Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD934
2009-04-06 09:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

COALITION DRAWDOWN DEMONSTRATES IRAQ,S MIXED

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ ES RO AS EN UK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0296
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0934/01 0960907
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 060907Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2551
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0050
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0090
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1999
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0028
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0021
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0033
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000934 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ ES RO AS EN UK
SUBJECT: COALITION DRAWDOWN DEMONSTRATES IRAQ,S MIXED
FEELINGS TOWARD FOREIGN ENGAGEMENT

REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 03940

B. LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TALABANI TO NATO SYG

C. BAGHDAD 00469

D. STATE 016188

Classified By: CDA Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000934

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ ES RO AS EN UK
SUBJECT: COALITION DRAWDOWN DEMONSTRATES IRAQ,S MIXED
FEELINGS TOWARD FOREIGN ENGAGEMENT

REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 03940

B. LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TALABANI TO NATO SYG

C. BAGHDAD 00469

D. STATE 016188

Classified By: CDA Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Coalition Forces, once representative of 39 countries
participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom, have now mostly
departed Iraq, indicative of significant improvements in
Iraq's security environment and Iraq's own recognition of its
sovereignty. Coalition members provided varying degrees of
support to Iraq, but where they respected their Iraqi hosts,
strong relationships grew. In the end, however, Iraq's
anti-foreign streak and history since 1958 of confrontation
rather than cooperation with foreign military forces, along
with the turbulence of Iraq's nascent political system, made
it very difficult to turn the Coalition into lasting
bilateral security relationships. At present, only the UK,
Australia, Romania and NATO forces remain in support of U.S.
and Iraqi forces. These Coalition partners and NATO were
willing - with considerable U.S. assistance - to
painstakingly work through the process of negotiating
separate bilateral agreements for their continued presence
until July 31.


2. (C) While the GOI's foreign policy abilities do not yet
extend to facilitating such military negotiations, the GOI is
committed to a robust NATO presence through the NATO Training
Mission Iraq (NTM-I). NATO is probably attractive to the GOI
because of its prestige, multilateralism, and non-combat
focus. NATO Assistant Secretary General (ASYG) Martin Howard
visited Iraq March 21-22 to conclude discussions for an MOU
between NATO and the GOI, and NATO Secretary General (SYG)
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer will visit Baghdad April 8-9 to sign
the document. The UK has begun the withdrawal of its forces,
but is currently negotiating an MOU for the continued

presence of some UK forces beyond July 31. Australian forces
are not likely to remain, owing to domestic political
concerns. Romania will withdraw its forces, but has
indicated a strong desire to bolster its participation in
NTM-I. END SUMMARY.

--------------
The Coalition of the Willing
--------------


3. (C) Since March 2003, 39 countries have joined the U.S. in
the Coalition that carried out Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
36 countries that have since departed deployed a total of
over 100,000 forces to Iraq over the course of their
participation in the Coalition. While these units varied in
size and mission, all contributed to securing and rebuilding
the new Iraq state. Many of them lost at least a few
soldiers' lives. Yet even the Republic of Korea's
engineering and medical assistance-dominated division in the
KRG did not meet the GOI's threshold for making the effort to
retain them beyond 2008. In pursuing arrangements for
continued foreign military support after the era of UN
Security Council Resolutions mandating foreign intervention
in Iraq, the GOI demonstrated ambivalence toward foreign
military presence and sought to regain sovereignty over the
use of force within its borders. This ambivalence was
compounded by the intense struggle to gain agreement for the
U.S. Security Agreement, which made PM Maliki extremely wary
QU.S. Security Agreement, which made PM Maliki extremely wary
of going to the Council of Representatives (COR) to establish
the legal presence for foreign forces. The GOI acknowledged
areas where it continues to need and want foreign assistance,
yet often lacked the political will to facilitate that
continued assistance.


4. (C) On November 13, 2008, the GOI invited the UK,
Australia, Romania, El Salvador, Estonia and NATO to remain
in Iraq beyond the expiration of United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1790 on December 31, based on
strong U.S. recommendations, and the fact that Iraq judged
the skills offered as necessary for ongoing operations and
the development of Iraqi Security Forces. The conclusion of
the U.S.-Iraq security agreement on December 17, however,
left little time or political energy for the GOI to focus on

BAGHDAD 00000934 002 OF 004


these other partner states. An Exchange of Letters (EOL) by
the Executive would have been most politically expedient, but
the PM's Chief Legal Advisor, Dr. Fadel, determined that the
Executive branch did not have the competency to authorize by
such means the legal presence of foreign troops in Iraq or to
provide for their immunity from legal process. Therefore, PM
al-Maliki reluctantly drafted a bill for approval by the COR;
reftel (A).


