Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD921
2009-04-05 07:12:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQ 201: TURKEY'S INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN IRAQ

Tags:  PGOV PREL PMIL MOPS TU IZ 
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VZCZCXRO9820
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0921/01 0950712
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 050712Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2532
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0607
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 0065
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0121
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000921 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: TURKEY'S INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN IRAQ

REF: A. ANKARA 395

B. BAGHDAD 505

Classified By: Acting Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Philip K
osnett for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000921

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: TURKEY'S INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN IRAQ

REF: A. ANKARA 395

B. BAGHDAD 505

Classified By: Acting Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Philip K
osnett for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The relationship between the Governments
of Iraq and Turkey has improved substantially in the last one
and a half years, though it remains fraught with
long-standing differences. Ongoing areas of concern include
KGK/PKK terrorists in northern Iraq; Kurdish demands to
control Kirkuk (and, potentially, its hydrocarbon resources);
Turkish and Iraqi Arab angst over Kurdish nationalism and
Turkish apprehension about the future of Iraq's Turkmen
minority. The Trilateral Security Dialogue shows some
promise as a mechanism for intelligence sharing to combat the
KGK/PKK. U.S. and Turkish interests in Iraq often but not
always coincide. The GoT was a positive, behind-the-scenes
player in the negotiations that led to the Security Agreement
between the U.S. and Iraq. On the other hand, it played an
unhelpful role in recent Iraqi provincial elections through
its clandestine financial support of the anti-Kurd al Hadba
Gathering, and its support seemed to harden Turkmen positions
during negotiations over the Provincial Elections Law.
Recent visits of PM Erdogan and President Gul to Iraq and PM
Maliki and President Talabani to Turkey are witness to the
warming relationship and their shared interest in limiting
Erbil's strength. Likewise oil and natural gas deals signed
between the KRG and the GoT (to the consternation of the GoI
central government) and Turkey's burgeoning economic presence
in a host of other non-oil/gas related areas all emphasize
the potential rewards of improving relations. End summary.

--------------
TURKEY AND THE KGK/PKK
--------------


2. (S/NF) Since the mid-1990's Turkey has engaged in cross
border operations (CBOs) into Iraq to battle the Kurdish
separatist organization PKK (or KGK, as it now calls itself),
sending as many as 35,000 troops in 1995 and 50,000 in 1997.
In its most recent major ground CBO in February 2008, Turkey

sent several thousand soldiers across the border. The
operation lasted one week and is reported to have resulted in
the deaths of 240 KGK/PKK fighters. Between 1400 and 2000
Turkish troops have been stationed in bases in northern Iraq
since the 1990s. Turkish artillery and air units regularly
strike KGK/PKK camps and personnel movements in thinly
inhabited areas of northern Iraq.


3. (S/NF) For years after the fall of Saddam, Kurdish
authorities refused to take any real steps against the
KGK/PKK for several reasons: in the short term, invoking the
wrath of the KGK/PKK could threaten peace and the increasing
prosperity in northern Iraq and deter foreign investment in
the region. Over the long term, a Kurd-on-Kurd confrontation
would undermine the desire of the Iraqi Kurds for greater
unity among all Kurdish groups. (Fighting between Iraqi
Kurds and the PKK in the nineties resulted in at least
hundreds of deaths.) For some time, the threat (and reality)
of Turkish cross-border operations (CBOs) coupled with the
jeopardy posed to economic gains prompted leaders to make
mildly critical statements against the KGK/PKK and to even
occasionally take limited steps to interfere with KGK/PKK
freedom of movement in northern Iraq. In 2006, Foreign
Minister Zebari promised his Turkish counterpart that Iraq
would get tough with the KGK/PKK, but most Iraqi Kurds
continue to believe that a political solution was the only
Qcontinue to believe that a political solution was the only
path to resolving the longstanding problem - most likely in
the form of a Turkish amnesty for KGK/PKK fighters.


4. (C) Following the Coalition occupation of Iraq, the USG
decision not to attempt to force the PKK out of the
mountainous Iraq-Turkey border region, along with repeated
attacks by PKK into Turkey, gave impetus to Turkish
conspiracy theorists that the U.S. supported the PKK - or, at
best, passively permitted it to attack Turkey from Iraq. In
October 2007 and again in October 2008 KGK/PKK fighters based
in northern Iraq attacked Turkish border garrisons in Turkey,
resulting in the deaths of 17 Turkish soldiers in 2007 and 15
in 2008. These incidents inflamed the passions of the
Turkish public. Fearing a full-on Turkish invasion, the GOI
and the KRG agreed to stepped-up efforts against the KGK/PKK.


