IRAQ 201: THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES

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SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES

REF: BAGHDAD 585

(U) This is one in a series of messages intended to provide
background for policy-makers on Iraq.


1. (SBU) Summary: The three-year old, 275 member Council of
Representatives (CoR) is suffering from growing pains, but
has recently demonstrated potential to act as a more
effective institution that can challenge executive power.
Among its shortcomings, the CoR's credibility as a
representative institution has been weakened by the closed
list system under which its current members were elected, a
fact that has undermined the Iraqi public's confidence in
parliament. Real power is in the hands of party bloc
leaders; and it lacks the expertise or resources to
effectively legislate. As a result, most laws are written by
the Executive or require substantial revision by the
Executive during the legislative process. But with the
gradual maturation in Iraqi politics the CoR is seeing an
increase in issue-based cross-sectarian alliances, such as
the recent alliance on the budget aimed at limiting PM
Maliki's centralizing policies (reftel). The CoR's 2009
election-year agenda will likely include a National Elections
Law, but at this stage it appears unlikely that there will be
a consensus on anything else. End Summary.

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Structure and Functions of the CoR
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2. (U) The Council of Representatives, Iraq's Parliament,
consists of 275 members, about one per 100,000 Iraqi persons,
elected for four-year terms. Annual legislative terms are
composed of two four-month sessions (Mar-Jun & Sep-Dec). The
first CoR was elected December 15, 2005, first met on March
16, 2006 and will complete its work at the conclusion of the
2009 legislative term. Elections for the 2010-2013 electoral
term should be held by January 30, 2010 so that a new CoR is
able to convene March 16, 2010.


3. (U) Key requirements for the CoR stipulated by the 2005
Iraqi Constitution are: "that the representation of all
components of the people shall be upheld in it" and that an
elections law should aim for female representation of at
least one-quarter of the members of the CoR.


4. (U) The Speaker of the CoR (a currently vacant position
which traditionally is filled by a Sunni),the First Deputy
Speaker Khalid Al-Attiya (United Iraqi Alliance ) UIA) and
the Second Deputy Speaker Arif Tayfur (Kurdish Democratic
Party - KDP) hold their positions by virtue of an unwritten
power-sharing agreement between the Sunni, Shi,a and Kurds
that allocated the three "Presidencies" -- the President of
the Republic, the Prime Minister and the CoR Speaker --
according to the results of the (2005) National Election
while providing deputy slots in each of the Presidencies for
the other two ethno-sectarian groups, the blocs and parties
within each of these groups determining the candidates for
these latter positions.


5. (U) The Council of Representatives passes national laws,
monitors the Executive, ratifies treaties, and approves the
nominations of specified officials. It elects the President
of the Republic, who, in turn, selects the Prime Minister
from the majority coalition in the Council of Representatives.

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Political Determinants of Legislation: Power-Sharing,
Blocs, Parties
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6. (U) The Shi,a Islamist blocs, which include Da,wa,
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Fadhila and Sadrists,
currently control the greatest number of seats (128),
followed by the Kurdish bloc, which includes the PUK and KDP
Qfollowed by the Kurdish bloc, which includes the PUK and KDP
(58 seats),and the Sunni blocs, which include Tawafuq and a
newly formed Sunni group (25 - 40 seats depending on how
they are counted). While it would seem that the Shi'a blocs,
with their 41% of the seats, should dominate CoR legislation,
the reality is something else. The practical necessity for
political consensus derives from the current power-sharing
agreement and the requirement that all laws must be approved
by the current three-man Presidency Council composed of a
Kurd, a Sunni Arab and a Shi'a, any one of which can veto the
law. For instance, while the pro-Maliki Shi'a blocs and the
Kurdish parties had the votes to ratify it, Sunni Arab
Vice-President Tariq Hashimi threatened to veto the SOFA
ratification bill last November. This threat led to the
passage of CoR reform resolutions demanded by the Sunni Arab
leadership in exchange for their support for the SOFA.

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Earlier in the Fall session, President Jalal Talabani's
unhappiness with the Provincial Elections Law resulted in a
Presidential veto and an amended law that achieved a broader
political consensus. Senior CoR figures, including acting
CoR Speaker Attiya and Shi'a Islamist bloc leader Jalal
ad-Saghir, have told us that this parliament still has to
pass legislation on the basis of consensus among the Shi'a,
Kurdish and Sunni Arab political blocs.


7. (U) Moreover, the competition and ideological differences
between the parties and groupings that comprise the Sunni
Arab and Shi,a blocs often weaken bloc solidarity on certain
issues. In the Sunni Arab camp, the Tawafuq coalition, which
has represented the Sunni Arabs in the GOI since 2005, are
now challenged by a new coalition composed of smaller
parties, including one that used to be a part of Tawafuq. In
the upcoming legislative term, each coalition can be expected
to compete for Sunni Arab votes by taking strong and likely
differing positions in the CoR. The same holds true for the
two major Shi'a parties ) the Prime Minister's Da'wa Party
and ISCI ) and, to a much lesser degree, the two Kurdish
parties, the PUK and the KDP.


