IRAQ 201: CENTRALIZATION AND POWER-SHARING -- A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000880

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: CENTRALIZATION AND POWER-SHARING -- A
NEW AXIS OF IRAQI POLITICS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 588

B. BAGHDAD 585

C. BAGHDAD 379

D. 08 BAGHDAD 2803

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Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reason 1.4 (d).

(U) This is one in a series of messages intended to provide
background for policy-makers on Iraq.


1. (C) Summary. Conflicting visions of the role of the state
are increasing divisions among Iraqis, and have become a
catalyst for political realignment at the national level.
Most Sunni and Shi'a Arabs are inclined toward a strong
central state, especially for the purpose of maintaining a
unified Iraq, though in the provinces they are bitter about
poor ministerial performance and suspicious of Saddam-style
abuse. Kurds have a stronger stake in promoting
decentralized authority over government functions as a means
of protecting and capitalizing on their hard-won autonomy.
The new Provincial Powers Law (PPL) gives local officials new
powers over provincial budgets and security, but few are yet
prepared to take advantage of them. The arrival of
pro-centralist parties like the Sunni Arab Hadba in Ninewa
and Shi'a Da'wa in the South into positions of real
provincial authority could make them better appreciate the
advantages of decentralization.


2. (C) Meanwhile, the decentralization issue affects
national politics too. Prime Minister Maliki's moves to
consolidate his control over security and other functions
have exacerbated divisions, provoking his former coalition
partners -- the Kurds and the Shi'a Islamic Supreme Council
of Iraq (ISCI),both anti-centralists -- to develop new
partnerships with other anti-Maliki groups. To counter this
bloc, the Prime Minister has been working to build support
from the remaining, relatively nationalist Shi'a parties and
perhaps from Sunni nationalist and ex-Baathist elements,
including the National Dialogue Front. A realignment of
national Iraqi politics along the axes of power-sharing,
centralization and the Prime Minister could further
complicate internal disputes such as those over territorial
claims and hydrocarbons. That said, in a country where
poliD,QL{Qy!H(Q!9=5sectarian security issues in the north. The varied
responses to the Prime Minister's late-2008 formation and
funding of tribal support councils (TSC),which were
ostensibly designed to have a strong advisory role in
provincial governance and security matters, illustrate the
difference. In the South, where Shi'a tribal leaders
responded positively to the TSC program, opposition came
almost solely from ISCI, which viewed TSCs as an abuse of
power designed to build Maliki's electoral support at ISCI's
expense. In Kurdish areas, the councils were seen as a force
to supplant Peshmerga in disputed areas, and thus as an
immediate security threat. For Kurds, the notion of

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organizing Arab tribal leaders, with their ability to
mobilize fighters, was unsettling. Sunni tribal and
provincial leaders, accustomed to much greater largesse from
the central government than provided by TSCs, largely ignored
the program. On March 5, the
Kurdish-ISCI-IIP bloc in parliament passed a budget removing
TSCs from the Prime Minister's office to an ISCI-friendly
office in the Ministry of Interior (ref B).

PPL: Budget and Security
--------------


5. (C) Officials from all provinces express frustration at
their inability to deliver services effectively, given the
strong role of Baghdad-based ministries. Whether fault lies
with central government mismanagement, local incompetence, or
both, voters used the provincial elections to change
leadership in almost every province. The new Provincial
Powers Law, effective with the seating of the new provincial
councils (PC) in April, provides local officials with a new
range of authorities. Provincial budgets can now be
augmented by local duties, fines, governorate services,
donations, and sale of assets. But provincial governments
have little bureaucracy to implement such a program, which
means they will remain reliant on central government
allocations for the time being. Provincial governments also
will enjoy an enhanced ability to remove directors general of
ministries who are not performing to satisfaction. It
remains to be seen how new provincial governments will use
their new powers; turnover on the PC in most areas approaches
80 percent and new members have serious training needs with
regard to the PPL and related matters.


6. (C) The PPL also enhances provincial oversight in
security, in a way that is not always clear and that sets
up the potential for conflict with the Prime Minister. Most
authority over the Iraqi Police (IP) shifts to the
provincial government, including the appointment and removal
of the Chief of Police, leaving command over the Iraqi Army
(IA) to the Prime Minister. To avoid conflicts under the PPL
with incoming governments, Maliki removed or appointed
several police chiefs shortly before the elections. The
success of Maliki's State of Law list should reduce the
potential for conflict with the national government over
police chief appointments in the southern provinces, but
tensions can be expected in central and northern provinces;
Diyala and Ninewa police chiefs should be point of
confrontation soon. Provincial governments are also
authorized under the PPL to develop local security plans, but
in coordination with the IA and IP, which may create
jurisdictional disputes, especially where PM-led Provincial
Operations Centers are present.


