Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD733
2009-03-18 12:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQ 201: SNAPSHOT OF IRAQ'S REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ GCC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2635
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0733/01 0771204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181204Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2254
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 000733 

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ GCC
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: SNAPSHOT OF IRAQ'S REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC
ENGAGEMENT

REF: A. BAGHDAD 630

B. BAGHDAD 575

C. BAGHDAD 532

Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

(U) This one in a series of messages intended to provide
background for policy-makers on Iraq.

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 000733

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ GCC
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: SNAPSHOT OF IRAQ'S REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC
ENGAGEMENT

REF: A. BAGHDAD 630

B. BAGHDAD 575

C. BAGHDAD 532

Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

(U) This one in a series of messages intended to provide
background for policy-makers on Iraq.

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Ref A provided a broad overview of Iraq's diplomatic
relations with its neighbors and a proposed U.S. strategy for
consolidating Iraq's regional reintegration. Ref B analyzed
Iraqi-Iranian relations. This cable aims to complement those
messages by providing a snapshot of practical efforts that
have been undertaken over the past several months to
strengthen Iraq's engagement with its neighbors. This cable
also reports on the status of new Arab embassies in Baghdad
and how internal GOI deficiencies (the weak position of the
MFA vis-a-vis other GOI bodies and its sour relationship with
the Prime Minister's Office) make progress slower than it
otherwise could be. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Iraq's Regional Reintegration: A Long-standing Policy Goal
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Since the fall of the Saddam regime, U.S. strategy
has sought to help reintegrate Iraq into its neighborhood,
strengthen its bilateral ties with key Arab countries,
encourage those countries to take a more active role in
supporting Iraq's development as a stable, peaceful neighbor,
and anchor Iraq firmly in the camp of Arab moderates. While
many of these countries had voiced support in the abstract
for these goals, concrete steps were few and far between.
Sunni Arab states' anxiety about the nature and intentions of
Iraq's new Shi'a-led government and its relations with Iran
compounded very real security concerns about reestablishing a
diplomatic presence in Baghdad -- concerns rooted in tragic
events including the August 2003 bombing of the Jordanian
Embassy and the July 2005 kidnapping and murder of the
Egyptian Ambassador.

--------------
2008 - Concrete Steps at Last
--------------


3. (C) A virtuous cycle of engagement began in late Spring

2008. The June 5 visit of UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin

Zayid initiated a string of high-level visits to Baghdad from
Iraq's neighbors. Then in September/October, key Arab states
(UAE, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait and Syria) returned Ambassadors
to Iraq. The GOI reciprocated by naming Ambassadors to Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon and Bahrain (albeit
with a delay until early 2009 before they were dispatched to
their posts) but has not yet named Ambassadors to Egypt, UAE
or Kuwait. At present, all of the new Arab embassies in
Baghdad continue to operate temporarily and in a very limited
fashion from the Rasheed Hotel in the International Zone (IZ)
(except for Syria which has an operating embassy in the Red
Zone). They hope to begin moving into permanent, secure
quarters in the IZ later this Spring when renovation work on
their assigned properties in the Diplomatic Zone adjacent to
the U.S. Embassy are complete.


4. (U) Para 9 presents a detailed country-by-country
summary of Iraq's engagement with its neighbors.

--------------
GOI Internal Deficiencies Make Things
More Difficult Than They Have to Be
--------------


5. (C) The decisions of Arab states to dispatch high level
official delegations, send Ambassadors and reopen embassies
in Baghdad signaled a new level of confidence in Iraq's
future, as well as an understanding that a stable Iraq is a
Qfuture, as well as an understanding that a stable Iraq is a
key counterweight to Iranian influence in the region. Visits
by Arab VIPs have become, if not commonplace, then at least
no longer remarkable and a gauge of how far we have come in a
relatively short period of time. That said, there is also a
sense of frustration -- by many of these countries, as well
as by us -- that the GOI has not taken full advantage of
these overtures. The fact that Iraq has yet to name
ambassadors to the UAE, Kuwait or Egypt, is a case in point.
Similarly, new Arab diplomatic missions in Baghdad report
regular difficulty in getting answers and/or timely

BAGHDAD 00000733 002 OF 005


assistance from the Iraqi MFA as they work to stand up their
embassies.


