Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD845
2009-03-29 08:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT DIYALA: POTENTIAL NEW PC ALLIANCES CROSSING

Tags:  PGOV KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3022
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0845/01 0880818
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290818Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2424
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000845 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: POTENTIAL NEW PC ALLIANCES CROSSING
ETHNIC/SECTARIAN LINES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 49

B. BAGHDAD 64

C. BAGHDAD 242

D. BAGHDAD 712

Classified By: PRT Diyala Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (a) and (
d).

(U) This is a PRT Diyala reporting cable.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000845

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: POTENTIAL NEW PC ALLIANCES CROSSING
ETHNIC/SECTARIAN LINES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 49

B. BAGHDAD 64

C. BAGHDAD 242

D. BAGHDAD 712

Classified By: PRT Diyala Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (a) and (
d).

(U) This is a PRT Diyala reporting cable.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Coalition negotiations in Diyala province
remain fluid and inconclusive. After weeks of
behind-the-scenes talks, two major blocs are forming; both
cross traditional ethnic and sectarian divisions. The first
bloc is comprised of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)-dominated
Tawafuq coalition and the Kurdish Alliance (KA). The second
consists of Saleh Al Mutlaq's Sunni Arab Iraqi National
Project (INP),Ayad Allawi's secular Iraqi National List
(INL),and two of the three the Shi'a parties. The two wild
cards in these negotiations are potential splits from the
Kurdish and Shi'a coalitions. The Shi'a parties in Diyala
have complained about the fairness of the elections and have
threatened to boycott the new PC. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Major parties and coalitions in Diyala province
continue their negotiations over the composition of the new
provincial government. The negotiations are primarily taking
place among party leaders at the national level -- in many
cases, the new PC members are not directly involved in the
talks. Indeed, the national INP has even created a special
committee to handle the negotiations. Others, such as the
Shi'a parties, have told the PRT that they intend to adhere
to whatever decisions are taken in Baghdad by their
negotiating teams. However, new PC member Abdallah
al-Jabouri, the leader of the Diyala branch of the INL,
claims to be independent from Allawi's national INL in
Baghdad and to be conducting his own negotiations at the
provincial level.


3. (C) The new Diyala PC will have 29 seats, thus requiring
15-seats for a majority. According to Abdallah, the INP (six
seats) and the INL (three seats) have formed a bloc. This
bloc's nine seats in the new PC would give it parity with
Tawafuq (also nine seats). The INP-INL bloc is negotiating
aggressively to carve out a majority. It has made overtures
to the Shi'a parties as well as to the KDP. PRT contacts
confirm that, while Maliki's State of Law (SoL--two seats)
and Jaafari's National Reform Trend (NRT--one seat) have

sided with the INP-INL bloc, the Al Hakims' Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI--two seats) has not, thus far.


4. (C) The INP-INL bloc has opened talks with Masoud
Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in hopes of
playing on KDP discontent and splitting the unity of the KA.
The KDP is dissatisfied with its single PC seat, while the
Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has three.
(NOTE: The KA has six total seats; the additional two
Kurdish seats are held by small socialist and communist
parties. END NOTE). The bloc is also focusing on the
personal desires of Assistant Governor Emad (KDP),who has
made it clear that he wants to be Deputy Governor. Should
the INP-INL alliance lure ISCI and the KDP to their bloc,
they would just achieve the required 15-seat majority in the
new PC (INP 6, INL 3, SL 2, ISCI 2, NRT 1, KDP 1).


5. (C) Tawafuq, with its nine seats, is counting on the
support of a unified KA to obtain a majority and is luring it
with the offer of the PC Chairmanship for a PUK Kurd.
According to current PC Chairman Ibrahim Bajelan (Kurd-PUK),
Tawafuq is also attempting to split the Shi'a parties by
entering into secret negotiations with ISCI. (COMMENT: The
PRT suspects that Tawafuq fears a KDP defection to the rival
bloc. Thus, they are attempting to gain the support of ISCI
Qbloc. Thus, they are attempting to gain the support of ISCI
to replace the potential single-seat loss this would entail.
END COMMENT).


6. (C) While the Kurds are attempting to appear unified
publicly, in private both the PUK and KDP are conducting
independent negotiations with the two blocs. Assistant
Governor Emad confirmed that the PUK has entered into
separate talks with Tawafuq, and emphasizes that the KDP has
not yet agreed to join the Tawafuq-KA bloc. On the contrary,
the KDP is contemplating joining the rival INP-INL bloc.
Moreover, should it become clear that the INP-INL bloc would
gain the majority, the PUK would be under tremendous pressure
to follow suit.


7. (C) In recent meetings with the PRT, Shi'a party
representatives complained about irregularities with the
provincial elections; they expressed many of these concerns
in advance of the election (ref A). They reject the election
results as tainted and have threatened to boycott the new PC.

BAGHDAD 00000845 002 OF 002


They are also threatening to use all means available to
hinder the work of the provincial government. Specifically,
they mentioned a possible work slow-down by the Shi'a members
of the Governance Center staff. Since almost all of the
office chiefs and most of their staff belong to outgoing
Shi'a governor Ra'ad Tamimi's tribe, a slowdown by the Shi'a
staff would have considerable impact on the functioning of
the provincial government. These threats notwithstanding,
the Shi'a are at the same time actively engaged in
negotiations with the INP-INL bloc. COMMENT: We predict
that if they can be part of a governing coalition without
Tawafuq or the KA, the Shi'a parties will participate in the
new PC. END COMMENT.


8. (C) COMMENT: The conflicting stories we hear of national
involvement, local dealmaking, and counterintuitive alliances
highlight the intense and still highly fluid nature of PC
negotiations. It is hard to imagine the KDP defecting from
the KA, since Kurdish organizational unity is so strong at a
national level; it is likely that the entire KA will ally
with Tawafuq or INP-INL as one unit. ISCI is obviously
working both sides in order to extract maximum
concessions--more prominent positions within the new
provincial government. Two major issues will discourage it
from entering into an agreement with the Tawafuq-KA bloc
however. First, Tawafuq and ISCI have conflicting goals in
many areas, primarily regarding relations with Iran. Second,
the national leadership of ISCI may not want to break from
the Shi'a ranks to align with the IIP with national elections
coming in late 2009/early 2010. END COMMENT.
BUTENIS