LIKELY REACTIONS TO UNAMI'S DIBS REPORTS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000912

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: LIKELY REACTIONS TO UNAMI'S DIBS REPORTS AND
MANAGING THEM

Classified By: PolMinCouns Robert Ford: Reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) Summary: Likely reactions to the release by UNAMI of
its reports on the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) areas
in mid-April, absent diplomatic intervention by us, will
range from public outrage to suspicious dismissal to private
relief. In our recent, very light conversationswith Kurdish,
Shia and Sunni Arab political figures in Baghdad about the
DIBs reports, we have found none who have focused much on how
to use the reports to best advantage. We may not see an
immediate reaction.It is likely that as they digest the
reports, Kurdish leaders will be angry at UNAMI and bitter
about perceived lack of U.S. support. It is possible they
could react by encouraging public demonstrations and making
destabilizing Peshmerga movements, although the first
official Kurdish reaction might be a rejection of a continued
UNAMI role. By contrast, PM Maliki likely will be relieved
the reports do not suggest incorporation into the KRG of some
of the most sensitive DIBs areas -- including Kirkuk,
Khanaqin, and Sinjar. He may use the opportunity to take the
high road in contrast to Kurdish anger, but his political
interests lie in using the reports to harness popular Arab
anger against Kurdish positions. Sunni Arab hardliners like
incoming Ninewa Governor Alnujaifi may ignore calls for
follow-on political dialogue or attach unacceptable
conditions to their participation. Iraqi reactions are
subject to our influence, however. Concerted diplomacy by
UNAMI, the USG, and other diplomatic missions can help
discourage provocative reactions, soothe tensions, and
promote a political atmosphere conducive to peaceful
negotiations. Political and security force
confidence-building measures should be an important part of
our diplomati strategy. Interestingly, some of the tougher
Kurdish and Sunni Arab politicos with whom we have raised
DIBs reports have not rejected starting a negotiating process
using the issuance of the DIBs reports as a launch point even
if they haven't accepted the idea yet either. End summary.


2. (C) UNAMI plans to release its reports on the DIBs areas
by April 15, initially to members of the Presidency Council
and PM Maliki, then more broadly. The reports have been
largely stripped of diplomatically phrased recommendations
that UNAMI originally planned to include in 2008. Instead,
the exhaustively researched reports generally will be
confined to factual information, with a focus on each area's
history, demography, economy, and administrative status. We
expect UNAMI will recommend formal incorporation into the KRG
of several less controversial DIBs areas that 1) are
overwhelmingly Kurdish, 2) have long been administered by the
KRG, and 3) lie north of the Green Line (and thus are areas
on which the constitution already has conferred Kurdish
authority). UNAMI will issue a single combined report on the
four districts of Kirkuk Province, which will propose four
options for a potential resolution of the province's status
for consideration by a follow-on political process. The
reports dealing with the two most contentious areas outside
Kirkuk (Diyala's Khanaqin District and Ninewa's Sinjar
District) highlight the political and administrative
difficulties in associating those areas with the KRG. That
will make it unlikely the Kurds can successfully negotiate
for the two territories, even though Khanaqin and Sinjar are
Qfor the two territories, even though Khanaqin and Sinjar are
overwhelmingly Kurdish-speaking areas (though religiously
Faili and Yezidi, respectively),have been administered by
the Kurds, and host populations that would support joining
the KRG.

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The Kurds: Public Outrage and Private Fuming, or Something
More Destabilizing?
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3. (C) We expect Kurdish Regional Government officials to
react negatively, although it is not clear whether their
reaction will be marked more by vituperative denunciations of
the UN in the press or (more dangerously, in our opinion)
grim private expressions of their determination not to engage
in any UN-organized political negotiating process. The Kurds
will feel they "get" little territory from the reports,
except for areas like Akre that are not subject to serious
dispute. They will see UNAMI's decision not to issue
recommendations on the most sensitive areas as a concession
to Prime Minister Maliki and Arab interests more generally
(which it was),and they will denounce the reports for
ignoring the clearly expressed desire of overwhelming
majorities in several areas to join the KRG (which they do).
What is not clear is whether the Kurds will use this to
precipitate a crisis, either politically or militarily.


4. (C) Possible (although less likely, in our opinion)
reactions include attempts to remove Maliki from power,

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refusal to engage further with UNAMI or any follow-on
political process, augmenting Peshmerga units in selected
DIBs areas, and calling on Kurdish soldiers to desert Iraqi
Army units and return to the north. We think it more likely
that Kurdish leaders, understanding their declining political
and military strength, will fume in private, denounce the
reports in public, berate the U.S. privately for betraying
the interests of a longstanding ally, and organize rallies in
the KRG and in selected DIBs in support of their territorial
claims and opposing further UN involvement. The latter would
be of particular concern, since Kurdish popular opinion will
be if anything angrier than that of KRG officials. There is
a risk of Kurdish mob violence against members of other
ethnic groups or of bombing attacks targeting the Kurdish
protests -- both of which we witnessed in July in Kirkuk city
-- and such violence could in turn elevate the risk of direct
conflict between IA units and Kurdish security forces.

