Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD615
2009-03-10 07:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQ 201: WHERE IS THE GREEN LINE?

Tags:  PGOV PREL PMIL MOPS IZ 
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DE RUEHGB #0615/01 0690716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100716Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2072
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000615 

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: WHERE IS THE GREEN LINE?

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor John Fox; reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)

(U) This is one in a series of messages intended to provide
background for policy-makers on Iraq. It is a joint
Embassy/MNF-I message.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000615

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: WHERE IS THE GREEN LINE?

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor John Fox; reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)

(U) This is one in a series of messages intended to provide
background for policy-makers on Iraq. It is a joint
Embassy/MNF-I message.


1. (C) Summary: None of the many interpretations of a
"Green Line" separating Kurdish-administered areas from the
rest of Iraq has either support across ethnic lines or a
conclusive legal basis. The term "Green Line" was first used
to describe the "front-line trace" between Peshmerga and
Iraqi Army positions following the 1991 Kurdish uprising
against Saddam. Those positions generally followed the
terrain, separating mountainous areas of Dohuk, Erbil, and
Sulaymaniyah Provinces (including small portions of Ninewa,
Kirkuk, Salah-ad-Din, and Diyala) from flat lands to the
south-west. The Iraq constitution passed in 2005 recognizes
the Kurdish Regional Government's authority as the official
government of areas held by the Kurds on March 19 2003,
implicitly delineated by what we now refer to as the Green
Line. We have fairly detailed information on the locations
of Iraqi Army units as of March 16 2003, but there is a
dispute regarding the location of the Peshmerga, who claim to
have been in control of territory to the rear of the IA
positions. End summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
After the First Gulf War
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (SBU) The first widespread use of the term "Green Line"
referring to a line of separation between Kurdish and
Arab-dominated areas of Iraq was in the aftermath of the 1991
Kurdish Uprising. It was based on the relatively stable
front-line military positions (the "front-line trace") of
Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi Army forces, and recognized de
facto Kurdish control over a majority of the territory in
what are now the governorates (provinces) of Dohuk, Erbil and
Suleimaniyah, as well as small portions of territory in the
governorates of Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala. The Green Line
did not correspond to the northern no-fly zone patrolled by
U.S., British, and French forces following the first Gulf
War, which barred GOI aircraft in the airspace north of the

36th parallel. Instead, it ran generally north-west to
south-east, separating more mountainous (and more easily
defensible) terrain to the north from the flatter lands to
the south. This first Green Line corresponded generally to
the historical division between Semitic-language speakers in
the plains and deserts of central Iraq, and Indo-European
language speakers in the mountains to the north.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Post-2003 Transitional Period
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (C) The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) signed in
March 2004 by the Iraqi Governing Council provided the
governing framework for Iraq until the ratification of the
Iraqi Constitution in 2005. TAL Article 53(A) states that
&the Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the
official government of the territories that were administered
by that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of
Dohuk, Erbil, Suleimaniyah, Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninewa.8 TAL
Article 53(A) did not more specifically define those
territories, however. (Comment: It is not clear to us
whether "administered by" was meant to refer simply to the
presence of Kurdish Peshmerga and the absence of Iraqi Army
troops, or whether Kurdish political authorities had to
exercise the functions of government in those areas. The
Qexercise the functions of government in those areas. The
parties themselves do not generally debate these legal
questions in any deatil. End comment.) While there is
fairly accurate information available regarding the
disposition of Iraqi Army units as late as March 16 2003, we
know less about Peshmerga positions as of March 19 2003.
Also, military positions were fluid throughout this period,
with small numbers of Peshmerga infiltrating southward in
anticipation of Coalition operations. It is possible that
some areas in what are now the disputed territories had
troops from both sides, while others had few or none from
either side.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Constitutional Period and Article 140
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) The Iraqi constitution approved by referendum 15
October 2005 superseded the TAL, with two exceptions. The
constitution's Article 143 that annuls the TAL exempts TAL

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Article 53(A),recognizing KRG authority over certain areas
of northern Iraq, and TAL Article 58, which sets out a
process for remedying the forcible displacements of Kurds and
others during Saddam's Arabization efforts. Moreover,
Article 140 of the constitution explicitly commits the
executive to fully implement all the provisions of TAL
Article 58, although it includes some confusing language
regarding a deadline for full implementation by December 31

2007. (Note: Some Arab politicians claim that the meaning
of the language in Article 140(2) is that the provisions of
TAL Article 58 are null and void if full implementation is
not achieved by the December 2007 deadline. Kurdish leaders
strenuously disagree, noting that their support for the
constitution was contingent on the incorporation of language
addressing Arabization, and threaten that a constitution
stripped of these provisions would not have the support of
the KRG. End note.) There are numerous references to the
Kurdistan region in the constitution, including Article 117,
which confers recognition of the Kurdistan region and "its
existing authorities," although the specific districts and
sub-districts determined to have been "administered by" the
KRG as of March 19, 2003 are never enumerated.

- - - - - -
Enter UNAMI
- - - - - -


5. (C) As the December 2007 deadline approached with no sign
the government would move to implement provisions of TAL
Article 58, and in the absence of political consensus on the
way forward, UNAMI offered to produce reports on each of the
disputed territories to serve as a baseline of factual data
and, officials of the United Nations Assistance Mission to
Iraq (UNAMI) hoped, a starting point for political
negotiations to resolve territorial disputes. While no Iraqi
legal mechanism conferred this role on UNAMI, in August 2007
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1770 provided UNAMI
with a mandate to advise, support and assist, the
Government of Iraq and the Council of Representatives on the
development of processes to resolve disputed internal
boundaries. To head the UN effort, the Secretary General
appointed Staffan de Mistura as his Special Representative.
While UNAMI's efforts were not formally endorsed by either
the GoI or the KRG, both sides acquiesced in them -- the
Kurds to see whether the UN could facilitate a deal, many
Arabs in the belief that repeated delays would eventually
drain the energy required to make any territorial changes
favoring the Kurds.


6. (C) The first round of UNAMI reports, in June 2008, was
designed to build confidence. UNAMI officials thus picked
four areas they thought were relatively non-controversial:
Acre, Hamdaniya, and Makhmour Districts in Ninewa Province
and Mandali, a sub-district of Balad Ruz in Diyala Province.
Its findings suggested that Acre and Makhmour, homogeneous
Kurdish areas long-administered by Kurdish authorities,
should join the KRG, while multi-ethnic Hamdaniya should
remain part of Ninewa. They suggested that Mandali, from
which Kurds were substantially forcibly removed, should stay
in Diyala. GOI officials and Sunni Arab political leaders
studiously ignored the reports. Kurdish officials were
publicly critical of the proposal, arguing that Acre and
Makhmour were already widely accepted as Kurdish areas
administered by the KRG and complaining that UNAMI had placed
less weight on the most important criterion -- the desires of
Qless weight on the most important criterion -- the desires of
local residents. The Kurds refused to provide an official
reaction to the first round of reports, saying they would
wait to see the entire set of reports. UNAMI will release
reports on all the disputed territories in northern Iraq in
mid-April, including a menu of options to resolve Kirkuk
Province, and will announce it is organizing a framework to
guide discussions among Iraqis.



BUTENIS