Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD83
2009-01-13 12:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SHIA PARTIES FACE ISSUE-BASED FISSURES BEFORE

Tags:  PGOV PINS KISL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5526
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0083/01 0131206
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131206Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1198
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000083 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2029
TAGS: PGOV PINS KISL IZ
SUBJECT: SHIA PARTIES FACE ISSUE-BASED FISSURES BEFORE
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 003773

B. BAGHDAD 000011

C. GMP20081108641001

D. 08 BAGHDAD3881

E. 08 BAGHDAD 003023

F. 08 BAGHDAD 3744

G. 08 BAGHDAD 003870

H. 08 BAGHDAD 002875

I. 08 BAGHDAD 3791

Classified By: PMIN Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000083

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2029
TAGS: PGOV PINS KISL IZ
SUBJECT: SHIA PARTIES FACE ISSUE-BASED FISSURES BEFORE
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 003773

B. BAGHDAD 000011

C. GMP20081108641001

D. 08 BAGHDAD3881

E. 08 BAGHDAD 003023

F. 08 BAGHDAD 3744

G. 08 BAGHDAD 003870

H. 08 BAGHDAD 002875

I. 08 BAGHDAD 3791

Classified By: PMIN Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Shia political parties, especially ISCI and Da'wa,
are engaged in ideological and policy-based battles among
themselves that might foreshadow a permanent split of the
Shia electoral alliance at the national level, according to
numerous meetings with our Shia contacts in Baghdad. These
battles are partially fueled by intra-Shia competition for
the January 31 provincial elections, but also reflect
potentially lasting fissures over issues like the proper use
of security forces, the assertiveness of the Prime Minister's
Office, economic privileges derived from government office,
ideological guidance from Najaf, and the federal balance
between center and province. Some observers think the split
between the Shia Islamists is likely to grow, driven by
rivalries in the Shia provincial governments. Already we are
seeing instances of the Shia Islamist parties abandoning
sectarian solidarity in favor of cross ethnic/sectarian
alliances centered around issues. If sustained, that would
be a very positive devel
opment for Iraqi democracy. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Fellow Shia Recoiling at an Assertive Prime Minister
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) officials have
regularly complained to Poloffs about Prime Minister Maliki's
insular governing style and aggressive use of national
security forces. Maliki, meanwhile, is campaigning for his
"State of Law" electoral coalition largely on his record of
providing security to areas formerly intimidated by militias.
In meetings with Ambassador Crocker, ISCI Vice President
Adil Abd al-Mahdi has repeatedly criticized Maliki for
failing to consult with the Presidency Council and warned
against a "strong man" as prime minister. In early December,
Ammar al-Hakim, the son and likely successor to ISCI Chairman

Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, asserted to PMIN that Maliki had used
the pretext of going after terrorists to intimidate the Kurds
during the Khanaqin standoff earlier in the year. Ammar said
the Iraqi Army should merely "train, be professional, and
remain in their barracks," rather than be used to solve local
disputes.

--------------
Some Shia Looking In
--------------


3. (C) Numerous Shia contacts outside of the dominant ISCI
and Da'wa parties have repeatedly complained to Poloffs of
being unfairly locked-out of power. In addition to wanting a
stronger policy voice, these Shia officials seek an ability
to distribute jobs and contracts to gain loyalists, an
especially important perk given the anemic state of Iraq's
private sector. For the Shia jockeying for government
positions, this appears to be a zero-sum game.


4. (C) Falih al-Fayyad, a member of former Prime Minister
Ibrahim Jafari's Reform Trend, complained to Poloff in
December that the major political blocs do not consult with
smaller ones like his own. Maliki's Da'wa in particular
relied on a tight inner-circle, he said. Shia independent
Qasim Daoud repeatedly complained about Prime Minister Maliki
during meetings at his home with Poloffs, and said he was
looking forward to working with ISCI to prevent Maliki from
consolidating his "dictatorship."
Qconsolidating his "dictatorship."


5. (C) Sadrist MPs have become remarkably marginalized. In
meeting with Poloffs, many Shia MPs have been dismissive of
their Sadrists colleagues, calling them "brutes" and
"children" for protesting COR votes by yelling and pounding
on tables. Fadilah has struggled for relevancy since it left
the Maliki government in March 2007 because Maliki refused to
give its opportunist members key cabinet positions. During
the debate on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement in parliament,
MPs told Poloffs Fadilah had attempted to trade its support
for the agreement for ministerial positions. The day before

BAGHDAD 00000083 002 OF 003


the COR vote on the agreement, Fadilah bloc leader Hasan
al-Shammeri asked PMIN for three armored cars and the release
of a former Fadilah local official. In a meeting with
Poloffs in December, Fadilah advisor Abbas al-Yaqubi said
Fadilah is not a competitive party because it lacks a funding
stream like Da'wa and ISCI, who he claimed receive support
from Iran. (Note: Yaqubi was certainly seeking U.S.
assistance. End note.)

--------------
Becoming Less Tethered to Najaf
--------------


6. (C) The marja'iya (the clerical establishment) in Najaf,
especially Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, remains a potent
guide and source of unity for many Shia politicians at the
national level. However, some Iraqi leaders are becoming
less tethered to the marja'iya because of an increased
confidence in taking major policy decisions on their own and
Sistani's tacit approval of intra-Shia competition during
provincial elections. In addition, Shia may split - at least
temporarily - over who will replace the ailing Sistani (ref
B).