5. (C) The draft bill was approved by the Council of
Ministers (COM) on December 18 but was subsequently rejected
by the COR on December 21. Chaos ensued the following day in
the COR over unrelated matters, as Speaker Mashadani was
forced to resign, pushing an agreement for Coalition and NATO
forces far down the list of priorities for Iraq's slow-moving
legislature. The COR moved for a two-week recess the
following day. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
ordered NATO forces to make preparations for their immediate
withdrawal, compelling the PM to direct National Security
Advisor Dr. Mowafaq al-Rubaie to issue a letter to NATO
reaffirming the GOI's commitment to NTM-I. Rubaie's letter
assured NATO of equivalent legal protections to those of U.S.
forces, despite the Executive's lack of constitutional power
to do so, forestalling a NATO withdrawal but complicating
efforts to resolve the NATO mission's legal status in
subsequent months.


6. (C) Under pressure from the U.S. and the PM's Office, the
COR finally passed Resolution 50 on December 23, providing
for the continued lawful presence of the 1 4 1. COR
Resolution 50 authorized the COM to "regulate the presence
and conditions of the activities of the (1 4 1) forces." The
COM delegated this authority to the MinDef, authorizing him
to negotiate separate MOUs with the Coalition states and
NATO, defining their tasks and activities and areas of
operation, and establishing joint committees for the
implementation of their respective MOUs. The COR decision
did not come in time to retain El Salvador, which announced
its withdrawal from Iraq hours earlier, perceiving a lack of
interest from the GOI in maintaining Salvadoran assistance.


7. (C) The UK, Australia and Romania quickly drafted MOUs for
signature by the MinDef. The UK and Australia signed
agreements on December 30, but Romania insisted on additional
human rights assurances, concerned that Romanian forces might
be subject to the death penalty under Iraqi law. The PM's
legal advisor and the MinDef both refused to include even a
vague reference to international human rights commitments in
Romania's MOU, requiring Post to seek a separate letter of
assurance from President Talabani; reftel (B). (Note: The
President is charged with ratifying death sentences according
to the Iraqi Constitution (Article 73(8)). End note.) With
this letter, Romania signed its MOU with the GOI on January

26.


8. (C) Estonia, which had already withdrawn its forces from
Iraq, was unable to successfully negotiate a suitable
agreement with the GOI, due to domestic concerns over status
protections for its forces. Estonia insisted on equivalent
protections to U.S. forces, but the GOI was unwilling to
concede, particularly in light of the UK and Australia having
already accepted lesser protections. The Estonian MinDef
Qalready accepted lesser protections. The Estonian MinDef
visited Iraq in February to attend Estonia's End of Mission
ceremony. In a meeting with Ambassador Crocker, he expressed
Estonia's strong commitment to maintain close bilateral ties
with Iraq - a source of pride for the relatively new Eastern
European democracy. Estonia maintains forces in NTM-I and
will look to augment its presence in the future.


9. (C) The passage of COR Resolution 50 caused a number of
NATO Allies to question the legal status of NTM-I, since COR
Resolution 50 provided lesser immunities than were offered in
the December 21 EOL between Rubaie and NATO. In an attempt
to assuage Allied concerns, ASYG Howard visited Iraq from
February 9 - 11 to seek legal clarifications and a
reaffirmation of the GOI's commitment to NTM-I; reftel (D).
Howard secured a letter signed by the PM, noting the GOI's
commitment to the continued presence of NTM-I and directing
the MinDef to sign a MOU with NATO. ASYG Howard met with Dr.
Fadel, who remarked that the PM was willing to go back to the
COR to pursue additional legal protections for NTM-I, noting
that the GOI would consider parity with the UN or
Administrative and Technical (A/T) diplomatic status under
the Vienna Convention. Dr. Fadel said that NTM-I was viewed

BAGHDAD 00000934 003 OF 004


differently from Coalition Forces by the COR and he judged
that a bill would pass without significant resistance;
however, he believed it would be best to wait a few months
before introducing any new legislation. On February 18, ASYG
Howard briefed the North Atlantic Council on his trip to
Iraq, which seems to have appeased most Allies.

--------------
Status and Future of Coalition Forces
--------------


10. (C) Romania currently has 417 troops deployed to Iraq,
including staff officers with MNF-I, MNC-I and MNSTC-I in
Baghdad, medical teams in Baghdad and Basra, the 241st
Romanian Infantry Battalion, conducting civil military
operations in Dhi Qar, and a small detachment in Al Kut
conducting reconnaissance operations using Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs). Romanian forces will draw down to 360 by
April 1. Romanian Political Counselor Eugen Chira met with
PolMil MinCouns Michael Corbin on March 25 to discuss
Romania's continued presence in Iraq. Chira indicated that
Romania will seek to bolster its commitment to NTM-I, but
that it will likely withdraw its remaining forces by July 31.



11. (C) Australia maintains 39 embedded staff officers in
MNF-I, MNC-I and MNSTC-I in Baghdad, but will draw down to 33
by April 1. It is unclear whether Australian forces will
remain beyond July 31. CENTCOM Commanding General (CG)
Petraeus wrote to the Australian Chief of Defense Force
asking that Australia stay beyond July 31, noting the value
of Australian staff officers to ongoing operations. However,
in a meeting on March 18, Australian Charge D' Affaires
Adrian Morrison advised PolMil MinCouns Corbin that Australia
would not likely remain beyond July 31, owing to domestic
political concerns.