6. (C) In part, these are problems of capacity, training and
resources at the MFA. The circle of competent officials in
the Foreign Ministry who have the confidence of, and are
empowered by Foreign Minister Zebari is very small. The
dedicated MFA team working directly with the new Arab
embassies is even smaller. In October, as the full brunt of
the increased number of visits and Arab Embassies was at its
peak, Ambassador Crocker stressed to Foreign Minister Zebari
the urgent need for MFA to beef up its resources in this
regard. Zebari promised that he was implementing such a
plan, although until now it appears that very limited
progress has been made.


7. (C) More troubling, however, has been the dysfunctional
relationship between Zebari and Prime Minister Maliki. Their
inability to agree on key Iraqi diplomatic assignments has
left many key Iraqi ambassadorships vacant for an inexcusable
length of time. (Note: The Ambassador, DCM and other emboffs
have repeatedly raised the need to appoint key ambassadors
with Maliki, his Chief of Staff and MFA officials including
Zebari. End note.) Similarly, the battle between the Prime
Minister's Office and the MFA for control of various IZ
properties (until recently held by the U.S.) led to confusion
and delay in designating these properties for new Arab (and
other country) embassies. In each case, internal GOI
friction caused delays in steps that should have been --
relatively speaking -- straightforward, and slowed progress
in developing these bilateral relationships to a level where
they could focus on more substantive issues.


8. (C) That said, as we look ahead to the coming months,
Baghdad will see the opening of several real,
bricks-and-mortar Arab embassies (UAE, Jordan, Bahrain,
Kuwait, and possibly Egypt) staffed with permanent diplomats.
At that point, hopefully, the focus of their (and our)
efforts will not be simply on reestablishing their presence
in Iraq, but on the important goals of promoting productive
relationships across the full range of issues that make up a
healthy bilateral relationship.

--------------
Country by Country - Where Things Stand
--------------


9. (C) A summary of key events/aspects of Iraq's engagement
with its neighbors follows:

UAE
---

-- June 5: UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid visits
Baghdad, the highest ranking Sunni Arab official to do so
since the fall of Saddam.

-- July 6-7: PM Maliki visits Abu Dhabi, during which the UAE
announces cancellation of Iraq's $7 billion debt and the
appointment of Ambassador Abdullah al-Shehhi as UAE
Ambassador to Iraq.

-- July 17-19: UAE hosts the Friends of Iraq meeting in Abu
Dhabi.

-- September 4: Ambassador Al-Shehhi travels to Baghdad and
presents his credentials during an initial five-day visit.

-- October 3: UAE Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayid, along with
the UAE's Interior, Defense and Foreign Ministers visit
Baghdad.

-- December 2: Ambassador al-Shehhi hosts a large UAE
National Day reception at the Rasheed Hotel. Since
September, Ambassador Al-Shehhi and a small embassy team have
worked out of the Rasheed. Renovation work is underway on
two villas immediately adjacent the NEC that, when ready
later in the Spring, will house their new embassy. Despite
the UAE's role in catalyzing the return of other Arab
countries to Baghdad, the GOI has still not agreed internally
on who will be Iraq's Ambassador in Abu Dhabi. We have
Qon who will be Iraq's Ambassador in Abu Dhabi. We have
repeatedly stressed to the Prime Minister's Office and the
MFA the need to resolve this quickly and fill this gap.

Jordan
--------------

-- June 12-13: Prime Minister Maliki visits Amman.

-- August 11: King Abdullah visits Baghdad, becoming the

BAGHDAD 00000733 003 OF 005


first Arab Head of State to do so since the fall of Saddam.

-- September 14: three Jordanian diplomats arrive in Baghdad
to reestablish Jordan's diplomatic presence and begin work on
renovating an IZ property that will become the Jordanian
embassy.