--------------
TRIALTERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE
--------------


BAGHDAD 00000921 002 OF 004



5. (S//NF) In an effort to reinvigorate GOT-GOI coordination
against the PKK - and in response to PM Maliki's angst over a
jump in direct GOT-KRG ties - in November 2008 the GOT, GOI,
and USG agreed to reinstitute a trilateral security process
aimed at combating the PKK, kicking off with a
ministerial-level meeting in Baghdad. A Working Group of the
subcommittee meets on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. The
second Ministerial-level meeting is scheduled to take place
on April 11. In the context of that dialogue, Iraq
(including the KRG) has taken some tentative steps toward
cooperating with the GoT in the provision of actionable
intelligence against the KGK/PKK. Discussions are now
focused on establishing a tripartite intelligence-sharing
office in Erbil, under the aegis of the trilateral security
committee.


6. (S/NF) In 2007, the U.S. began substantial intelligence
sharing with Turkish authorities and began providing ISR
support to their artillery attacks and sorties into northern
Iraq and against the PKK, resulting in a marked improvement
in relations.

-------------- --------------
AN INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN AND THE STATUS OF KIRKUK
-------------- --------------


7. (C) One of Turkey's greatest fears is an independent
Kurdistan on its south-eastern border. In a March 2007
interview, KRG President Masoud Barzani told Turkish NTV that
Turkey and the world should just get used to an independent
Kurdistan that, Barzani suggested, encompasses some 40
million Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. Since that
time, however, Barzani has also made comments stressing the
KRG's commitment to remaining a part of Iraq. We assess that
most senior KRG leaders understand that a unilateral
declaration of Kurdish independence would almost certainly
result in an immediate intervention of troops from Ankara,
Tehran, and Baghdad as well as an economic strangulation of
the region. In March 2009, President Talabani, while in
Istanbul, dismissed the idea of an independent Kurdistan as
simply "a dream in poems."


8. (C) The threat of the KRG controlling Kirkuk has long
prompted Turkish leaders to make dramatic statements about
the status of the City. They fear that if Kirkuk and its
vast oil reserves come under the control of Kurdish leaders,
the likelihood of the KRG severing its ties to the Republic
of Iraq increases exponentially. In the years after the fall
of Saddam, Turkey repeatedly said that Kurdish control of
Kirkuk is a red-line that would likely result in Turkish
troops crossing into Iraq. In recent years, the GoT pushed
for a delay in the Article 140 process on the status of
Kirkuk and in 2006, the Turkish Defense Minister warned the
GoI against "imposing an
unrealistic future on Kirkuk."

--------------
THE TURKMEN
--------------


9. (C) The Iraqi Turkmen are a distinct Turkic ethnic group
living mostly in the cities of Kirkuk, Erbil, Tal Afar, and
Mosul. They are one of largest of Iraq's small ethnic
groups; however, estimates of their numbers vary
dramatically, from 222,000 to two million. Turkmen are
roughly divided between Sunni and Shia. Some Iraqis dismiss
Turkish concern for the safety and status of the Turkmen as
merely cover for GOT involvement in Iraqi politics aimed
fundamentally at preventing the emergence of an independent
Kurdistan. Yet concern for the safety of the Turkmen is not
without merit. They have undergone decades of assimilation
campaigns in Iraq.
Qcampaigns in Iraq.


10. (S/NF) In the 1970's, all Turkish language schools were
closed and in the 80's Saddam declared their language
officially banned. In the post-Saddam Iraq, the government
of Turkey has helped fund such political organizations as the
Iraqi Turkmen Front, which opposes the proposed annexation of
Kirkuk to the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi
federalism, to the extent that it provides either Kurdish or
Arab control over Turkmen-inhabited areas. Of more concern,
in the January 2009 provincial elections, the Turks
clandestinely supported the anti-Kurdish al Hadba Gathering
political party in Ninewa, and its support seemed to harden
Turkmen positions during negotiations over the Provincial
Elections Law. Both Baghdad and Erbil recognize the GoT's
exercise of influence in Iraq. In an April 2007, interview
with Al-Arabiyah television, Barzani warned Turkey that
"there are 30 million (sic) Kurds in Turkey. If they

BAGHDAD 00000921 003 OF 004


interfere in Kirkuk over just a couple thousand (sic)
Turkomans, we will interfere in Diyarbakir and other cities
in Turkey."