12. (C) The UK has approximately 4,000 forces deployed to
Iraq, including the forces until recently comprising the
MND-SE Division HQ in Basra, as well as the 20th British
Armored Brigade in Basra, CNaTT with MNSTC-I at Um Qasr and
staff officers with MNF-I, MNC-I and MNSTC-I in Baghdad. The
UK transferred authority for MND-SE to the U.S.-led MND-C on
March 31 and is preparing the division headquarters personnel
for redeployment home, but is currently negotiating an MOU
with the GOI for the continued presence of some of its other
forces until December 31, 2011. The UK seeks to maintain
approximately 315 troops to conduct training and assistance
missions and naval operations, and to fill 100 staff officer
positions with MNF-I, MNC-I and MNSTC-I in Baghdad
(eventually USF-I). The UK expects to conclude its new MOU
within the next month and will redeploy its combat forces,
except for naval assets, by May 31.

--------------
NATO - ASYG Howard's Visit to Iraq
--------------


13. (C) NATO Assistant Secretary General (ASYG) Martin Howard
visited Iraq March 21 - 22 to conclude discussions for a
short-term MOU between NATO and the GOI, defining NATO's
tasks and activities and agreed facilities and areas. The
MOU was initialed by ASYG Howard and Minister of Defense Abd
al-Qadir on March 20 and will be signed by NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during his visit to Iraq April
8-9. According to ASYG Howard, Minister Abd al-Qadir
Q8-9. According to ASYG Howard, Minister Abd al-Qadir
reaffirmed his own personal commitment to NATO's continued
mission in Iraq and commented that NATO was "vital to the
development of the Iraqi Security Forces."


14. (C) ASYG Howard sought advice and assistance from the
Embassy in obtaining a letter of human rights assurances from
President Talabani, noting that a number of NATO Allies - the
Danes in particular - had raised concerns about their forces
potentially being subject to the death penalty under Iraqi
law. Pol-Mil MinCouns advised that a letter for signature by
Talabani was the best course of action and that we would
assist in getting a letter signed, as we had done with the
Romanians. NATO legal advisor Baldwin De Vidts drafted a
letter, based on the Romanian model, providing basic
assurances that the GOI would respect international human
rights agreements to which NATO states are party. (Note: The
letter is now with President Talabani's office for signature.
End note.)

BAGHDAD 00000934 004 OF 004




15. (C) ASYG Howard advised that the next step for NATO was
to draft a long-term agreement for the continued presence of
NATO forces, possibly through 2011, which provides immunity
from legal process equivalent to Administrative and Technical
(A/T) diplomatic status under the Vienna Convention. ASYG
Howard noted that Dr. Fadel had mentioned this as an option
during his last visit to Iraq, which Howard judged would be
acceptable to Allied members. ASYG Howard noted that he
discussed NATO's long-term agreement and augmented
jurisdictional protections with Minster Abd al-Qadir, but
that a number of issues remained unclear. He had hoped to
discuss the details of jurisdiction and immunities with Dr.
Fadel, but was unable to meet with him during this visit.


16. (C) ASYG Howard concluded that his visit was a success:
having concluded negotiations for a MOU to be signed by the
SYG during his April 8 visit to Iraq; having drafted a letter
of human rights assurances for signature by President
Talabani; and having discussed a long-term agreement with
Minister Abd al-Qadir, even though legal protections remained
unclear. He noted that he would likely have a draft
long-term agreement in the coming week, but cautioned that
NATO "is not an agile organization" and that it takes a long
time to gain consensus on any matter.

--------------
Comment
--------------


17. (C) Iraq in general acknowledged the value of maintaining
the continued support of these key partners, but at times
seemed unwilling to do what was necessary to ensure their
continued support, however minimal the effort. GOI officials
demonstrated very limited political will to support the
continued presence of foreign forces in Iraq, wary of having
to defend such decisions to the Iraqi legislature and public.
The GOI's recent willingness to negotiate with NATO for
additional jurisdictional cover and the continued presence of
NATO forces is more encouraging. The GOI demonstrated
initiative during Howard's February 18 visit to Iraq,
proposing potentially viable alternatives to provide for
sufficient jurisdictional protections for NATO forces. It
appears that the GOI has recognized the value and importance
of NTM-I and appears to be demonstrating greater flexibility
in negotiating a suitable long-term agreement for its
continued presence.


18. (C) In pursuing international relationships, the GOI
grapples with two sometimes competing motivations: on the one
hand, the need to regain sovereignty and self-sufficiency,
removing any visible dependencies on foreign forces, and on
the other hand, the desire to become a fully functioning
member of the international community that boasts
partnerships with prestigious security alliances like NATO
and that benefits from the modern capabilities they can offer
Iraq. Navigating those competing priorities in a politically
volatile environment - in the run-up to national elections -
will prove very difficult. However, Iraq will likely seek to
engage in security relationships with members of the
international community in the future, if it can find
politically feasible means of doing so.
BUTENIS