-- October 15: Jordanian Ambassador Nayef Fantoul al-Zeidan
arrives in Baghdad for a week-long visit and presents
credentials.

Ambassador Al-Zeidan has not been back to Baghdad since this
initial October visit and will only return when the permanent
Embassy facility is ready for occupancy). Jordan's
diplomatic team (lead by a Charge) currently operates out of
the Rasheed. They believe they will be able to move into
their permanent IZ quarters in late April/early May. Embassy
Amman has reported the possibility that Jordanian PM Dhababi
will lead a delegation to Baghdad in the coming weeks. In a
recent conversation, the Jordanian Charge indicated that a
Ministerial visit may be pushed back to coincide with
Jordan's May 25 National Day.

Turkey
--------------

-- July 10: Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visits Baghdad and
meets with GOI leadership.

-- December 24: PM Maliki visits Ankara, with much discussion
focused on economic, energy, and water issues. During that
meeting, Turkish President Gul rebutted GOI criticisms that
GoT Special Envoy Ozcelik had been interfering in internal
Iraqi affairs, particularly as it related to U.S.-Iraqi
negotiations on a bilateral security agreement.

March 14-15: President Talabani travels to Ankara for
official visit.

March 22-23: President Gul to visit President Talabani and PM
Maliki in Baghdad.

Note: Septel will cove the Iraqi-Turkish relationship as seen
from Baghdad in more detail.

Bahrain
--------------

-- September 2-4: Bahraini technical team makes initial visit
to view possible IZ properties for the Bahraini Embassy.

-- October 7: Bahraini Ambassador Salah Ali al Malki arrives
for initial visit to Baghdad

-- October 16: Ambassador Malki presents credentials

-- October 18: Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid makes
a one-day visit to Baghdad to meet with GOI leaders.

Since November, Ambassador Malki his made several visits to
Baghdad, most recently in late February to attend the Kuwaiti
National Day reception. He continues to operate out of the
Rasheed when he is in Baghdad as renovation work is
proceeding slowly at the IZ property to be the Bahraini
Embassy.

Kuwait
--------------

-- October 21: Kuwaiti Ambassador Ali al-Mou'min arrives in
Baghdad for initial one-week visit, becoming the first
Kuwaiti Ambassador in Baghdad since Saddam's invasion. He
presents credentials the following day.

-- November 10: A personal representative of the Amir of
Kuwait arrives in Baghdad with Ambassador al-Mou'min to
Baghdad to personally deliver an invitation to the January
19-20 Arab League Economic Summit it Kuwait to President
Talabani.

-- November - February: Ambassador al-Mou'min makes several
visits to Baghdad seeking to gain GOI agreement on the lease
terms of an IZ property for the future Kuwaiti Embassy.
Issue is still not resolved.

-- January 19-20: President Talabani leads Iraqi delegation
to the Arab League Economic Summit in Kuwait. In bilateral
discussions on the margins of the Summit, there is agreement
that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister will lead a delegation to
Baghdad shortly to discuss all outstanding issues between the

BAGHDAD 00000733 004 OF 005


two countries. Initial reports that the long-running Kuwait
Airways case had been settled prove to be premature.

-- February 25: Ambassador Al-Mou'min hosts well-attended
Kuwaiti National Day celebration at the Rasheed Hotel, the
first time Kuwait has held an event in Baghdad since Saddam's
1990 invasion.

-- February 26: Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister Sheikh Mohammed al Sabah visits Baghdad -- the
highest level Kuwaiti official to do so since Saddam's
invasion (Ref C). The two sides agree to form a senior level
joint commission to deal with all outstanding bilateral
issues that would meet initially in Baghdad, perhaps by the
end of March.

Despite the progress above, the GOI has yet to name an
Ambassador to Kuwait. Embassy Baghdad continues to press the
Prime Minister's Office and MFA to resolve this issue quickly
and send an Ambassador as an important gesture of
good will.

