Guidelines for PRT and MND/BCT Engagement with Newly

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000769

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

NEA/I FOR TBETTS, WWEEMS

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KDEM KCOR IZ
SUBJECT: Guidelines for PRT and MND/BCT Engagement with Newly
Elected Provincial Officials

REFS:
A) 2/2/09 Provincial Coordination Meeting
B) Joint Campaign Plan
C) Operations Order 09-01


1. (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified; handle
accordingly. Not for distribution on the Internet.


2. (SBU) Summary: This message provides guidelines for PRT and
MND/BCT engagement with newly elected provincial officials. This
guidance is being issued to assist PRT and MND/BCT personnel as they
adjust to a changing post-provincial elections/post-Strategic
Agreement political landscape. The seating of new provincial
councils will initiate what may be a turbulent period of transition
as local governments negotiate new power-sharing modalities with
Baghdad accordaQ?K=.47.QQIQQteam leaders should be the first USG personnel to
engage with newly elected provincial officials. PRT team leaders
should coordinate these initial contacts with the PRT's USAID
representative and the U.S. military commander. If military
officials accompany PRT team leaders on their initial calls, this
should be undertaken in such a way that it is clear to Iraqi
interlocutors and possible media representatives that the PRT team
leader is the central USG representative in the province for
non-security related issues.


5. (U) PRT team leaders should engage early with newly elected
officials and reiterate the USG's message that we are there to offer
technical assistance and that we are coordinated in our efforts.
They should explain the role of the PRT/ePRTs and team members; how
they deal with officials and others within the province; the
PRT/ePRTs' objectives; what assistance the USG can offer; and which
activities are underway.


6. (U) PRT team leaders will introduce the PRT USAID representative
Q6. (U) PRT team leaders will introduce the PRT USAID representative
as the lead USG development coordinator within the province. The
PRT USAID representative will explain USAID-funded programs and
resources and how they assist the Iraqi people and provincial
government.


7. (SBU) PRT team leaders will introduce U.S. Military Commander as
the leader of the supporting element for the PRT/ePRT efforts within
the province and the USG entity that leads support in security and
stability operations. Stability operations are defined as those
kinetic and coordinated (with the PRT) non-kinetic activities
determined necessary by the U.S. military commander to support
security operations. U.S. military elements should not engage
directly with newly elected governors and provincial council members
on civil capacity efforts without coordinating beforehand through
the PRT. The U.S. military will engage and encourage/mentor their
ISF counterparts to inform elected officials on issues that relate
directly to security, the development of provincial security plans
and stability operations support. IA/IP/DBE commanders should
clearly identify and define the security and stability operations
within the province for the elected officials and what support U.S.
forces and governmental organizations provide the provincial

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government and Iraqi security forces. U.S. military commanders
should inform PRT team leaders of significant security engagements.


8. (U) Embassy political POCs on political engagements are POL
Deputy Political Counselors Steve Walker and John Fox
(WalkerSC@state.gov / FoxJ@state.gov),and OPA Political Officer
Bonnie Long (LongBD@state.gov).

--------------
Provincial Powers Law (PPL) Implementation
--------------


9. (SBU) PPL implementation will doubtless vary from province to
province, according to local politics, custom and the closeness of
the relationship between the province and the central government.
PPL interpretation and implementation is a matter for Iraqis. The
USG should not be seen as taking sides in politically sensitive
debates on these subjects. This includes offering opinions on these
subjects when asked. Any assistance should be supportive not
directive.


10. (SBU) Concerning the PPL, PRTs/MNDs/BCTs should coordinate
closely through their respective chain of command within the Embassy
and refer for guidance to Embassy-drafted and cleared materials.
The Embassy developed a "PPL Road-Show" that provides in-depth
briefings for interested PRT/ePRT personnel on the substance and
political aspects of the new law. Details will be sent within the
next two weeks.

11. (SBU) USAID, through its Local Governance Program III program,
has the Embassy lead on providing technical and capacity-building
assistance to the PPL - mandated (Article 45) High Commission for
Governorate Affairs. POL, through CLA, will have the lead on
providing technical assistance related to the Constitution Article
105-mandated regions and governorates committee and efforts to
establish a Federation Council (which, when created, will be
parliament's upper house). USAID and POL/CLA will consult closely
to ensure coordinated, effective assistance.