8. (SBU) Finally, temporary coalitions that cross ethnic and
sectarian boundaries can and do form in the CoR on the basis
of issue salience. The 2009 Federal Budget bill, passed nine
weeks after the scheduled end of the 2008 Fall session, was
held up by a Sunni Arab Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)-ISCI,
Kurdish Alliance (KAL) insistence that the election of a new
Sunni Arab CoR Speaker take precedence over all other
legislation, and by their desire to use the budget to impose
some restraints on the Prime Minister's authority.

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Practical Determinants of Legislation: Closed Lists,
Expertise, Physical Resources
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9. (U) The current structure of the CoR and its lack of
human and material resources prevent it from becoming a fully
functioning entity. First, the CoR's credibility and
accountability to the populace is limited by the closed list
system in which seats are awarded to many members whose
qualifications are affiliation rather than expertise. As a
consequence, MPs' constituents are party bloc leaders rather
than residents of the districts they represent, and their
primary duties are to appear for key votes and to adhere to
bloc discipline. This has led to a situation in which real
political power in the CoR is in the hands of the bloc and
party leaders. (Media reporting about the special benefits
of CoR members, including relatively high salaries,
diplomatic passports and even special access to land also
diminish the standing of the CoR in the Iraqi public's eyes.)


10. (U) Consistent with the notion of bloc power, individual
CoR members employ no professional staff other than
bodyguards with their individual CoR allotments, although
even if they did, there would be no place for them to sit,
since individual CoR members do not have office space in the
temporary CoR building. CoR members meet either in the suites
to which their blocs are entitled or in CoR committee
offices. Unaffiliated CoR members hang out in the CoR
cafeteria. Yet the CoR's professional staff, upon which
individual CoR members are forced to rely to research and to
generate legislative proposals, lack the expertise to
proficiently examine, write and amend legislation. As a
result, laws proposed by CoR members and CoR committees are
so poorly drafted and flawed that they cannot accomplish what
Qso poorly drafted and flawed that they cannot accomplish what
is intended. This means that after a law receives a first
reading in the CoR, it is often rewritten by technical staff
in the Ministries to ensure that it meets minimal standards.
As a result, many if not most of the bills legislated by the
CoR were either drafted by the government or were CoR
proposals that were substantially modified by the relevant
Ministry, which has both the human and material resources to
produce draft laws. Much legislation is currently
rubber-stamped GOI legislation.


11. (U) The CoR also suffers from a deficiency of resources:
photocopying machines break down regularly -- a reason often
cited for the inability of the CoR staff to provide draft
laws in a timely manner. An electronic voting system donated
to the CoR has never been installed because the equipment
came without technical assistance, training or maintenance.

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Upcoming Legislation, Legislative Challenges
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12. (U) A key legislative challenge for the CoR in the

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current year will likely be the passage of a new National
Elections Law, probably modeled on the Provincial Elections
law passed last Fall. While national elections could be held
under the old election law, that would involve using the
closed list candidate system that is considered by many
Iraqis to have had a negative impact on public confidence in
elected politicians. There will also be great interest in
the passage of a &political parties8 law to more clearly
define the structure and funding of political parties and
blocs. The rest of the fore-shortened Spring session will be
devoted to cleaning up Saddam-era laws and the introduction
of non-controversial legislation and, possibly, laws to
formalize extra-constitutional entities such as Tribal
Support Councils and National Security Office staff.
Although it is the subject of much discussion, it is unlikely
that a hydrocarbons bill will be introduced -- let alone
passed -- due to fundamental differences between key
stakeholders. Additionally, the CoR may consider legislation
to carry out the CoR-mandated referendum on the SOFA
agreement by July 31. But it will likely be only a debate
and an opportunity for election year posturing as few members
of parliament are enthusiastic supporters of such a
referendum. Less clear is the future of the reform
resolution that was passed in November 2008 in exchange for
Sunni support for the SOFA. While Prime Minister Maliki and
his supporters are noticeably unenthusiastic about this
resolution, IIP and ISCI leaders have told us they want
Parliament to address the resolution.


13. (U) For all its problems, the CoR has shown in recent
weeks that it has the potential to develop into a political
institution capable of challenging Executive power. It
successfully held up the 2009 Federal Budget bill and used
constitutionally mandated authority to alter the terms of the
bill to remove funding from several controversial entities
under the Prime Minister's direct control. In doing so, the
CoR ) although the process was driven by one bloc leader
(the IIP's Ayad Samarraie) ) served notice that it could
exercise its oversight responsibilities and may begin to hold
the Maliki government responsible for its actions.


14. (U) We have multiple avenues of USG-funded assistance to
the CoR now. USAID has an institutional capacity building
project that focuses on establishing an information resource
center and also aims to build the CoR's legislative oversight
capabilities. The National Democratic Institute is working
directly with several CoR committees, including Finance and
Education, on how to build ties with the ministries they are
to oversee and how to assess Iraqi government programs. In
addition, through the Embassy's Constitutional and Legal
Assistance program we provide training on legislation
drafting and tracking of legislation through committees and
into the Executive Branch here.
BUTENIS