Egypt
--------------

-- October 5: Egyptian Foreign Minister Abul Gheit visits
Baghdad and Sulimaniyeh for meetings with Prime Minister
Maliki, President Talabani, Foreign Minister Zebari and other
GOI officials. While in Baghdad, Abul Gheit also
visits IZ villas that MFA has identified to be the site of
the future Egyptian Embassy and announces Egypt's intention
to reopen an Embassy in Baghdad. Both GOI and GOE officials
report the visit as a success.

Mid-March: Iraqi delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister
Abbawi visits Cairo for talks on strengthening the bilateral
relationship, including steps needed to reopen an Egyptian
embassy in Baghdad . Egyptian delegation expected to visit
Baghdad soon to follow-up. These discussions follow several
visits to Baghdad by Egyptian technical teams. At present,
Egypt has yet to name an ambassador to Iraq nor reestablish a
diplomatic presence in Baghdad, and Iraq has not named an
Ambassador to Cairo (currently represented at Charge level).


--------------
Arab League
--------------

-- August: Senior Egyptian Diplomat Hani Khallaf named Arab
League Ambassador to Iraq, filling a vacancy from 2007 when
former Arab League Ambassador Lemani resigned.

-- March 16-19: Arab League Secretary General Amr Mousa
visits Baghdad for meetings with GOI leaderships and key
Iraqi political figures.

March 17: Foreign Minister Zebari publicly announces that
Iraq will request to host the Spring 2010 Arab League Summit


Syria
--------------

-- September 16: The SARG names Nawaf Fares, then Governor of
Quneitra Province, as its first Ambassador to Iraq, ending
two decades of bilateral estrangement.

-- September 28: The GOI names Ambassador Ala'a Jowadi, the
head of the MFA's Arab Department, as Ambassador to Syria.
This represents an upgrading of representation from the
Charge level.

-- October 16: Ambassador Fares presents credentials to
President Talabani and takes up his post.

-- January 28: Iraqi Ambassador Jowadi arrives in Damascus
and presents credentials to President Asad on February 16.

Syrian-Iraqi relations were strained in November following
the events at the Syrian border town of Abu Kamal regarding
the Abu Ghadiyya network. While initial press reports
indicated Syria would withdraw its Ambassador, this proved
untrue and Syrian Ambassador Fares remained in Baghdad
throughout.

Lebanon
--------------

-- July 17: Lebanese Parliamentary bloc leader Sa'ad Hariri

BAGHDAD 00000733 005 OF 005


visits Baghdad and Najaf; meets with GOI leadership as well
as Ayatollah Sistani.

-- August 20: Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora visits Baghdad
for meetings with GOI leadership.

-- September 28: Iraq names Omar al-Barzanji as Ambassador
to Lebanon, to replace Ambassador Jawad al-Hairi who died
July 12, 2008, of a heart attack.

-- January 29: Ambassador al-Barzanji arrives in Beirut to
take up his post. Lebanon continues to be represented at the
Charge level in Baghdad.

Saudi Arabia
--------------

-- September 28: The GOI names Ghanem al-Jumaili, its
Ambassador in Tokyo, as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, upgrading
Iraq's diplomatic representation in Riyadh from the level of
Charge.

-- Late January: Saudi Arabia grants Agrement to Ambassador
al-Jumaili who is expected to take up his post shortly.

Progress in improving Iraqi-Saudi ties has been slow owing to
Saudi King Abdullah's continuing suspicions about the nature
of the Maliki government and its ties to Iran.

Qatar
--------------

-- September 28: Iraq names Jawad al-Hindawi as Ambassador to
Qatar. This represents an upgrading of representation from
the Charge level.

-- February 4: Ambassador al-Hindawi arrives in Doha to take
up his post.

-- February 8: KRG President Massoud Barzani visits Doha.

President Talabani will lead the Iraqi delegation to the
March 30 Arab League Summit in Doha. Also, UNAMI has
informed us that the Qatari First Lady may visit Iraq in
early May for a cultural/educational visit, possibly tied to
a UNESCO initiative.

BUTENIS