PRT DIYALA: DIYALA TAWAFUQ/IIP AIMS TO SHARE PC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000629

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PSOCI IZ
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: DIYALA TAWAFUQ/IIP AIMS TO SHARE PC
SPOILS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 628

B. BAGHDAD 64

Classified By: PRT Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Diyala reporting cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY: PRT Diyala recently discussed formation of
the new Provincial Council (PC) with members of the United
Accord and Reform Front (Tawafuq) list, the leading vote
getter in Diyala's PC elections. Tawafuq members asked for
PRT technical assistance for the new PC, which would
facilitate efforts to build and maintain a broadly inclusive
provincial government. The party wants to allocates
provincial government offices to all parties holding seats on
the PC in order to promote local reconciliation and to curry
favor with the Shi'a-led Government of Iraq (GOI). They also
informed the PRT of Iraqi concerns that recent Shi'a protests
about election results in the province may escalate into
violence, and that GOI figures in Baghdad were influencing
Diyala's PC formation. END SUMMARY.


3. (SBU) PRT Diyala hosted the leadership of the Diyala
Tawafuq list on March 2 at the list's request. Tawafuq,
whose major partner is the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),won a
plurality of nine of the 29 seats in the recent PC elections,
and is now poised to lead the transfer of power from a
Shi'a-Arab led to a Sunni-Arab led provincial government.
Participants in the meeting included Hamdi Hasun Al Mehdi, a
representative of the IIP in Diyala and a member of the
President's Council in Baghdad; current Assistant Governor
Hafiz Abdul-Azzez Jum'a Saleh al-Jubouri; and Omar al Farook
Muhammad Mahmud, a newly elected PC member and possible
gubernatorial candidate. The meeting focused both on the
post-elections political maneuvering to form a new provincial
government and on their concern that PM Maliki's security
apparatus might arrest the top leaders of the IIP to prevent
them from forming a new provincial government (ref A).

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POST ELECTION POLITICAL MANEUVERING
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4. (C) Rather than forming a narrow coalition, Tawafuq hopes
to form a unified coalition by allocating the provincial
government's offices among each list that won a PC seat.
They propose that Tawafuq would take the Governorship; the KA
the Provincial Council Chair; and the Iraqi National Project
Gathering (INPG) and the Shi'a parties the two Deputy
Governorships. Hamdi is particularly concerned that Da'wa be
represented among the Shi'a parties in order to maintain good
ties with the Maliki GOI. According to Hamdi, the INPG had
proposed a narrow "Sunni (Arab)" coalition with Tawafuq, but
Tawafuq had rejected the idea, preferring to try to include
all parties.


5. (C) Hamdi said the major hurdle Tawafuq faces is that
both the INPG and the KA want the PC Chairmanship. He
relayed that within the KA list, both the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) want the PC Chairman position (an internal matter that
should not affect broader negotiations). More broadly, he
noted a challenge in convincing all parties to accept the
distribution. Hamdi requested PRT technical assistance for
the new PC to help parties to work together and to provide
training.

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SHI'A DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING ELECTION RESULTS IN DIYALA
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6. (C) Responding to reports of March 1 demonstrations in
Diyala's Khalis and Muqdadiyah districts by Shi'a groups
unhappy with the PC election results, Hamdi believed that the
Qunhappy with the PC election results, Hamdi believed that the
Shi'a do in fact appear to be underrepresented. However, he
maintained that the Shi'a underrepresentation was not due to
voting irregularities, but because their vote was divided
among several parties--some of which failed to reach the
threshold needed to seat a PC member. He added that Sunni
Arabs should have received more seats than they did since
they comprise a majority of Diyala's population.


7. (C) Hamdi thought of the demonstrations as a natural part
of the democratic process, but also reported a worrisome
meeting with Sa'ad Chaloub, the Prime Minister's
Representative in Diyala. Sa'ad warned Hamdi that Shi'a
elements might go beyond demonstrations to taking violent
action. Hamdi told us he responded that cooperation in
forming the government would be a better option, and that
those engaging in violence would only hurt their own cause.

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BAGHDAD 00000629 002 OF 002


COMMENT
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8. (C) Tawafuq's awareness of the GOI's power is likely the
driving force behind their desire not to exclude any
political factions from the provincial government: Hamdi
informed us that negotiations to allocate PC offices are
taking place both in Diyala and in Baghdad. Sunni Arab
leaders in Diyala feel that the GOI is intentionally
targeting them to cripple Sunni Arab political power
(reftels). Tawafuq's inclusiveness is a positive response to
what may be outside meddling, and offers a promising way to
assist in the transfer of power from a Shi'a Arab-led
provincial government to the new Sunni Arab-led one. It
could serve as a model for political reconciliation in other
provinces. END COMMENT.
BUTENIS