PRT DIYALA: SUNNI ARABS CLAIM GOI REINSTITUTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000628

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: SUNNI ARABS CLAIM GOI REINSTITUTING
SECTARIAN ARRESTS; REQUEST U.S. ASSISTANCE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 64

B. BAGHDAD 544

Classified By: PRT Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Diyala cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Members of the Tawafuq/IIP party in Diyala
fear that the Government of Iraq (GOI) is using the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) to prevent Sunni Arab leaders from
forming a new provincial government in Diyala (reftels).
They claim that after a pause around the provincial elections
due to American pressure, the GOI has begun again to issue
warrants to and to arrest specifically Sunni Arab politicians
on false terrorism charges in Diyala and elsewhere. Diyala
Sunni Arab leaders requested USG intervention in these
alleged arrests. While specific allegations are difficult to
confirm, there is evidence of GOI targeting Sunni Arab
leaders with politically-motivated warrants. Embassy Baghdad
has requested further evidence from Sunni Arab contacts in
Diyala on this issue. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) PRT Diyala and Embassy PolOff met the leadership of
the Diyala Tawafuq list on March 2 at the PRT at the list's
request. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) is the major partner
in the list. Hamdi Hasun Al Mehdi, a leading representative
of the IIP in Diyala and a member of the President's Council
in Baghdad; current Assistant Governor Hafiz Abdul-Azzez
Jum'a Saleh al-Jubouri; and Omar al Farook Muhammad Mahmud, a
newly elected PC member and possible gubernatorial candidate,
represented Tawafuq/IIP. The meeting focused both on the
post-elections political maneuvering to form a new provincial
government (reported SEPTEL) and on their concern that PM
Maliki's security apparatus might arrest the top leaders of
the IIP to prevent them from forming a new provincial
government.


4. (C) Over the past eight months, Sunni Arabs in Diyala
have repeatedly complained that the ISF have specifically
targeted Sunni Arab political leaders for arrest and/or
prolonged detention on terrorism or corruption charges in an
effort to neutralize Sunni Arab leadership in the political
process. Hamdi acknowledged that while there was a decrease
in arrests around the provincial elections, in Diyala
multiple levels of the Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP),
the Crimes Office, Emergency Reaction Forces, and, within
Khanaqin, the Asayeesh and Peshmerga, have begun reenacting a
policy of arbitrary arrests and detentions to hinder the
transfer of power from a Shi'a Arab- to a newly-elected Sunni
Arab-led provincial government.


5. (C) Hamdi confirmed that the GOI had issued a warrant for
his arrest but said he had not yet seen the warrant. He
worried that he would be detained at any time. According to
Hamdi, a prevailing atmosphere of fear and confusion over
arrest had driven IIP politicians and other Sunni Arab
leaders to avoid sleeping in their own homes in order to
elude ISF. Hamdi recounted other incidents in which the GOI
arrested prominent Sunni Arabs in Diyala and elsewhere,
including the cases of Dr. Hussein Al Zubaidi (reftels),and
Hasan Malali, the Diyala IIP's expert on religious issues,
who was detained the week of February 22. Many of those
arrested have been detained without formal charges or
conviction for extended periods of time. Hamdi claimed that
over 70% of those detained by the ISF are innocent.


6. (C) He also suggested that Coalition Forces (CF) had
occasionally supported ISF in these arrests. He claimed that
the new Diyala (Security) Operations Commander, Major General
Tariq Abdal Wahaba Jasim Al Azawi, might be an ally of PM
QTariq Abdal Wahaba Jasim Al Azawi, might be an ally of PM
Maliki. However, Hamdi was especially concerned by the
actions of Iraqi Counter Terrorism Special Forces that report
directly to the Prime Minister's Office without coordinating
with local security organizations.


7. (C) Hamdi, Hafez, and Omar entreated USG for assistance,
saying "as the Coalition Forces are still responsible for
security in Diyala, there must be something that you can do
to alleviate this situation." Hamdi proposed forming a
committee with Embassy representation to visit prisons and
document cases. At points in the discussion when they felt
the PRT and PolOff were not adequately responsive to their
concerns, they warned that the public would be tempted to
turn to the tribes (alluding to potential violence) for
solutions, and that there may be significant danger Iran
could gain control of Diyala.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) There has been a surge in reports and rumors of

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arrests and warrant issuances for prominent Sunni Arabs in
Diyala and Baghdad: Mohammed Al Daini and Hamdi Hasun
himself are just two examples. But it is not clear at this
point that this signifies a post-election resumption of
concerted GOI efforts to limit Sunni Arab political
engagement. PolOff requested that Hamdi send written,
specific information to the PRT in order to help USG evaluate
the extent of GOI arrests of Sunni Arabs. The PRT and
Embassy believe that IIP's claims that Sunni Arabs will turn
to tribal violence or of growing Iranian influence may be
exaggerated. END COMMENT.
BUTENIS