AFTER THE AWAKENING: TRIBES AS GOVERNMENT IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000763

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2014
TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL PINR KDEM
SUBJECT: AFTER THE AWAKENING: TRIBES AS GOVERNMENT IN
ANBAR?

REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 03008

B. 08 BAGHDAD 03928

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Classified By: Deputy Polcouns John G. Fox, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY. Sahwa's success at helping beat back
Al-Qaida and associated extremists led to its first-place
finish in Anbar Province's January provincial election.
Winners now move, amid high expectations, from electoral
victory into governing. Fallujah-area tribal sheikhs,
including the province's top vote-getter, say they will use
their victory to improve services and infrastructure. This
sheikh bluntly stated that the formerly politically dominant
Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) would not be welcomed into any
provincial governing coalition. More senior Fallujah
sheikhs, however, said they did not want Sahwa to dominate
the provincial government. One prominent senior sheikh
proudly displayed a picture of Vice President Tariq
Al-Hashimi (of the IIP) in his tribal gathering room.


2. (C) SUMMARY (cont'd): Fallujah's local IIP representative
refused to speculate about an eventual governing coalition,
but stressed that the "Awakening" in Anbar had included
elements of society beyond tribes and that it had begun well
before the U.S. troop surge in Iraq. He said all sides in
Anbar, so far, had agreed "to talk, and not to fight"
following the election. Given Sahwa's first-place finish,
Ramadi-based Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha is a power-broker in
filling new leadership slots. Another prominent Anbar sheikh
vaguely suggested that recent sensitive discussions in
Baghdad between Sahwa members and PM Maliki might lead to a
new and "surprising" national-level coalition after
parliamentary elections. END SUMMARY.

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SAHWA: BEATING BACK AL-QAIDA FIRST
-- "NOW WE ARE POLITICAL"
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3. (SBU) The Iraq Awakening Conference, or Muatammar Sahwat
Al-Iraq (MSI),was the first-place winner in Anbar's
Provincial Council (PC) election in January, taking some 20
percent of the popular vote. Sahwa, as it is known, is
expected to get eight seats on Anbar's 29-seat council. Over
the past several weeks, MSI president Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha
has been active in holding behind-the-scenes talks with other
local power-brokers on nominating people to assume Anbar's
key leadership positions. Sheikh Ahmed has led MSI since the
assassination in 2007 of his younger brother, Sheikh Sattar,
who founded the original Awakening as a security organization
to expel Al-Qaida from Ramadi. Ahmed later transformed the
Awakening into a political party. His grip on his party's
leadership has long been the subject of speculation
(reftels). Misgivings within tribal ranks about the
Awakening's future and MSI's ability to govern were aired to
Embassy Poloff during a recent visit to Fallujah.


4. (SBU) Sahwa's electoral success is noteworthy for the
degree to which tribal leaders' campaign promises translated
into votes. The Awakening coalition is not uniform, but
comprised of parts of the broader Sunni Arab population. It
is the largest tribal-oriented party, but there are others
(Hamid Al Heiss's and Ali Hatem's Iraqi Tribal Front, for
example). Since the election, some fissures have developed
within Sahwa. The extent to which Sheikh Ahmed and other
Qwithin Sahwa. The extent to which Sheikh Ahmed and other
tribal leaders can succeed in governing is what Anbaris and
other parts of Iraq will be watching closely in coming months.


5. (C) In Fallujah, top vote-winner Sheikh Aifan al-Issawi
(a darkly charismatic 30-something and mostly-fluent English
speaker with family ties in Saudi Arabia) provided a candid
assessment of this emerging tribal political scene in Anbar.
As a major Sahwa leader, he has benefited from close ties to
the Marines (via SOI payments); his $400,000 armored BMW sits
alongside a large purple and black rock star-like concert
tour bus currently being renovated (and armored) in his
extensive compound on the outskirts of Fallujah. Aifan told
Poloff that, even though he received the most votes in Anbar,
he did not want to be governor -- instead, he would take a
seat on the PC "because governors come and go." (NOTE: A
host of past Anbar governors has been assassinated or
intimidated to the point of leaving the province altogether.