8. (C) During the negotiations and debate about the security
agreement, Shia politicians took great care to keep the
marja'iya informed. In meetings with Poloffs, however,
prominent Da'wa MPs and close Maliki advisers Haidar al-Abadi
and Hassan al-Sunayd seemingly shrugged off Sistani's public
demand for a "national consensus" in parliament. While Sunni
MPs wavered on whether to support the agreement, Abadi and
Sunayd separately told Poloffs they were willing to push
ahead on SoFA ratification despite Najaf's warning to include
the Sunnis. Sistani's representative in Karbala days after
the agreement passed called for a referendum (ref A). Even
so, a few days later in a meeting with the Ambassador, Maliki
did not appear eager to hold a public vote.


9. (C) Sistani and the other marja'iya have stated they will
not favor specific parties or candidates during the upcoming
provincial elections, which has given ISCI and Da'wa cover to
form competing coalitions nationwide. Our contacts, however,
tell us Sistani had asked for a unified Shia list in mixed
ethno-sectarian provinces but Da'wa and ISCI failed to reach
a compromise on seat allocation. Shia parliamentarian Qasim
Daoud in December told Poloffs his Solidarity Party will
follow Sistani's guidance by running with ISCI's coalition in
Diyala, but ISCI and Da'wa are split there because their
intra-Shia competition trumped Sistani's guidance.

--------------
Federalism Divides Shia
--------------


10. (C) The distribution of power between the center and
provinces has re-emerged as a salient divide among Shia
politicians in Baghdad. Maliki in early November publically
said he wishes to revisit federalism in favor of a stronger
center (ref C). Ridha Taqi, the head of political relations
for ISCI, days later told PMIN that Maliki's speech "attacked
the constitution" and that federalism has become a sensitive
topic between senior ISCI leaders and Maliki. Haitham
al-Husseini, a senior adviser to Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim,
wondered why Maliki criticized the constitution given his
role in drafting it. Da'wa MP Haidar al-Abadi told Poloffs
that Maliki's speech merely reflected discussions that were
occurring behind closed doors. (Note: Federalism is being
addressed in one of the five close-hold inter-party
committees established in the fall, ref D. End Note.)


11. (C) The most public recent example of the federalism
dispute is the controversy about Maliki's Tribal Support
Qdispute is the controversy about Maliki's Tribal Support
Councils (refs E, F),although other disputes are likely to
Emerge too. As stipulated in the Law of Governorate Councils
(aka the Provincial Powers Law),after the January 31
elections, provinces will gain enhanced authority over
appointing local officials and over local security, a likely
source of friction between an increasingly assertive central
government and southern provinces in which ISCI currently is
strong. The upcoming budget fight in the COR might pit Da'wa
against ISCI. An ISCI MP who sits on the Finance Committee
in December complained to Poloffs that
the budget proposed by the Maliki government unfairly cuts
funding to the provinces.


12. (C) Shia also lack a common vision about regions
formation. Ridha Taqi and Haitham Husseini both told Poloffs
that Iraq is not ready for the formation of (political)
regions, citing specifically the Fadilah-sponsored initiative
in Basra (ref G). Ammar al-Hakim, however, told PMIN in
December that ISCI still favors regions formation, but that

BAGHDAD 00000083 003 OF 003


they should not be based along sectarian lines. Maliki's
Da'wa and the Sadrists remain opposed to regions formation,
although neither have offered strong public critiques of
Fadilah's efforts.

--------------
Comment: A Permanent Split?
--------------


13. (C) As Da'wa and ISCI compete head-on in provincial
elections (ref H),Sadrists contemplate their political
future, and "liberals" like former prime ministers Ayad
Allawi (Iraqi National List) and Ibrahim al-Jafari (Reform
Trend) seek their niche among Iraqis disaffected by the
religious parties, we may see a permanent split among Shia
parties based on ideology and policy priorities. If true,
this could open Iraq's political scene for cross-sectarian
electoral alliances (ref I). The Sadrists and Fadilah
already have forged an informal alliance in the COR with some
Sunni parties joined by elements of Ayed Allawi's secularist
Iraqi National List that also feel locked-out of power -- the
so-called Parliament Coordination Group, or the July 22 Bloc.
ISCI's cooperation with the Kurdish Alliance on federalism
and power-sharing has become a pillar of politics in Baghdad.
In the fall, ISCI, the Kurds, and the
Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) pressured Maliki's Da'wa to
form the five party committees to address the most
contentious disputes.


14. (C) How provincial governments are formed after
elections will test whether this intra-Shia split is
permanent. Raja al-Khalili, an advisor to ISCI Vice
President Mahdi, told Poloff in November and January that the
ongoing tension between ISCI and Da'wa might prevent the two
from forming governing coalitions in the provinces after the
January 31 election. Khalili predicted there will be no
unified Shia banner in national elections.


15. (C) The COR must pass legislation to determine the rules
for the next round of national elections, planned for late
2009 or early 2010. The 2005 national elections system
favored large coalitions that appealed to sectarian
identities. This, along with the Iraqi Constitution that
charges the largest bloc in the COR with forming a
government, gave the Shia incentives to run under a unified
banner so to ensure a Shia prime minister. A question that
some political thinkers here (Shia and others) will wonder if
the Shia Islamists' split endures well into 2009 is whether
one could imagine national lists that combine Kurdish and/or
Sunni Arab parties running for parliament.

CROCKER