IRAQ 201: KURDISH POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000859

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2024
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: KURDISH POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 811

B. BAGHDAD 796

Classified By: PMIN Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (d).

(U) This is one in a series of messages intended to provide
background for policy-makers on Iraq.


1. (C) Summary. The Kurdish political landscape is mostly
about the delicate balance maintained by the two dominant
secular parties - the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Changes in
leadership for either party set off a game of musical chairs
for Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Kurd-designated
national political positions. Of late, the PUK is
experiencing internal power struggles which jeopardizes the
KDP-PUK 50/50 power-sharing accord. Moves to ensure that the
accord remain intact could end up weakening Kurdish political
power in Baghdad at a time of heightened Arab-Kurd tensions.
With Maliki and other Arab politicians running on a popular
anti-Kurd platform for the provincial and national elections,
the Kurds are nervous and on the defensive. As Maliki
continues to flex his PM muscle with provocative actions like
replacing Kurdish officers in the Iraqi Army (IA) with Arabs,
moving IA troops into Peshmerga controlled areas of Khanaqin
and Kirkuk, using Prime Minister Office funds to establish
tribal support councils in disputed territories, and
attempting to amend the constitution and dilute KRG autonomy,
it is difficult for the Kurds to want to trust Maliki or play
ball with the central government (GoI). The slow-moving
process on the resolution of Kirkuk, the stalled hydrocarbons
law, perceived USG indifference, and Dawa's (Maliki's party)
success in the provincial elections has the Kurdish
leadership primed to fight for what they have and if
necessary retrench to "Fortress Kurdistan." We are urging the
Kurdish leadership to lobby more for Kurdish interests in
Baghdad, building alliances around issues. So far Massoud
Barzani hasn't shown much interest in this, but the meeting
between Nechirvan Barzani and the Prime Minister last week
was a small step in the right direction (ref A). End Summary.

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THE PLAYERS
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2. (C) Politically, the Kurds are organized into two main
secular parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Small Kurdish
opposition parties do exist but are, in large part, funded by
the PUK-KDP coalition. (Note. Some parties like the
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) has an indepedent platform and
some independent popular support. End Note) The head of the
KDP is Masoud Barzani who is President of the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG). The KDP consists of family clans,
operating very much like a mafia organization. For example,
his uncle is Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, his
nephew/son-in-law is KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and
his son Masrur is Head of KRG's Intelligence Directorate. By
contrast, the PUK has been described as an umbrella of
different personalities with Iraq's President Jalal Talabani
at its head. Like KDP, PUK's politburo mainly consists of old
guard Peshmerga generals. KRG VP is former Peshmerga General
Kosrat Rasoul, however, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih is
a Princeton-educated western user-friendly fluent English
speaker. Considering the tumultuous history of the Kurds,
especially at the hands of Saddam, many Kurdish leaders
sought refuge in various countries and maintain dual
citizenship.

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KURDISH ALLIANCE - ONE AND ONLY
QKURDISH ALLIANCE - ONE AND ONLY
--------------


3. (C) From 1994-1998, the KDP and PUK were at war with
each other. The USG helped broker a KDP-PUK accord, which put
an end to the fighting and split power-sharing 50/50 in the
ministries, parliament, and its military. Since the fall of
Saddam, Kurdish-controlled areas have become Iraq's most
stable and prosperous region, although one that still depends
heavily on government funding and, ultimately, rent from
Iraqi oil exports. There is stability coming from an often
stifling authoritarian style of democracy and pervasive
corruption that likely hinders some investment (ref B).
During the 2005 government formation, Talabani and Barzani
put aside their ideological differences, formed the Kurdistan
Alliance (KAL) and headed to Baghdad with all their eggs in a
unified basket. The KAL has proven to be a disciplined force
in both regional and national politics, with Talabani
agreeing to stay in Baghdad and work with the GoI and Masoud
Barzani assuming the mantle of KRG President. As long as
Talabani is President of Iraq and Barzani is President of

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Kurdistan, the KDP-PUK power balance is maintained.

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PUK SQUABBLES
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4. (C) As such, Talabani brought a handful of trusted
politicos to Baghdad to represent Kurdish interests at the
national level. Talabani has demonstrated that he is the
grand master of consensus building and deal making
(nationally, if not within his own party),ensuring that the
Kurds are not left out of the national agenda. However, in
doing so, there is a schism between Baghdad PUK and
Sulemaniyah PUK. PUK is weaker in the North, unable to match
the power of Masoud Barzani and his KDP clan. The KRG seat of
government in KDP's home town of Erbil has enjoyed
accelerated growth and prosperity compared to PUK's home town
Sulemaniyah. Even though Kurdistan has never had it so good,
there is growing resentment by Sulemaniyah-based PUK towards
KDP and in part towards Talabani and his Baghdad team for
being more "Iraqi" than "Kurdish."


