Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD898
2009-04-01 12:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT SALAH AD DIN: TUZ KHURMATO: THREE VERY

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL PTER PINS IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6316
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0898/01 0911233
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011233Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2504
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000898 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PTER PINS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: TUZ KHURMATO: THREE VERY
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES FROM TURKMEN, ARABS, KURDS

REF: BAGHDAD 670

Classified By: Salah Ad Din PRT Leader Rick Bell for reasons 1.4 (d).

(U) This is a PRT Salah ad Din reporting cable.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000898

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PTER PINS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: TUZ KHURMATO: THREE VERY
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES FROM TURKMEN, ARABS, KURDS

REF: BAGHDAD 670

Classified By: Salah Ad Din PRT Leader Rick Bell for reasons 1.4 (d).

(U) This is a PRT Salah ad Din reporting cable.


1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 26, Poloffs and PRT and CF staff
met with representatives from each of the three main ethnic
groups in the Tuz Khurmato district of Salah ad Din (SaD):
Turkmen, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. The United Nations (UN)
views Tuz as one of the areas with Disputed Internal
Boundaries (DIBs) in Iraq. The three groups (in separate
meetings) predictably gave widely differing perspectives on
the district, and did not acknowledge each others' points of
view. The Arabs and Turkmen were concerned that Kurdish
expansionism from Erbil threatened stability in Tuz, and that
Kurdish pressure would influence the UN and USG. The Turkmen
also felt alienated from the Sunni Arab-dominated provincial
government, while the Arabs focused on the loss of two
elements of their former power: the Ba'ath Party and the old
Iraqi Army. The Kurds emphasized their history of
oppression, and hoped that Tuz would be realigned with Kirkuk
province soon. All three groups were aware of the upcoming
UNAMI report on Tuz and other disputed areas in northern
Iraq, and uneasy about what it would say. All considered it
important that boundary disputes be resolved before the
withdrawal of U.S. forces. END SUMMARY.

TURKMEN CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE
--------------


2. (C) The Turkmen saw themselves most threatened by Kurdish
expansionism, which they said was driven by Erbil, not by
local Kurds. Led by newly elected PC member Ali Hashem
Noori, they were quick to point out that, unlike other areas
with an ethnic mix such as Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninewah, Tuz
enjoys relative peace among its different ethnicities and
sects. The Turkmen complained that PUK and KDP militias, as
well as Asaish (Kurdish Intelligence Service),were acting
outside the law. They also insisted that the Iraqi Army (IA)
must fill the security gap when CF withdraw, rather than a
Kurdish security force. While making common cause with Arabs

against the Kurds, the Turkmen also felt neglected by the
Sunni Arab-dominated provincial government in SaD. They
shared a copy of a joint petition by local Turkmen to UNAMI
calling for Tuz to be made into an independent province. As
many Turkmen are Shiites, they have direct ties to Baghdad.


3. (C) The Turkmen worried about the fairness of the upcoming
UNAMI report on disputed areas in northern Iraq. Their
concerns were heightened, they said, when the Kirkuk
Provincial Council Chairman discussed the issue in a recent
closed-door meeting with SRSG de Mistura; they still have not
been informed what transpired in that meeting, despite having
asked for clarification. The Tuz Turkmen petition to UNAMI
laid out a clear stance: Tuz should not be considered among
the disputed areas (NOTE: The district was part of Kirkuk
until SaD province was founded in 1976. END NOTE). They
held that Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution has legally
expired and that renewing it would require a constitutional
amendment.

ARABS LAMENT LOSS OF POWER; FEAR OUTSIDE THREATS
-------------- --


4. (C) The Tuz Sunni Arabs saw threats from the Kurds and
other outsiders, notably Iran. Unlike the Kurds and Turkmen,
they conveyed a strong sense of the importance of patriotism
and were offended to see Tuz Kurds fly the KRG flag. They
worried that some Kurds wanted to remove Tuz from SAD
province, and that through Kurdish influence the UNAMI
Qprovince, and that through Kurdish influence the UNAMI
reports would cause additional suffering (beyond that of the
past six years) to Sunni Arabs. They bemoaned the loss of
strong institutions (the Ba'ath Party and the former army)
run by capable, trained officers (COMMENT: Sunni Arab
officers disproportionately staffed the former IA, though
they did not say it. END COMMENT). The Arabs saw Tuz as
part of the inviolable Iraqi national territory, and the
greater long-term threat as coming from Iran. As Sheikh
Husam Al Bayati put it: "Iranians have wanted to take
control of Iraq for 1,350 years." Without a strong Iraqi
Army in place, they feared that when CF withdraw Iran is
likely to fill the gap.


5. (C) The Arabs dismissed the current Iraqi Army as a
militia, whose leaders lack the professional training of the
former army's officers. Those in government now in Baghdad
were in hotels while the true Iraqi patriots were in the
trenches. The best solution would be to bring the old
professional soldiers, the true patriots, and the "innocent
Ba'athists" back. "After all", they argued, "the army and
the Ba'ath Party existed long before Saddam came to power."

BAGHDAD 00000898 002 OF 002



KURDS PLAY THE VICTIM CARD
--------------


6. (C) The Kurdish group was led by Tuz Qaimmaqam "Mayor"
Mohammed Rasheed Raouf and newly elected PC member Amin Aziz
Jawad. For the Tuz Kurds, the discussion began with a
recitation of their history of oppression (COMMENT: Neither
the Sunni Arabs nor the Turkmen acknowledged this. END
COMMENT). They listed Saddam's orders to destroy 54 of their
villages in 1986 and 1988 in an attempt to push the Kurds out
of Tuz, and recalled their people's suffering in the 1991
uprising. They saw it as part of the course of history that
Tuz should be returned to Kirkuk, from which it was separated
in 1976.


7. (C) In the Kurds' view, Tuz is tied to Kirkuk by blood and
business ties, which are much closer than its administrative
connection to SaD, from which it is separated by the natural
barrier of the Hamrin Mountains and the bureaucratic barrier
of an unresponsive provincial government in Tikrit. The UN
and US should enforce Article 140 so that Tuz can return to
Kirkuk. As uncaring as Tikrit is, the GOI in Baghdad is no
better, they say. The Kurds complained that government jobs
are doled out disproportionately to Arabs. An even bigger
problem is GOI land made available to corrupt Arabs who do
not even live in Tuz, which the Kurds can only lease. The
Kurds saw little value in the UNAMI representative's visit to
Tuz )- yes, he listened, but in the end there was nothing
new. The one point on which the Kurds agreed with the Arabs
and Turkmen was that it is critical to resolve boundary
disputes prior to CF withdrawal.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) While Tuz Khurmato has not suffered inter-ethnic
violence as other disputed areas have, fear and mutual
mistrust inform Sunni Arab, Turkman, and Kurdish opinions of
the impending release of UNAMI's reports, and of the future
of the district. This fear and mistrust could complicate
efforts to further reconcile ethnic differences in Tuz. END
COMMENT.
BUTENIS