BAGHDAD 00000763 002.3 OF 003


Two new candidates for governor have recently emerged. END
NOTE.) He said outgoing Anbar governor Ma'moun could "sit
alongside" Sahwa members, but "corrupt" IIP officials would
be effectively shut out of decision-making.


6. (C) Sheikh Aifan, who had been targeted at his compound
by a suicide-bomber the week before, said bluntly that "the
Awakening is over" and added that "we woke up after they
killed our families, but now we are political." Another
close Fallujah contact characterized Sahwa as "revenge-takers
-- and not much more than that." (NOTE: The first 30
minutes of the conversation centered on Aifan's insistence
that the young suicide-bomber who had unsuccessfully targeted
him could not have been a member of his tribe because his
remains included a hairy leg and long straight hair; these
were physical traits, he stressed, that did not match those
of his close-knit tribe's. The Marines have so far been
unable to trace the bomber's fingerprints, from the fingers
which Aifan had provided them after the bomber blew himself
up inside the compound's W.C., killing a young family guard.
Both Aifan and older Albu Issa sheikhs expressed concerns
about detainees being released who were not welcomed back
into the tribes; their only recourse, they said, was to
become suicide-bombers. Several recently released detainees
have been killed in the Haditha region after returning home,
allegedly by local Iraqi Police seeking revenge. Aifan said
the bomber's "pale skin" likely meant he'd been in detention
at a U.S. facility such as Bucca and only recently released.
END NOTE.)

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GOOD AT FIGHTING, BUT
WHAT ABOUT GOVERNING?
--------------


7. (C) Sheikh Aifan expressed optimism that a Sahwa-led
coalition in Ramadi could attract regional investors, which
he said past IIP leaders had failed to do. He acknowledged
likely budget shortfalls for the province due to lower
national oil revenue, but was confident (perhaps overly so)
that Anbar's tribes would be able to keep all their promises
to the people. IIP's past failures, Aifan added, meant the
party should be excluded from any new decision-making
coalition in Anbar, a comment echoed by a young Fallujah
lawyer whose father had won a new (non-Sahwa) seat on the
provincial body. Aifan claimed he had recently met with PM
Maliki, who had promised close attention to Anbar's
rebuilding needs -- and who had suggested that end-of-year
parliamentary elections would lead to a new and "surprising"
national coalition. While Aifan would not go into detail
regarding his "sensitive" discussion with PM Maliki, he did
suggest that there might be more active behind-the-scenes
reconciliation under way between the Anbar tribal movement
that he represents and the central government. Aifan
predicted that Maliki and associated candidates would win
national parliamentary elections. NOTE: The sheikhs'
opinions of the continued presence or withdrawal of U.S.
Marines in Anbar, alongside other Anbaris' views, will be
reported septel. END NOTE.


8. (C) Internal splits within Sahwa and concerns about their
governing potential were evident in lengthy lunch and dinner
conversations in Fallujah. Sheikh Khamis al-Issawi, echoed
Qconversations in Fallujah. Sheikh Khamis al-Issawi, echoed
by another prominent relative and Fallujah City Council
member (Sheikh Talib),said that Awakening PC members should
not control Anbar -- "this would not be good for the
province." Another senior sheikh added that "you do not have
to be gray in the hair to be wise" -- a sarcastic swipe at
the younger Aifan. In a sign of changing times, Khamis
excused himself from the lunch gathering with Poloff and a
Marine general and battalion commanders in order to meet with
DPM Rafe al Issawi, a native of Fallujah. (Past standard
"protocol" among tribes viewed all Marine generals as
paramount points of contact, symbolic of the de facto status
the U.S. Marine Corps has assumed since arrival in Iraq's
western province: that of strongest and most well-armed
tribe -- to say nothing of their sizable discretionary CERP
funds.)

