Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD712
2009-03-17 08:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

DISGRUNTLED SHI'A THREATEN TO BOYCOTT NEW

Tags:  PGOV KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1302
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0712/01 0760831
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170831Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2220
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000712 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DISGRUNTLED SHI'A THREATEN TO BOYCOTT NEW
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL

REF: BAGHDAD 629

Classified By: Diyala PRT Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

This is a PRT Diyala reporting cable

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000712

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DISGRUNTLED SHI'A THREATEN TO BOYCOTT NEW
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL

REF: BAGHDAD 629

Classified By: Diyala PRT Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

This is a PRT Diyala reporting cable

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Representatives of four major Shi'a parties that
fared poorly in the 2009 Diyala Provincial Elections have
rejected the election results, alleging fraud and
irregularities. They say they will boycott the new
Provincial Government unless there is a new election under
different conditions. The Shi'a politicians hinted that the
situation in Diyala could turn violent. They intend to defy
a request from Prime Minister (PM) Maliki to take their seats
and participate in the new Provincial Council (PC). Some
Shi'a electoral fraud claims may be valid, but others are
inconsistent and implausible. While it is clear that these
Shi'a leaders are uncomfortable having lost in the elections,
it is unclear whether many other Shi'a share these leaders'
sense of injustice. END SUMMARY.

--------------
SHI'A PLAN TO BOYCOTT NEW DIYALA PC
--------------


2. (C) PRT Diyala met with representatives of Shi'a parties
on March 11 to discuss concerns about the January 31
Provincial Elections and ways to avoid a potentially divisive
political clash that could reignite sectarian and ethnic
violence. Current PC Member Saja Qaddouri and Isam Shaker
Mezher of the State of Law Coalition (led by Maliki's Da'wa
party); Mohammed Mehdi of Fadhila; Abbas Farhan of the Diyala
National Alliance (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq,
(ISCI)--al Hakim's party); and Amed Hameed Khalaf of National
Reform Movement (Jaafari's party) attended. The group also
claimed to speak for the "Freedom Party" (Al Harra).


3. (C) The Shi'a party representatives consider the recent
Diyala Provincial Elections fundamentally flawed. Shi'a
parties will have only five seats on Diyala's new twenty-nine
seat PC, a sharp decrease from the 20 seats (and governing
majority) they held on the outgoing 41 seat PC. They are
demanding that the local IHEC office, which they have been
complaining is controlled by one party since before the
election, be re-established and that the elections be redone
in Diyala. At a March 5 press conference in Baghdad, the
Shi'a parties announced that they would boycott the incoming

Diyala Provincial Government, an assertion that they repeated
to us. They acknowledged that PM Maliki has requested that
they take their seats and participate in the new Provincial
Council (PC),but at the same March 5 meeting, they decided
to defy the PM's directive because "the public will not
accept otherwise."


4. (C) They dismissed summarily the idea of working with the
three winning candidates from the Iraqi National List
(INL--Allawi's secular party),which they described as a
"Sunni party." (NOTE: Not only is Allawi Shi'a himself,
INL's top candidate in Diyala is Shi'a, and its national
leadership is largely Shi'a. END NOTE). Saja explained that
there is an arrest warrant for the INL's number two candidate
in Diyala and that the local leader of the party, Abdulla
Hassan al-Jibouri, is under investigation by the integrity
committee.

--------------
FRAUD ALLEGATIONS
--------------


5. (C) The Shi'a leaders cited several examples of what they
consider electoral fraud. Mohammed alleged that there was
130 percent turnout in Khanaqin--he added that even the UN
knew it. (NOTE: IHEC reports one ballot box in Khanaqin had
over 130 percent of its projected ballots, and about 20
additional boxes had suspiciously high turnouts, including
Qadditional boxes had suspiciously high turnouts, including
several of over 100 percent. The Diyala Government Election
Official (GEO) previously told us that this was not
necessarily proof of voter fraud--it was possible and legal
for some IDPs and others to get permission to vote at some
voting stations where they were not officially registered,
causing some ballot boxes to have over 100 percent of their
projected registered voter turnout. END NOTE). Mohammed
also stated that there were instances in which only the names
of heads of households, but not remaining family members,
were found on voter lists. He complained that thousands of
Shi'a votes were lost.