5. (C) While Talabani continues to "fight the fight" in
Baghdad, disgruntled PUK leaders sit in Sulemaniyah, with few
understanding the value of having Talabani in Baghdad. In
October 2008, after spending 3 months in the US recuperating
from heart surgery, Talabani addressed PUK leaders' demands
for reform by establishing committees to overhaul PUK's 32
centers worldwide. In addition, he delegated equal authority
to KRG VP Kosrat Rasoul Ali and DPM Barham Salih to manage
PUK affairs on his behalf. The committee findings, unveiled
in February 2009, did not anoint the disgruntled with key
positions. As a result, more PUK internal powerplays have
ensued and negotiations continue to plague Talabani. In an
effort to restore PUK's regional prowess, Talabani decided to
nominate DPM Barham Salih to be KRG's next Prime Minister.
The move would boost the PUK's power in the KRG but also
would weaken the Kurds influence in Baghdad. KDP leaders can
only fret on the sidelines and hope that Talabani's health
remains stable. At a time when Kurd-Arab tensions are
elevated, the Kurdish leadership recognizes the need to be a
unified front in battling with Maliki and the central
government.

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THE FUTURE - SUCCESSION
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6. (C) The PUK's internal squabbles have revealed that
competent Kurdish leaders are few in number. Several Kurdish
leaders do not speak Arabic, have no interest in national
politics and could not effectively serve in Baghdad. Others
lack the Peshmerga legacy that gives them credibility to
thrive in regional politics. Maintaining the PUK-KDP accord
becomes a burden since leadership positions must rotate
between KDP and PUK. The current family structure of the KDP
and lack of acceptable new blood in PUK leaves both parties
struggling to fill strategic posts. The KRG draft
constitution limits the presidency to two four-year
consecutive terms. Thus,KDP leader Masoud Barzani has an end
date. There is much speculation about who in the KDP could
succeed Masoud Barzani and be a counterweight to Jalal
Talabani's successor in the PUK. Recent polling in Kurdistan
indicates that the people are fed up with the insider game,
want an end to KRG corruption and lack of transparency. At
some point, KDP and PUK will need to amend their accord. In
addition, on March 14, Talabani mentioned that he may not run
for President in the next national elections. This has
started another round of musical chairs that would involve
Arab Sunnis who seek more high-profile external Iraqi
QArab Sunnis who seek more high-profile external Iraqi
positions like the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry.
Several trades would have to be negotiated.

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BROKEN TRUST - FORTRESS KURDISTAN
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7. (C) Kurdish leaders have more than just internal party
politics to worry about. Their prosperity is viewed by the
lower 14 governorates as greedy overreach. PM Maliki's
rhetoric reflects the general Arab view that it is time to
push back on the Kurds and replace KRG "facts on the ground"
in disputed areas. In this year of elections, Maliki and
other Arab nationalist politicians play the Kurd card often.
Barzani is not able to refrain and has entered into a tit for
tat, criticizing Maliki's dictatorial ways. Rhetoric has
increased on both sides. The relationship between Masoud
Barzani and Maliki has devolved into a precarious war of
words.


8. (C) In August 2008, when Maliki moved IA into Khanaqin,

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an area secured by the Peshmerga, Barzani considered Maliki's
unilateral maneuver a personal betrayal of their friendship.
Masoud recalled a time which Maliki lived for two years with
the Barzanis fighting Saddam. He earned his warrior name -
Kak Jawad (Brother Jawad) - and was considered a dear friend.
U.S. intervention defused the situation and prevented a
military confrontation. But now that the trust has been
broken, Barzani believes Maliki is just getting started and
Khanaqin is the first step towards taking Kirkuk and even
Erbil. U.S. prodding made a reluctant Barzani travel to
Baghdad in November and extend the olive branch, establishing
the 5 Party Committee talks as a mechanism to resolve
regional/central government issues. Unfortunately, this
process ran out of steam during the ratification of the
US-Iraq Security Agreement.


9. (C) Maliki's move to establish tribal councils in
disputed areas using PMO funds, to replace Kurdish IA
commanders with Arabs, his plan to move IA troops to the
northern side of the disputed city of Kirkuk, has Barzani
feeling isolated and under siege. The Kurds are nervous.
Combined with a stalled oil legislation, Dawa's success in
the provincial elections, and perceived USG indifference to
their concerns, Barzani has deep suspicions of Maliki's true
intentions. We have highlighted to Barzani that the front
line of defending Kurdish interests and autonomy is not
Kirkuk or Khanaqin but rather Baghdad. We have urged him to
engage more, both with KRG officials visiting Baghdad to find
political allies on various issues and in Barzani himself
occasionally lobbying in the capital. Barzani, however,
hasn't done much to follow up with Iraqi officials in
Baghdad, leaving this to Talabani and DPM Saleh.


10. (C) As we work to prevent an armed confrontation
between Iraqi security forces and Kurdish regional security
forces in the North, we also have to foster communication and
political discussions between Erbil and Baghdad. This does
not mean bringing Barzani to Baghdad promptly. All our
contacts in Baghdad caution that a visit must be properly
prepared so that Maliki and Barzani have productive
discussions. The meeting between Maliki and Nechirvan
Barzani last week was a step towards establishing better
communication but we have far to go before Baghdad and Erbil
start serious discussions about the issues that divide them.

BUTENIS