Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD910
2009-04-02 07:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT SALAH AD DIN: MOI HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE

Tags:  PHUM PGOV PREL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7361
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0910/01 0920700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020700Z APR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2518
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000910 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: MOI HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE
UNDERSTAFFED; SAD JAILS OVERCROWDED

Classified By: PRT Leader Rick Bell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000910

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: MOI HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE
UNDERSTAFFED; SAD JAILS OVERCROWDED

Classified By: PRT Leader Rick Bell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a March 24 meeting, Idris Ahmed Khalaf,
Deputy Chief of the Salah ad Din (SaD) Office of Human
Rights, told the PRT that overall conditions in Ministry of
the Interior (MOI) Detention facilities have "marginally"
improved but are still severely overcrowded. Idris said
that although his office is understaffed, improved security
has allowed investigators to increase their case loads.
Based on their investigations over the last year, police
abuse cases are decreasing; there are fewer instances of
torture and fewer arrests of obviously innocent people in
the province. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On March 24, the SaD PRT Rule of Law Coordinator met
with Idris Ahmed Khalaf, Deputy Chief of the SaD MOI Office
of Human Rights, and one of his investigators, Ali Mohammed
Najim. Idris told the PRT that the SaD MOI Human Rights
Office has been operating in the province since it was
established in November, 2005. He said the lack of
sufficient staff has made it very difficult to visit all
the outlying MOI detention facilities in the province; the
office has only four investigators, the chief, deputy, and
two support personnel. The office reports directly to the
MOI Human Rights central office in Baghdad, which also
supplies its support and training. GOI training in Baghdad
is supplemented by frequent workshops and courses offered
through the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).


3. (C) Idris said that in some areas support from Baghdad
could be improved --for example, the office is responsible
for certifying eligibility for widows' benefits, but does
not have access to the database in Baghdad. If Baghdad
gave the SaD office access, widows would not be forced to
wait for such a long time (often months) before they could
begin receiving their monthly support payments.


4. (C) In addition to inspecting MOI detention (pre-trial)
facilities, Idris said that the investigators organize
their work with teams that focus on human rights issues in
education, dealing with schools and colleges; health and
environment; and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). An

Ex-Regime Team handles missing persons cases and the
recovery and identification of remains of missing persons
from the previous regime. An NGO Team works with NGOs that
supply humanitarian aid, such as medicines for chronic
diseases, clothing and wheelchairs.


5. (C) The office sends its investigators to visit MOI
jails monthly, including juvenile and women's jails.
Improved security has allowed investigators to increase
their case loads and visit more facilities. Idris said
that MOI detention officials in SaD are generally
cooperative and allow investigators to inspect MOI
facilities throughout the province. He did, however,
request assistance in getting permission from MG Rasheed,
Samarra Operations Center Commander, to inspect facilities
in Samarra. Idris said that, based on the inspections,
investigators make recommendations to jail officials on
areas such as health conditions and family and attorney
visitation rules. For example, investigators persuaded
authorities in the transitory jail to remove mesh
separators between prisoners and families to allow for
contact visits.


6. (C) For cases where the offI\d$nQ[J
QQIQ11 IZ
SUBJECT: FINANCE MINISTER ON GE PAYMENTS, SONS OF IRAQ,
BUDGET

REF: BAGHDAD 766

Classified By: EconMin Marc Wall for Reason 1.4 (b).


1. (C) Summary. Finance Minister Bayan Jabr told EMIN on
March 30 that he had directed Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) to
make $400 million in loan proceeds available to the
Minister of Electricity to pay some of the $580M
arrearage due to General Electric (GE) on March 29 Jabr
further discussed his payment to fund the salaries of the
Sons of Iraq (see CJ9 update to Charge,),the unusual
arrangements with
the Council of Representatives (CoR) and Presidency Council
for expediting the
finalization of the 2009 budget law, as well as the looming
prospect of a rescission budget in June or July if oil
prices and production fail to climb. End Summary.

