of Maliki (a
mutual, and deeply personal, feeling between the men, PMIN
pointed out),and his sense "that the UN has exhausted its
usefulness for me." De Mistura proposed that the UN, U.S.
and EU jointly approach Barzani to brief him on the reports
and reassure him that the International Community's support
for Kurdish aspirations remains strong.

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Hashmi -- Afraid to Be Seen as Impotent
in Defending Arab Rights
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4. (C) De Mistura said Iraqi Vice President Tareq Al-Hashmi
has warned him that issuing the DIBs reports will only prove
inflammatory. Like Maliki, his instinct is to postpone, also
believing that time is on the Arabs' side as the U.S.
military prepares to withdraw and the Kurds grow more
isolated politically. In addition, De Mistura said,
Al-Hashmi sees himself as particularly vulnerable: "the Arab
side will expect him to defend them against the Kurds and he
will be accused of being weak" when he is unable to meet that
expectation.

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The Nightmare Scenario No One Really Wants
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5. (C) While Maliki, Barzani, Hashmi and others each have
reasons to wish the DIBs reports away, De Mistura noted, none
-- in the end -- truly wants to see the situation
dramatically worsen. If they did, De Mistura surmised, they
have had ample opportunities to spark serious violence.
Nevertheless, with Iraqi Army and Kurdish forces facing off,
there is a very real threat that human error or
miscalculation could lead to "a nightmare scenario."

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352 Pages of Reports - An Alibi for Everyone
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6. (C) De Mistura said he concluded that delaying release
of the DIBs reports will only raise the odds that the
situation would worsen: Maliki and Barzani will become ever
more "negatively focused" on elections, the personal
animosity between them can only deepen, and the chance for
"human error" will increase with time. The only alternative,
he said, is "to throw on the table 352 pages of reports and
say 'here we are, at least read through this.'" The reports
(which he said are almost all complete and have begun to be
translated) "are not restrictive and not prescriptive; they
show that no one is perfect and it gives them all an alibi"
for avoiding the trap of their own rhetoric.

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Turkey -- Engaged, Involved, Active
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7. (C) De Mistura stressed the important role Turkey can
play to mediate between Baghdad and Irbil. The Kurds, he
said, "feel comfortable with them" but also recognize that
the price of Turkish support is that "you don't take over
Kirkuk since it's a clear Turkish redline." De Mistura went
on to say "Turkey is on our side, we should be helping them."
To that end, he is sending Deputy SRSG Andrew Gilmour and
UNAMI Political Officer Peter Bartu to Ankara in the coming
days to discuss with the Turks how best to move forward
together. He noted that Gilmour and Bartu have requested a
meeting with Ambassador Jeffery while they are there.

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The Next 10 Days Step-by-Step
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8. (C) De Mistura then went on to provide a fairly detailed
roll-out plan for the next 10 days. U.S. support (as well as
that of the EU) will be essential, he stressed. In
particular, De Mistura requested that the U.S. (along with
the EU) travel with him to Irbil April 16-17 to make the case
on DIBs to Massoud Barzani. The plan he laid out is as
follows:

-- April 9 or 10: UNAMI will share the reports with the U.S.
Embassy only for our review. De Mistura recalled the press
leak but said it ended up working like a trial balloon that
enabled him to gauge Iraqi reactions more accurately. That
said, De Mistura underlined, only the U.S. would receive
advance copies of the reports and they must be kept
confidential.

-- April 10 or 11: De Mistura will invite DPM Barham Salih
Q-- April 10 or 11: De Mistura will invite DPM Barham Salih
and FM Zebari to his residence to read the reports for
"accuracy." Both had complained previously about factual
errors in previous UNAMI reports and had requested the
opportunity to correct any mistakes. De Mistura said he
would honor this request, but not allow them to take copies
with them.

-- April 13: De Mistura meets with us, the Czech Ambassador
(as EU President) and other "Friends of the DIBs" for a
thorough briefing of the case he will make to PM Maliki (or
one of Maliki's advisors if Maliki declines to meet with
him),and jointly with them to Massoud Barzani.


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-- April 15: De Mistura briefs Maliki and/or his advisors on
the key points of the reports, but not present the full
reports at that time. Later the same day, he provides the
same briefing to President Talabani.

-- April 16-17: De Mistura, PMIN and the Czech Ambassador
travel to Irbil for a detailed briefing and discussion with
Barzani (preferably overnight to provide
plenty of time). De Mistura suggested that it would be
beneficial for General Odierno to have a follow-on meeting
with Barzani shortly afterward in order to reinforce the
message and get Barzani's reaction.

-- April 18: UNAMI provides both Maliki and Barzani the full
reports.


9. (C) De Mistura agreed with our view that, to the extent
possible, this entire process should be kept out of the
public eye and press. De Mistura said he expects there will
be leaks and he would seek to correct any inaccurate
information as appropriate.

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"Benign Non-Neglect"
and "Controlled Unhappiness"
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10. (C) The initial objective of his plan, De Mistura
explained, is to gain agreement from all sides to review the
reports and accept them as a basis for discussion. How this
discussion is structured, De Mistura said is best left up to
the Iraqis. The optimum initial reaction to the reports, he
said, would be "controlled unhappiness" from all sides.
Enthusiastic support by any one side would cause fear and
suspicion with the other sinking the process immediately.
Assuming his initial steps are successful, De Mistura
envisions what he characterized as "benign non-neglect" -- a
UN-mediated dialogue that can begin slowly and at a level
comfortable for all, but that is sustainable. Participants
would discuss the contents of the reports, identify which
aspects are "doable and negotiable" and then come up with
mechanisms and formats to move ahead. PMIN cautioned that
moving to this phase was the critical part but would not be
easy. No Iraqi figure we've met has thought deeply about
mechanisms and discussion structures, much less negotiating
formats. In this regard, efforts such as the current
trilateral mechanism involving Iraqi Army, Peshmerga and U.S.
Military officials on specific security matters could offer a
model for a UNAMI-mediated forum for dialogue on other
issues.

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Comment and Action Request
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11. (C) We believe that De Mistura's assessment of the
motivations of the parties, and his plan of action, are
realistic. His plan is a good combination of highly specific
near-term steps and a broad, flexible strategy for managing
the reactions to the reports (and, it is to be hoped, then
move on to negotiations among the parties). Unless otherwise
instructed, we will support De Mistura's approach and accept
his invitation to participate in the briefing of President
Barzani and other KRG officials in Irbil.


12. (C) The harder part is figuring out a plan for May and
June - how to go from sharing reports to actually organizing
a useful group that can begin discussions on at least some
aspects of the DIBs reports. Here the UNAMI thinking is much
shallower. Obviously much of that depends on Iraqis'
thinking too. We will be discussing with UNAMI and reliable
Iraqi contacts what kinds of mechanisms and agendas would be
manageable over the next week.

BUTENIS