Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD787
2009-03-23 07:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH KRG ELECTIONS: USG SHOULD
how-toVZCZCXRO6758 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #0787/01 0820727 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 230727Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2335 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000787
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH KRG ELECTIONS: USG SHOULD
CALL FOR OPEN LISTS AND A CREDIBLE AND LEGITIMATE POLL
REF: A. BAGHDAD 514
B. BAGHDAD 642
Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000787
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH KRG ELECTIONS: USG SHOULD
CALL FOR OPEN LISTS AND A CREDIBLE AND LEGITIMATE POLL
REF: A. BAGHDAD 514
B. BAGHDAD 642
Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Elections for the 111-member Kurdish
parliament are planned for May 19. These elections are not
likely to be a potential flashpoint in Kurd-Arab tensions.
That said, the Kurdish elections are important to U.S.
interests. How they are conducted, both in terms of meeting
(or not) international norms and what administrative role the
central government will play, will factor into Iraq's overall
political dynamic. Moreover, the leadership in Iraqi
Kurdistan is struggling to maintain its traditional power.
It needs to start finding and developing future leaders, and
these elections are a means to that end. This cable conveys
Embassy's policy approach three issues: elections timing,
open or closed lists, and which bureaucratic entity
administers the elections. Embassy will underscore to
Kurdish leaders that the U.S. will not endorse the KRG
parliamentary elections as entirely credible and legitimate
unless they in fact meet international norms. Building
genuine democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan will be a long process
and we should begin laying markers now. At the same time,
our advocacy for good elections must be calibrated with our
efforts with the Kurds in other important areas such as
settling Kirkuk/Article 23, Article 140, and reducing
Kurd-Arab tensions to avoid a national civil war. End Summary.
--------------
Background/State of Play
--------------
2. (SBU) The last Kurdish National Assembly (KNA)
elections, held in 2005, were administered by the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI),the precursor to the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in Baghdad. KRG
Parliamentary elections are governed by the 1992 Election Law
(amended in 1994, 1998, and 2004). Elections are by closed
list. A new amendment currently under consideration in the
KNA would:
-- raise the quota for women from 25 to 30%;
-- lower the minimum age for candidates from 30 to 25;
and
-- establish minority set-aside seats: five for
Turcoman, five for Christians, and one for Armenians.
3. (SBU) As reported ref B, on March 1, KRG President
Barzani returned the draft Election Law amendment to the KNA
with the request that the law also provide for the
establishment of a Kurdistan electoral office to administer
elections in the KRG; adopt language that would limit
electoral lists that are not associated with a political
party; allow for Kurds outside the country to vote; and
stipulate that the Kurdistan High Judicial Council rather
than a federal judicial entity would have responsibility for
resolving electoral complaints. The KNA is reviewing the
President's comments. (Note: Barzani will be out of the
country until March 31. End note.)
--------------
KRG Parliamentary Elections: What We Want
--------------
4. (C) We have an interest in the Kurdish regional
elections. As we have reported (see ref A for example),the
old-guard Kurdish leadership here is facing real pressures
for change as it tries to maintain power. It needs to find
and begin grooming new leaders. Moreover, Iraqi Arabs
perceive that we have a special relationship with the Iraqi
Kurds. If Iraqi Arabs perceive that we wink at Kurdish
anti-democratic practices we will have more difficulties
convincing Iraqi Arabs to improve upon their efforts to build
a more transparent and accountable system in the rest of Iraq.
Qa more transparent and accountable system in the rest of Iraq.
5. (C) Therefore, unless instructed otherwise, Embassy
officials, in their conversations with Kurdish leaders, will
underscore that the U.S. will not endorse the KRG
parliamentary elections as credible and legitimate unless
they meet international norms. The ideal elections would be
open list and overseen by an independent, technically capable
body. There would be a neutral mechanism to monitor ballot
security, and domestic and international observers would
monitor not only voting on election day, but the campaign
period to certify that political parties representing a broad
spectrum of candidates were able to freely express a broad
range of views and compete equally.
--------------
Policy Issue #1: Timing
--------------
BAGHDAD 00000787 002 OF 003
6. (C) As noted in reftel B, the May 19 date may slip to
late 2009 or early 2010; they might even be held concurrently
with national parliamentary elections. The voters list has
to be updated. Candidates need to be registered and vetted
and political entity lists confirmed. Ballots need to be
designed and printed. Polling centers need to be located and
staff trained. Security arrangements need to be made. The
1992 Election Law requires a 60-day lead period between
passage of an amendment to the Elections Law and the holding
of elections. IHEC regulations require 90 days. The KNA's
term ends on June 19. If the elections are delayed beyond
June 19, there would need to be an amendment to extend the
parliament's mandate until election day.
7. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, Embassy will urge the
KRG leadership to hold the parliamentary elections as soon as
practical according to national and regional laws and
regulations. The timing of the elections is a matter for the
KRG to resolve. UNAMI, which has the international lead on
elections assistance, shares this view. A postponement -- as
long as it is not indefinite. -- would not adversely affect
U.S. interests.
--------------
Policy Issue #2: Open or Closed List?
--------------
8. (C) Although stipulated in the KRG election law, the
decision to use a closed, combined KDP/PUK candidate list has
provoked negative press commentary and continues to be
contested by the Islamic parties Kurdistan Islamic Union
(KIU) and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) which have submitted
a separate bill to the KNA to change the election process to
an open list format. However, KRG leadership sees closed
lists as essential to maintaining the PUK/KDP 1998 Washington
Agreement that ended the KDP-PUK civil war, establishing a
joint list with a 50-50 split of PUK-KDP seats in the Kurdish
National Assembly. Many Kurdish leaders argue that the KDP
or the PUK would outscore its rival and thus alter the
carefully negotiated balance between the two parties, risking
a resumption of KDP-PUK fighting.
9. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, Embassy will call a
closed list KRG parliamentary election what it would be:
neither very transparent nor especially democratic. We would
be hypocritical to demand open lists for provincial and
national elections and look the other way on KRG elections.
We will caution the Kurdish leadership that they will face
criticism from the USG and the international community if
they have a combined PUK-KDP closed list. That an open list
could lead to renewed KDP-PUK fighting should not be readily
or casually dismissed. It is possible. For the parties'
leadership, the risk of renewed internecine fighting
outweighs the embarrassment of international and U.S.
criticism. We will recognize and even be understanding of
their dilemma, but we will urge them to find ways to settle
their political competition transparently and peacefully and
to recognize the need to develop future leaders. We need not
approve of any election process they put forward and thus we
will lay down a clear marker that we would criticize a
closed-list election process.
-------------- --------------
Policy Issue #3: Who Should Manage Elections in the KRG?
-------------- --------------
10. (C) There is a debate between the KRG and IHEC as to
which should supervise KRG elections. President Barzani has
indicated that the KRG, as an autonomous region, should
Qindicated that the KRG, as an autonomous region, should
supervise its own elections, not Baghdad. For that reason,
he wants the Kurdish Regional Technical Committee for
Elections, and not IHEC, to supervise the elections. The
IHEC Board of Commissioners, led by Chairman Faraj Al-Haydari
(a Kurd),has argued that IHEC has the authority,
credibility, and technical capacity to supervise KRG
elections. During the first week of March, IHEC presented
its points to the Legal Committee of the Kurdish National
Assembly, and they report that there is agreement at the
legal and technical level. However, Barzani has not yet
accepted the proposal. Based on previous Kurdish electoral
skullduggery, there is merit in having a non-KRG entity
supervise to ensure legitimate and credible elections. IHEC,
with assistance from its International Electoral Assistance
Team (IEAT) technical advisors, has already prepared an
operational plan for the KRG parliamentary elections,
including a budget of USD 37.4 million. IHEC is ready to
work with the Kurdistan Regional Elections Office (KREO) in
Erbil, and each of the Governorate Electoral Offices (GEOs)
in the three provinces. IHEC began to work with these
regional entities when they administered IDP voting during
the provincial elections in January.
BAGHDAD 00000787 003 OF 003
11. (C) According to Iraq's Constitution Article 110,
elections are not a federal government authority. All powers
not stipulated as exclusive to or shared by the GOI, are
under the authority of the region(s) or provinces. In our
view, the KRG does not have a legal reason to accept IHEC's
supervision of KRG elections. However for technical and
budgetary reasons, and for increased credibility, IHEC is the
best choice for supervising elections in the KRG.
12. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, Embassy will urge the
KRG accept IHEC's proposal to supervise the KRG elections. If
KRG decides against IHEC's proposal, we should encourage the
KRG to take advantage of its invitation to have IEAT (UNAMI
plus the International Foundation for Electoral Systems,
USAID's implementing partner on technical assistance for
IHEC) support for the election.
--------------
Kurdish Elections and Other U.S. Interests
--------------
13. (C) We can anticipate some strong resistance from
Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani and other Kurdish leaders
when we lay down markers about their elections. We can
expect to be pressing the Kurds on other issues, such as
settling Kirkuk/Article 23, disputed territories and Article
140, and reducing Kurd-Arab tensions to avoid a national
civil war. Our advocacy for good elections must be
calibrated with these other efforts with the Kurds.
BUTENIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH KRG ELECTIONS: USG SHOULD
CALL FOR OPEN LISTS AND A CREDIBLE AND LEGITIMATE POLL
REF: A. BAGHDAD 514
B. BAGHDAD 642
Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Elections for the 111-member Kurdish
parliament are planned for May 19. These elections are not
likely to be a potential flashpoint in Kurd-Arab tensions.
That said, the Kurdish elections are important to U.S.
interests. How they are conducted, both in terms of meeting
(or not) international norms and what administrative role the
central government will play, will factor into Iraq's overall
political dynamic. Moreover, the leadership in Iraqi
Kurdistan is struggling to maintain its traditional power.
It needs to start finding and developing future leaders, and
these elections are a means to that end. This cable conveys
Embassy's policy approach three issues: elections timing,
open or closed lists, and which bureaucratic entity
administers the elections. Embassy will underscore to
Kurdish leaders that the U.S. will not endorse the KRG
parliamentary elections as entirely credible and legitimate
unless they in fact meet international norms. Building
genuine democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan will be a long process
and we should begin laying markers now. At the same time,
our advocacy for good elections must be calibrated with our
efforts with the Kurds in other important areas such as
settling Kirkuk/Article 23, Article 140, and reducing
Kurd-Arab tensions to avoid a national civil war. End Summary.
--------------
Background/State of Play
--------------
2. (SBU) The last Kurdish National Assembly (KNA)
elections, held in 2005, were administered by the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI),the precursor to the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in Baghdad. KRG
Parliamentary elections are governed by the 1992 Election Law
(amended in 1994, 1998, and 2004). Elections are by closed
list. A new amendment currently under consideration in the
KNA would:
-- raise the quota for women from 25 to 30%;
-- lower the minimum age for candidates from 30 to 25;
and
-- establish minority set-aside seats: five for
Turcoman, five for Christians, and one for Armenians.
3. (SBU) As reported ref B, on March 1, KRG President
Barzani returned the draft Election Law amendment to the KNA
with the request that the law also provide for the
establishment of a Kurdistan electoral office to administer
elections in the KRG; adopt language that would limit
electoral lists that are not associated with a political
party; allow for Kurds outside the country to vote; and
stipulate that the Kurdistan High Judicial Council rather
than a federal judicial entity would have responsibility for
resolving electoral complaints. The KNA is reviewing the
President's comments. (Note: Barzani will be out of the
country until March 31. End note.)
--------------
KRG Parliamentary Elections: What We Want
--------------
4. (C) We have an interest in the Kurdish regional
elections. As we have reported (see ref A for example),the
old-guard Kurdish leadership here is facing real pressures
for change as it tries to maintain power. It needs to find
and begin grooming new leaders. Moreover, Iraqi Arabs
perceive that we have a special relationship with the Iraqi
Kurds. If Iraqi Arabs perceive that we wink at Kurdish
anti-democratic practices we will have more difficulties
convincing Iraqi Arabs to improve upon their efforts to build
a more transparent and accountable system in the rest of Iraq.
Qa more transparent and accountable system in the rest of Iraq.
5. (C) Therefore, unless instructed otherwise, Embassy
officials, in their conversations with Kurdish leaders, will
underscore that the U.S. will not endorse the KRG
parliamentary elections as credible and legitimate unless
they meet international norms. The ideal elections would be
open list and overseen by an independent, technically capable
body. There would be a neutral mechanism to monitor ballot
security, and domestic and international observers would
monitor not only voting on election day, but the campaign
period to certify that political parties representing a broad
spectrum of candidates were able to freely express a broad
range of views and compete equally.
--------------
Policy Issue #1: Timing
--------------
BAGHDAD 00000787 002 OF 003
6. (C) As noted in reftel B, the May 19 date may slip to
late 2009 or early 2010; they might even be held concurrently
with national parliamentary elections. The voters list has
to be updated. Candidates need to be registered and vetted
and political entity lists confirmed. Ballots need to be
designed and printed. Polling centers need to be located and
staff trained. Security arrangements need to be made. The
1992 Election Law requires a 60-day lead period between
passage of an amendment to the Elections Law and the holding
of elections. IHEC regulations require 90 days. The KNA's
term ends on June 19. If the elections are delayed beyond
June 19, there would need to be an amendment to extend the
parliament's mandate until election day.
7. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, Embassy will urge the
KRG leadership to hold the parliamentary elections as soon as
practical according to national and regional laws and
regulations. The timing of the elections is a matter for the
KRG to resolve. UNAMI, which has the international lead on
elections assistance, shares this view. A postponement -- as
long as it is not indefinite. -- would not adversely affect
U.S. interests.
--------------
Policy Issue #2: Open or Closed List?
--------------
8. (C) Although stipulated in the KRG election law, the
decision to use a closed, combined KDP/PUK candidate list has
provoked negative press commentary and continues to be
contested by the Islamic parties Kurdistan Islamic Union
(KIU) and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) which have submitted
a separate bill to the KNA to change the election process to
an open list format. However, KRG leadership sees closed
lists as essential to maintaining the PUK/KDP 1998 Washington
Agreement that ended the KDP-PUK civil war, establishing a
joint list with a 50-50 split of PUK-KDP seats in the Kurdish
National Assembly. Many Kurdish leaders argue that the KDP
or the PUK would outscore its rival and thus alter the
carefully negotiated balance between the two parties, risking
a resumption of KDP-PUK fighting.
9. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, Embassy will call a
closed list KRG parliamentary election what it would be:
neither very transparent nor especially democratic. We would
be hypocritical to demand open lists for provincial and
national elections and look the other way on KRG elections.
We will caution the Kurdish leadership that they will face
criticism from the USG and the international community if
they have a combined PUK-KDP closed list. That an open list
could lead to renewed KDP-PUK fighting should not be readily
or casually dismissed. It is possible. For the parties'
leadership, the risk of renewed internecine fighting
outweighs the embarrassment of international and U.S.
criticism. We will recognize and even be understanding of
their dilemma, but we will urge them to find ways to settle
their political competition transparently and peacefully and
to recognize the need to develop future leaders. We need not
approve of any election process they put forward and thus we
will lay down a clear marker that we would criticize a
closed-list election process.
-------------- --------------
Policy Issue #3: Who Should Manage Elections in the KRG?
-------------- --------------
10. (C) There is a debate between the KRG and IHEC as to
which should supervise KRG elections. President Barzani has
indicated that the KRG, as an autonomous region, should
Qindicated that the KRG, as an autonomous region, should
supervise its own elections, not Baghdad. For that reason,
he wants the Kurdish Regional Technical Committee for
Elections, and not IHEC, to supervise the elections. The
IHEC Board of Commissioners, led by Chairman Faraj Al-Haydari
(a Kurd),has argued that IHEC has the authority,
credibility, and technical capacity to supervise KRG
elections. During the first week of March, IHEC presented
its points to the Legal Committee of the Kurdish National
Assembly, and they report that there is agreement at the
legal and technical level. However, Barzani has not yet
accepted the proposal. Based on previous Kurdish electoral
skullduggery, there is merit in having a non-KRG entity
supervise to ensure legitimate and credible elections. IHEC,
with assistance from its International Electoral Assistance
Team (IEAT) technical advisors, has already prepared an
operational plan for the KRG parliamentary elections,
including a budget of USD 37.4 million. IHEC is ready to
work with the Kurdistan Regional Elections Office (KREO) in
Erbil, and each of the Governorate Electoral Offices (GEOs)
in the three provinces. IHEC began to work with these
regional entities when they administered IDP voting during
the provincial elections in January.
BAGHDAD 00000787 003 OF 003
11. (C) According to Iraq's Constitution Article 110,
elections are not a federal government authority. All powers
not stipulated as exclusive to or shared by the GOI, are
under the authority of the region(s) or provinces. In our
view, the KRG does not have a legal reason to accept IHEC's
supervision of KRG elections. However for technical and
budgetary reasons, and for increased credibility, IHEC is the
best choice for supervising elections in the KRG.
12. (C) Unless instructed otherwise, Embassy will urge the
KRG accept IHEC's proposal to supervise the KRG elections. If
KRG decides against IHEC's proposal, we should encourage the
KRG to take advantage of its invitation to have IEAT (UNAMI
plus the International Foundation for Electoral Systems,
USAID's implementing partner on technical assistance for
IHEC) support for the election.
--------------
Kurdish Elections and Other U.S. Interests
--------------
13. (C) We can anticipate some strong resistance from
Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani and other Kurdish leaders
when we lay down markers about their elections. We can
expect to be pressing the Kurds on other issues, such as
settling Kirkuk/Article 23, disputed territories and Article
140, and reducing Kurd-Arab tensions to avoid a national
civil war. Our advocacy for good elections must be
calibrated with these other efforts with the Kurds.
BUTENIS