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IIP: WE SACRIFICED, AND FOUGHT, TOO;
TRIBES INTO GOVERNMENT WILL TEST ALL

BAGHDAD 00000763 003.3 OF 003


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9. (C) In a detailed exchange at a Marine base near
Fallujah, the IIP's main representative, Sheikh Khalid
al'Ubaydi (aka Abu Mujahid),told Poloff and Marine battalion
leaders that post-election politicking in Anbar had avoided
overt violence, though inter-party suspicions remained high.
He said the IIP had previously felt "a big gap" with Marines
in Anbar, but the situation had improved. (NOTE: Some
Fallujah contacts report that naturally close Awakening ties
-- on top of significant CERP payments for SOI salaries --
between Marine units and Anbar's tribes had led some
residents to believe the U.S. had picked sides -- tribes over
IIP -- in Anbar politics. These concerns appear to have
lessened, and it was evident that the IIP representative
welcomed continued meetings with Poloff and Marines. END
NOTE.)


10. (C) The IIP's Abu Muhahid described improved security in
the Fallujah area, but also voiced concerns about a
still-active tribal support council in the Karmah area that
did not fall under the Iraqi Security Forces. Better
policing had reduced the need for Sahwa-based security, he
said, while adding that Sahwa members "are part of our
families, we were in school with them." The IIP in Anbar
accepted the election results, Abu Mujahid said, despite
lacking the "talents of democracy and its tradition of not
fighting." He said PM Maliki was "getting stronger and
stronger" but that Anbaris hoped he would not become a
"political fanatic."


11. (C) Abu Mujahid, in a set of pointed comments,
emphasized that Anbar's current security had resulted from
many Anbaris, not just Sahwa members, working collectively to
root out terrorists. He recounted the evolution of the
turn-around, which began in early 2006, remarking, "the
people here fought Al Qaida before Sahwa and before more U.S.
troops arrived; this is a fact and we must acknowledge it."
Abu Mujahid believes that credit principally belongs to city
leaders (many later assassinated),IP, IA and Sahwa (he did
not cite U.S. troops' contributions). Now that Sahwa had won
an election, it would be held accountable for better services
and sustained security, tasks he said no one had found easy
to accomplish since the U.S. invasion and subsequent
eruptions of sectarianism and terrorism in Iraq. (NOTE:
Fallujah has traditionally been an IIP power base in the
province, so friction between the party and Sahwa is most
prominent there. END NOTE.)

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COMMENT
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12. (C) The political transition in Anbar remains delicate.
Sahwa - IIP relations will likely continue to be tense.
Internal splits, such as those exemplified in the Fallujah
area between Sheikh Aifan and other, older tribal leaders,
could complicate the shift from fighting to governing. The
older sheikhs seem wary of too rapid an assumption of tribal
power, or a lack of a diverse coalition, and so are concerned
about Sheikh Aifan's apparent intention to marginalize the
IIP at the expense of the tribes.


13. (C) Sheikh Aifan said that he would lead a provincial
security committee in Anbar, voluntarily pulling himself out
of an overt political role, for now. His comments also need
to be viewed in the light of current divisions and
Qto be viewed in the light of current divisions and
politicking within the overall Sahwa bloc; his is one voice,
albeit an important one, among several. PM Maliki might be
positioned to win more -- and more long-term -- friends in
Anbar, especially if resources flow from Baghdad despite
lower oil revenue and if SOI are successfully integrated into
the ISF (a big if). The PM's characterization to us
privately, however, of the western province as a "hot spot"
in need of a sustained U.S. military presence probably more
accurately reveals his continued concerns about possible
Anbar-based Sunni Arab (read: ex-Baathist) machinations --
and their capabilities.
BUTENIS