12. (U) Embassy POCs on PPL implementation and coordinated PPL
activities for the newly elected officials are April
Powell-Willingham (powell-willinghama@state.gov) in CLA, Steve
Walker (WalkerSC@state.gov) in POL and Julie Koenen-Grant
(jkoenen-grant@usaid.gov) in USAID.

--------------
Governance Programming
--------------


13. (SBU) The Embassy, in coordination with POL, OPA, USAID, CLA,
Treasury and MNF-I, will provide guidance on governance training and
assistance to the newly elected provincial officials.


14. (U) USAID's LGP III team will provide direct capacity
development to provincial governments - provincial councils,
governors and their staffs -- in 11 provinces: Baghdad, Basra,
Babil, Ninewa, Wasit, Karbala, Najaf, Salah ah Din, Diyala, Anbar
and Maysan. The direct capacity-development program will provide
orientations, as requested, to new provincial councils, governors
and staff. In addition, assistance that combines training with
mentoring will address budgeting, public investment planning,
service delivery and performance improvement, oversight functions,
development of professional provincial staffs, and support to the
Local Governance Association. LGP III will initially provide
indirect support to the provinces of Diwaniyah, Dhi Qar and
Muthanna, in the form of reference and training materials and an
orientation for the benefit of interested, newly elected PC members.
Subject to funding, efforts will be made to expand direct capacity
development via LGP III to Diwaniyah, Dhi Qar and Muthanna. LGP III
will engage and coordinate with the PRTs in the work-planning phase
Qwill engage and coordinate with the PRTs in the work-planning phase
of the project and will keep the PRTs informed of progress through
briefings, discussions, and sharing of quarterly reports.



15. (U) USAID's Tatweer Program will provide training, coaching and
mentoring for provincial directors general, initially in six
provinces and in seven key Baghdad ministries. Technical assistance
will focus on three main areas: budget formulation and execution,
project management and project life-cycles, and human resource
development. Training in all six public administration and
management core areas will be conducted at an advanced level.
Trainers, who graduated from the Tatweer Training of Trainer
classes, will disseminate the training to their colleagues in the
provinces. Tatweer will work in close coordination with the
PRT/ePRTs in the targeted provinces to maximize impact.


16. (U) USAID's Community Action Program (CAP) will work with
grassroots community groups and provide governance assistance, in
the non-KRG provinces, to Qada (district) and Nahiya (local)
councils. CAP will coordinate with and share work-plans and

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quarterly reports with the PRT/ePRTs through the USAID
representative to the PRT/ePRT.


17. (U) US Embassy Treasury's PFMAG has two roles in supporting
provinces for budgetary training. The first role is to host a
training conference in Baghdad that will include 5-7 Provincial
Council officials from each province and will provide an overview of
the budget process. It will also be an introduction to the issues
provinces will be facing. The second is to conduct trainings in the
provinces. For the provinces where USAID/LGP has a presence under
the LGP III contract, PFMAG will only provide assistance when asked
by LGP. For the provinces where LGP III is not working, PFMAG will
provide budget training at the request of the PRTs. The agenda for
the province-specific trainings will be tailored to the needs of the
individual provinces.


18. (SBU) The Embassy's Anti-Corruption Coordinator's Office (ACCO)
requests that PRTs engage on anti-corruption issues with newly
elected Provincial Council members and other provincial and local
officials as opportunities arise. Materials previously submitted to
PRTs via e-mail can serve as a basis for PRTs' discussions of the
anti-corruption dossier with officials. ACCO also plans to make
periodic visits to the provinces for consultations with officials
and participation in public outreach events as desired by the PRTs.
One area that the provincial councils must pay attention to is the
establishment of their own individual Gazettes, as stipulated in the
PPL (Article 7). One means to fight corruption is for the council
to write its own gazette law, making it as broad as possible. This
can be done by requiring not only the councils own rules and laws be
published but that of the governor and such things as contract
notifications, internal policies, and so on. One of the first
actions a council should consider is to publish its own rules of
procedure thus locking in the right of the public to attend
meetings. ACCO will subsequently provide a list of provincial
offices for the (Iraqi) Commission on Integrity. ACCO is in the
early stages of implementing anti-corruption projects with the
United Nations and the University of Utah that involve strengthening
the capacity of provincial and local authorities to combat
corruption. ACCO will keep PRTs apprised of the development of
these projects. ACCO will distribute additional anti-corruption
related materials to you for use in engagements with newly elected
officials.