BAGHDAD 00000712 002 OF 003



6. (C) Isam said he had reliable reports that significant
numbers of the Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP) in
Diyala voted twice--both in the "Special Needs Voting" day on
January 28 and on January 31. He believed that reviewing
signatures on voting lists could prove this. He also charged
that most of the IA and IP voted for Sunni candidates. Saja
reported that a committee from Baghdad had determined that 75
percent of the IP officer corps were Sunni. (NOTE: IA votes
are returned to the military members' province of origin, and
are not included in the Diyala vote totals. Coalition Forces
(CF) estimate that IP units in Diyala are almost completely
Shi'a. During Operation "Glad Tidings of Benevolence" in
July-September 2008 and in several subsequent periods, dozens
of the already small numbers of Sunni IP Police Officers in
Diyala were either fired or forced to retire early. END
NOTE).


7. (C) Isam then described a voter with ink on both hands,
indicating that the individual had voted twice. He stated
that a Sunni witness who arrived at a polling station late in
the afternoon had found that someone had already signed next
to his name in the voting list. Isam also mentioned that
when he was visiting one polling station, an election monitor
passed him a note alleging fraud.


8. (C) Mohammed charged that some ballot boxes were counted
at a Sheikh's house rather than at the polling center. Saja
contended that Diyala Assistant Governor Hafith (Sunni) and
several other Sunni Arab leaders sent twenty busloads of
(presumably Sunni) voters to vote at the Mussa bin Nasir
polling center on the border between Shifta, Buhriz, and
Tahreer. The IP Commander at Mussa bin Nasir turned the
buses away. While unsuccessful, Saja thought this definite
proof of Sunni efforts to commit vote fraud. (NOTE: In
contrast to the Saja, Assistant Governor Hafith said several
hundred Sunni voters had been told at another voting center
that they were not registered there and had to go to Mussa
bin Nasir voting center to vote. Hafith said he had arranged
for them to go to Mussa Bin Nasir only to find out they were
not allowed to vote there either. He charged that these
voters had been illegally disenfranchised. END NOTE).

--------------
OFFICIAL COMPLAINTS
--------------


9. (C) Isam reported that his party (Da'wa) had submitted
seven specific complaints to IHEC regarding the elections;
ISCI had also submitted four complaints; and a total of 44
parties had submitted complaints. Mohammed suggested the
establishment of a neutral committee or the recruitment of a
neutral organization such as the United Nations to review the
complaints. Although they demand that the newly elected PC
be declared illegitimate and a new election held, they
indicated that they would accept (with numerous caveats) a UN
ruling on their complaints. Mohammed Mehdi suggested Kirkuk
as a possible model (e.g. a negotiated settlement). (NOTE:
On February 11, an IHEC team with UN advisors decided not to
go to Diyala to investigate claims of election fraud in
Khanaqin further. END NOTE).

--------------
POSSIBLE VIOLENT CONSEQUENCES
--------------


10. (C) Saja predicted dire potential consequences without a
new election. She said the Shi'a are arming in response to
injustice and the Sunni are arming because they feel strong.
Saja expects the Director of the Major Crimes Unit to be
replaced; Amed voiced concerns about the loyalty of both the
IA and IP.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Shi'a claims of electoral fraud are debatable at
Q11. (C) Shi'a claims of electoral fraud are debatable at
best; some are obviously false. Sunni candidates have also
alleged electoral fraud (reftel). The PRT's evidence so far
indicates that all sides, i.e., Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurds, have
some legitimate complaints, but that on the whole the
election was fair and credible. This is the Shi'a parties'
first experience of losing an election. They may be refusing
to accept the result as sour grapes: all but one of the
participants in the discussion were candidates who failed to
win seats. By stating their intransigence strongly and
publicly, the Shi'a are leaving themselves little room to
negotiate and seem likely to decline any leading position in
government which the victorious Sunni Tawafuq party might
offer them (reftel).


12. (C) But Shi'a alienation with the political process

BAGHDAD 00000712 003 OF 003


could potentially reignite sectarian violence in Diyala.
Further, the Shi'a minority's refusal to engage in the new PC
could be a destabilizing influence in the province,
particularly since it has strong ties to the Shi'a-led
central government. END COMMENT.
BUTENIS