GE Gets Half a Loaf
--------------


2. (C) During a meeting in his Adnon Palace office with
EMIN on March 30, Minister of Finance, Bayan Jabr,
explained how, despite the absence of a national budget and
against the advice of his advisors, he sought Cabinet
approval for a $400 million loan from TBI to pay part of
the delinquent installment due to GE under the
December 2008 gas-turbine purchase and another $34 million
to pay the salaries of the Sons of Iraq. The Cabinet
approved the loans on March 29. Although, not yet received by
GE, Post was told by GE on April 1, that it was satisfied
that payment had been transmitted. Also participating were
Treasury Attache, James Wallar and CJ9 CO MG David
Perkins.


3. (C) Jabr acknowledged receiving calls from the office
of the Centcom commander urging him to pay GE the delinquent
first
installment payment (396 Million Euros/$580 million) of the
"Mega Deal" gas-turbine purchase. This payment had just
been renegotiated March 19-20 in Washington by the Minister
of Electricity (ME),who had agreed to pay GE no later
than March 29. In response, Jabr received Cabinet approval
and instructed the President of TBI to work out the details
with the ME. Jabr told EMIN that he heard there was some
confusion over the method of
payment, but that as far as he was concerned "the money is
available."

How Much? How Fast?
--------------


4. (SBU) According to Jabr, there are two methods for
Getting the funds to GE: a wire transfer through the SWIFT
process, which requires a letter of guaranty from GE, or by
opening
a Letter of Credit (LOC). Jabr said the ME insisted that the
GE contract required an LOC which, curiously to Jabr, the
ME only wanted to fund up to $250 million, $150M less than
the
authorized amount and well short of the full arrearage.
Subsequent to this meeting, Embassy Baghdad confirmed that
the ME had requested only a $400 million loan to fund both
the GE and the Siemens gas-turbine purchases, which may have
accounted for the ME,s wish to open the GE LOC for only
$250 million. By COB March 30, however, the Minister informed
the
Embassy that, before leaving for several days in Jordan, he
had directed his DG of Accounts to make the entire $400
million available to GE in the manner most convenient to
GE. If GE provided the guaranty, the SWIFT transfer could
take place almost immediately. The ME claimed even an LOC
would make funds available at JP Morgan Chase in "just a
couple of days."


5. (SBU) Jabr said that, after the final enactment of a
budget, he would be able to add $1.3 billion (1.7 trillion
ID) to the Ministry of Electricity's capital budget based
upon the budget passed by the CoR or by cutting the
Qupon the budget passed by the CoR or by cutting the
investment budgets of other ministries by around 14 .

Money for SOI to Avert A Crisis
--------------


6. (C) Jabr further stated that he had directed the
deposit of 31.5 billion IQD (approximately $34 million, or
one month's pay) for the Ministry of the Interior's
disbursement to the Sons of Iraq. This he said he did over
the unanimous objections of his financial advisors, who
argued that, because there was no budget it might be held

BAGHDAD 00000910 002 OF 002


in the Tikrit Terrorist Jail, prisoners are forced to sleep
in shifts because not everyone can lie on the floor at the
same time. As a practical matter, this means that many of
the prisoners are forced to stand for much of the time.


9. (C) COMMENT: We believe the information from Idris and
Ali is reliable. It is consistent with previous reporting
based on conversations with the Human Rights office chief,
Israa Frahan Ali, and with reporting from other sources,
including the Provincial Director of Police, judges, police
advisors, and Coalition jail-abuse reporting. The Rule of
Law coordinator has inspected the jails personally over the
last 19 months and finds his observations consistent in
general terms with those of the human rights investigators.


10. (C) NOTE: The PRT was instrumental last year in
increasing visits by the provincial Health Department to
monitor the prisoners' health and treat illnesses,
implementing corrections training for the jailers, and
successfully lobbying provincial officials for funding for
a new transitory jail that will relieve overcrowding. END
NOTE.

BUTENIS
BUTENIS