19. (U) ITAO's Provincial Reconstruction Development Council Program
will reorient to provide PRT's with tools to assistance and support
the newly elected Provincial Council efforts to provide essential
services to their populations. Executed through the PRTs, the
program will be used as a capacity-building tool to assist the
councils in developing their ability to plan, design, procure,
contract and manage and sustain projects that will improve the
equitable distribution of essential services and enhance their
legitimacy at the same time as their capability to govern. In
addition, ITAO will provide expertise through their senior
consultants and/or by acquiring local or international experts to
assist Councils in determining the feasibility of solutions
connected with project-planning design or execution. In conjunction
with the PRTs, ITAO will work with the newly elected Councils to
institutionalize the skill sets required to maintain essential
service infrastructure through targeted training programs that
directly meet the maintenance and sustainment needs identified by
Qdirectly meet the maintenance and sustainment needs identified by
our Iraqi counterparts and the PRTs. There is a dire need for
planning initiatives in tS1Qand
private spheres of the KR. But their opinions differ on whether
these political parties have advanced the democratic process in the
KRG. With few exceptions, students are dissatisfied with the
current political status quo and seek greater participation in the
socio-political development of the KR. END SUMMARY

POLITICAL PARTIES: TRAILBLAZERS OR ROADBLOCKS?
-------------- -


2. (U) Since the creation of the modern autonomous region, the
Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) have held heretofore unchallenged dominance of the
political sphere in the Kurdistan Region (KR). Over the course of
history, their influence4Q^,L&+Q PQqj__QgC"|QQq++1eQcritical of dominant party
control of all political
and socio-economic developments in the Kurdistan Region. They
accused those parties of closing the larger political process to
anyone not affiliated with the KDP or PUK and using any means
necessary to prevent the development of a proper opposition party
within the government. (Note: The KIU is the third largest
political party in the KR, and received seven percent of the Kurdish
vote in 2005. Although KIU influence is slowly growing, it does not
constitute a threat to either of the two major parties.)


5. (U) Political party youth leagues are also extremely vocal on
the issue of a future independent Kurdistan. Said a 23-year-old
member of the KDP Youth League in Dohuk of the Iraqi federal system,
"This union is a compulsory marriage and we want a divorce!" Some
Q"This union is a compulsory marriage and we want a divorce!" Some
went so far as to suggest that those who call for additional steps
toward decentralization (such as a plethora of strong political
parties rather than the current two-party monopoly) are insensitive
to the fact that the Kurds must remain unified if they will ever be
able to secure an independent Kurdistan. Said another member of the
KDP Youth League, "The most important goal is to be recognized as an
independent nation. Once we are independent, we will be able to
have more parties. But for now, we must unify against external
threats instead of fighting against one another."


6. (U) The most critical students were those either not affiliated
with political parties or affiliated in name only as a sort of
"insurance policy." The variance in their opinions was reflected in
the responses of the different groups to similar questions.
Unaffiliated students cited unemployment, the lack of essential
services and corruption as the issues of greatest significance,
while political party youth league students replied Article 140
implementation, Kurdish independence and the upcoming legislative
elections. (Note: Responses from the unaffiliated group track
popular opinion more closely. During a recent youth-focused radio
program on which RRTOff is a regular guest, 90% of callers'
questions and comments were about fears of unemployment. End Note)
Many youth admitteQX{QQQQVJ|Qttudent at the University of
Sulaimaniyah, "The political parties do not really care for the
problems and concerns of youth. The parties are struggling to
maintain their influence in society and we are caught in the middle.
Youth are used as tools in the party." Others believe that vested
interests in the KRG are actively working against democratization
and are incapable of moving democracy any further, since to do so
would jeopardize the influence that [politicians'] have over
socio-economic and political issues. (Note: RRT local staff persons
remark that previously, students were much more receptive of
political party ideology. RRT local staff believe that the change
reflects the degree to which elected KRG officials have failed to
keep campaign promises. End Note)


9. (U) COMMENT: Conversations at universities in Kurdistan can
sound very similar to those at schools in developed countries.
Youth here, like elsewhere, are eager to participate in a modern
life that suits a youthful perspective, and take their place in
society. Recent changes in the Kurdistan Region indicate that
students may soon have a greater chance to do so. On February 11,
the Kurdistan National Assembly lowered the minimum age of
parliamentary officials from 30 to 25 and there is already
competition for those seats. Whether these young people will be
able to affect change from within the system remains to be seen. END
COMMENT

BUTENIS