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The Prime Minister: Smug Satisfaction, or Something More
Destabilizing?
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5. (C) A public display of Kurdish anguish would give PM
Maliki an opportunity to take the high road, but it is in his
political interest to keep the pot simmering even as he calls
for national unity. He will recognize that the UNAMI reports
remove his three greatest strategic concerns concerning the
Kurds: loss of control to the Kurds of Kirkuk and its
hydrocarbons. With those apparently off the table, he may
issue some qualified support for sections of the reports that
recommend territorial transfers to the KRG (e.g., Acre,
Sheikan, maybe Makhmour). We should expect him, however, to
use the opportunity to remind voters of his support for
limits on KRG autonomy and stress elements of the
constitution (e.g., his role as commander-in-chief of all
security forces, right of free movement of people, central
government authority over hydrocarbons) that undercut Kurdish
autonomy and power in the north. He may even commit himself
and his government to participation in a UNAMI-organized
follow-on political process, although any such public
declaration would probably be accompanied by a restatement of
his redlines.


6. (C) More worrying, it is possible he could use the
release of the reports as an opportunity to call for
immediate removal of all Kurdish security forces from at
least those DIBs areas that the UNAMI reports do not
recommend go to the KRG. Such a public call would be itself
politically provocative, more so if IA and IP commanders on
the ground moved to implement the PM's order by trying to
arrest and deport to the KRG Peshmerga and Assayish (Kurdish
security police) found in areas like Khanaqin, Sinjar, and
northern Kirkuk Province. Deployment of IA units into some of
the DIBs areas (even those below the Green Line, but
especially those above it, like Khanaqin) without
consultation with the KRG could provoke fighting. The
emotions aroused by release of the reports will be
politically useful to Maliki as we approach national
elections (if the emotions last),and we can expect him to
continue to court parties (Hadba, Hewar/National Dialogue,
Sadrists) that have successfully utilized anti-Kurd political
platforms or are otherwise committed to rolling back Kurdish
autonomy.

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Hardline Sunni Arabs: Dismissal, or Something More
Destabilizing?
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7. (C) For some Sunni Arab politicians, such as Hadba's
Atheel and Osama Alnujaifi and Hewar's Salih Mutlaq, any
territorial acquisition by the KRG is too much. That is
particularly true regarding DIBs areas in Ninewa, because
every potential Kurdish gain (e.g. Sheikan, Faida
sub-district in Tel Keif) is a loss of territory and
influence for incoming governor Atheel Alnujaifi. Sunni Arab
politicians largely ignored the release in June 2008 of
UNAMI's first four preliminary DIBs reports and they may do
the same in response to the release of the final reports.
Public reactions by these leaders will likely be accompanied
by claims that the process laid out in Article 140 of the
constitution for adjudicating DIBs claims is dead and that no
further territory should be attached to the three northern
governorates of the KRG. Some may use harsher language to
reject Kurdish political positions and criticize abuses by
Kurdish security forces. It is not clear whether hardline
Sunni Arabs are inclined to immediately reject a UNAMI-led
process of political dialogue. Even if they agree to
participate, their acceptance will likely be accompanied by

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demands that may not be acceptable to the Kurds, such as a
demand that Kurdish security forces depart the DIBs until the
negotiations process is completed.

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The Role of U.S. and UNAMI: Full Engagement, or Something
More Destabilizing?
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8. (C) Comment: It is very possible that the issuance of
the reports will not generate much immediate reaction at all,
since no Kurdish, Sunni Arab or Shia political leader we have
met in Baghdad in recent days has evidenced having given any
thought to how the reports might be used to best advantage.
The Kurds are the ones most likely to react quickly since
these territories are a more existential issue for them. It
is possible that there will be some unhelpful rhetoric or
acts on the ground that we will need to try to head off or at
least contain. That said, Iraqi leaders will not make
decisions regarding how to respond to the UNAMI reports
independent of a cold-hearted calculus of their political
interests. Thus, to a substantial extent, we can influence
their public and private statements and actions, even if we
cannot change their underlying views. Warnings by us and
UNAMI against destabilizing actions and comments, especially
if tied to targeted incentives and disincentives, can
safeguard the opportunity for dialogue and negotiation and
avoid poisoning the atmosphere before talks even get started.
We plan to demarche all concerned parties on the need to
respond to the UNAMI reports by pledging good faith
commitment to peaceful resolution, but it is vital that UNAMI
be prepared to talk in detail about the political process
they will propose. So far, UNAMI has not indicated to us
much detail about the follow-on political process. Also
important will be engaging political leaders on
implementation of confidence-building measures, some of which
are identified in the UNAMI reports and some -- such as
security force CBMs -- we will need to drive ourselves.
Interestingly, some of the tougher Kurdish and Sunni Arab
politicos with whom we have raised DIBs reports, such as
Osama Alnujaifi and Fuad Massoum, have not rejected starting
a negotiating process using the issuance of the DIBs reports
as a launch point. End comment.

BUTENIS