--------------
ADVOCATE ON SHARED U.S. GOALS
--------------


11. (S) Turkey is second only to the United States in the
influence it has in the KRG and, perhaps, third behind the
U.S. and Iran in its overall influence in the rest of the
country. Turkey has been an occasional advocate on some of
our shared interests - especially in the final weeks
preceding our signing a Security Agreement with the GoI in
November 2008. During that time, Turkish Special Envoy to
Iraq Murat Ozcelik engaged in a form of shuttle diplomacy
between Sunni leader Vice President Tarik al Hashimi, PM
al-Maliki and Ambassadors Crocker and Satterfield, mostly as
an advocate for the marginalized Sunnis. Turkey,s role and
influence in Iraq is growing and will continue to expand as
our troop levels decrease.

--------------
HIGH-LEVEL VISITS BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAQ
--------------


12. (C) The exchange of high-level visitors between the two
countries is also evidence of improving relations. Prime
Minister Maliki and President Talabani have each visited
Turkey twice in the last 18 months. PM Erdogan visited Iraq
in July 2008 when he and Maliki signed a strategic
partnership agreement to cooperate in the fields of regional
security, fighting KGK/PKK terrorism, controlling the
borders, and ensuring joint interests in terms of oil and
water resources, border crossings, trade exchanges, cultural
activities, and the role of Turkish companies in
reconstructing Iraq. To this end, the two countries formed a
High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council calling for annual
prime ministerial meetings and quarterly ministerial
meetings. To date, however, there has not been significant
follow-up on the Council and no ministerial meetings other
than the Trilateral Security Ministerial have taken place.
President Gul visited Iraq March 23-24 during which the GoT
and GoI signed an Economic Partnership Agreement aimed at
boosting bilateral trade between the two countries.


13. (U) Water issues continue to be a point of friction
between Iraq and Turkey. Since 1986, when Turkey completed
tunnels to divert an estimated one-fifth of the water from
the Euphrates River into the Ataturk Dam Reservoir, Syria and
Iraq have complained about Turkish interference with their
right to water. In March 2008, the three countries
established a water commission to develop projects for the
fair and effective use of trans-border water resources. Iraq
participated in the Fifth World Water Forum in Istanbul March
16 to 22 with a delegation headed by President Talabani.
Vatan Turkish newspaper reported that Presidents Gul and
Talabani met in Istanbul during the forum and Gul said the
two countries should take advantage of ways to cooperate with
each other. He told Talabani "we will share happiness if we
act rationally; we will share sorrow if we don't act
accordingly."


14. (C) Turkish Deputy Chief of Military Staff (DCHOD) Hasan
Igsiz visited Iraq on March 4, 2009 and met with Iraqi MoD
Abdul Qadir, Chief of Staff Babakir Zebari, and CG Odierno,
following a visit by the Iraqi DCHOD General Nasir Abadi in

2008. The main issues discussed were further cooperation
between the Turkish military and the Iraqi Army and
cooperation against the PKK.

--------------
Q --------------
A GROWING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
--------------


15. (C) The last months have been marked by warming relations
and growing economic opportunities between the GoT and the
KRG. Turkish Prime Minister Reep Tayyip Erdogan discussed
petroleum contracting during his July 2008 visit to Iraq.
However, as Ambassador Crocker warned Ozcelik (ref b),
cutting deals directly with the KRG will result in Turkish
companies being black-listed by the Iraqi central government.



16. (C) Turkey remains a natural and active trading partner
with Iraq. Currently Kartet, a Turkish power company,
supplies 100% of Iraq's Dahuk province's electricity in
exchange for heavy fuel oil from the Bayji Oil Refinery.
Turkey has shown strong interest in Iraq's hydrocarbon

BAGHDAD 00000921 004 OF 004


resources and Turkish oil companies are currently active in
the Kurdistan areas of Iraq. Iraq exports approximately 20
percent of its crude oil through the Kirkuk to Ceyhan
pipeline. In addition to hydrocarbon resources, Turkish
contractors have built housing units in Erbil and are
building a luxury hotel in Erbil as well. Trade along the
Iraqi-Turkish border is vital to south eastern Turkey and
northern Iraq. Turkish companies are some of the most active
international companies in Iraq.
BUTENIS