7. (U) Comment: USAID's Local Governance Project is ready
now to begin assisting 11 high-priority provincial
governments. The assistance will begin with a series of
orientation sessions to explain provincial governments' new
roles and responsibilities. We will follow this with a
program, tailored to each province, covering capital budget
planning and implementation, the oversight of
services-delivery, the organization and management of staffs
and committees, outreach to civil society and other topics.
END Comment.

Regional Governments and Their Aspirants
--------------


8. (C) Relations between the central government and the
Kurdish Regional Government have their own, and worrying,
set of complications. While the constitution grants Kurdish
authorities control over areas of Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Diyala
Provinces that were administered by them on May 19, 2003
QProvinces that were administered by them on May 19, 2003
(i.e., north of the "Green Line"),there is no agreement on
where that line is, nor on what specific powers Kurdish
authorities have and what authorities the central government
retains in those areas. (The Article 140 process of
adjudicating conflicting territorial claims has made little
progress, and the release in mid-April by UNAMI of reports on
the Disputed Internal Boundaries may or may not help.) For
that matter, there is no agreement between Baghdad and Erbil
on the division of power even within the three northern
governorates of the KRG. IHEC is pressing its
(constitutionally dubious) claim to authority over elections
in the KRG. The Ministry of Oil is pressing its
(constitutionally much better founded) claim of authority
over contracts and exports of oil from the Khurmala Dome in
Erbil Province. The relationship between the Peshmerga as a
regional security force, and the national security force
institutions is unclear. Attempts by either side to impose
its preferred solution (e.g., deployment by Maliki of ISF to
sensitive areas now occupied by Peshmerga without
consultations with Kurdish authorities) could provoke armed

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conflict.


9. (C) Region-formation aspirations in the South -- whether
of the nine-province variety favored by elements in ISCI, or
the one- and three-province variants promoted occasionally in
the oil-rich far south -- are dormant for the time
being. Maliki's victories in Shi'a-majority provinces showed
that security, dissatisfaction with local incumbents, and
Shi'a Iraqi nationalism (support for a strong, unified state,
hostility toward Iran, deep skepticism toward Kurdish
intentions, and relative religious moderation) were more
important motivators than discontent with Baghdad. Southern
regional aspirations could resurface if Da'wa fails to
deliver better government, however. Sunni Arabs, with a
strong
nationalist bent and a still-vivid memory of a highly
centralized Sunni government in Baghdad, have few regional
aspirations of their own. They are highly critical of the
regional rumblings of the Kurds in the North and the Shi'a
Arabs in the South. They see a decentralized state with
strong regional governments as a force that would weaken Iraq
in relation to its neighbors, particularly the Sunni Arabs'
bte noir to the east, Iran.

Shifting National Alliances
--------------


10. (C) While the Prime Minister's amassed authority has
enabled him to project an image as a strong leader and build
popular support among Shi'a Arabs, it has also provoked ISCI
and the Kurds to work against him in parliament, in
partnership with other anti-Maliki elements such as the Sunni
Iraqi Islamic Party. In the early March debate over the 2009
GoI budget, this group inserted amendments authorizing an
increased direct transfer of funds from service-providing
ministries to provincial governments (ref B). To counter
this bloc, the Prime Minister has been working to build
support from the remaining, relatively nationalist Shi'a
parties and perhaps from Sunni nationalist and ex-Baathist
elements, including the National Dialogue Front. A
realignment of national Iraqi politics along the axes of
power-sharing, centralization and the Prime Minister could
further complicate internal disputes such as those over
territorial claims and hydrocarbons. Current political
partnerships are far from permanent, however, and could shift
in response to new issues and tactical opportunities. Many
parties with tendencies toward nationalism and centralization
(Da'wa, Hadba in Ninewa) now control provincial governments,
which may temper their support for central government
authority. Thus the limited decentralization that already
exists in Iraq provides an incentive for regional and local
leaders to balance against central government power, even if
they do so for tactical rather than philosophical reasons.
BUTENIS