Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD575
2009-03-05 13:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQ: MAKE IT A STRONG PARTNER IN DEALING WITH

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0336
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0575/01 0641340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051340Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2004
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000575 

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: MAKE IT A STRONG PARTNER IN DEALING WITH
IRAN

REF: A. (A) BAGHDAD 289

B. (B) BAGHDAD 011

BAGHDAD 00000575 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b)

(U) This is the first in a series of messages intended to
provide background for policy-makers on Iraq.
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000575

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: MAKE IT A STRONG PARTNER IN DEALING WITH
IRAN

REF: A. (A) BAGHDAD 289

B. (B) BAGHDAD 011

BAGHDAD 00000575 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b)

(U) This is the first in a series of messages intended to
provide background for policy-makers on Iraq.
SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) The 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent
seating of a Shia-led government, opened new opportunities
for Iran to influence Iraqi politics and to bleed U.S.
forces. Many Iraqis, especially Sunnis, still view Shi'a
Islamist parties ISCI and Badr, which have their origins in
Iran, as no more than catspaws of Tehran. In the past year,
however, Iraq has grown more assertive in dealing with Iran
and, as a result, the relationship has become more normal.
Maliki's routing of Shi'a militias has soothed many Iraqis'
worries that he was but a pawn of Tehran, and helped his
Da'wa party in the provincial elections. ISCI and Badr
support for the U.S.-Iraq security agreement against intense
private and public Iranian opposition was a strong signal
that Iraqi Shi'a parties are unwilling to be dictated to by
Iran. And, as historical Iraqi nationalism reasserts itself,
so do Iraqi leaders in their dealings with Iran.


2. (C) Having lost the strategic initiative, at least for
the present, Tehran appears to be taking a more pragmatic
approach to relations with Baghdad. Good, normal relations
with Iran will help stabilize Iraq, but the nature of the
Iranian government ensures that subversion will also remain
in Tehran's tool-kit. U.S. and Iraqi positions are well
aligned concerning relations with Iran, both the good and the
bad of them. Iraq's current behavior and enduring interests
point away from a strategic alignment with Iran. We should
treat Baghdad as a strong partner in dealing with Tehran,
while understanding that our tactical approaches will often
differ. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) The 2003 invasion of Iraq opened new opportunities
for Iran to exert influence in Iraq, and indirectly over the
United States. Iran suddenly found itself with American

forces on both its western and eastern borders, in Iraq and
Afghanistan. To be sure, this situation posed risks for
Tehran, but it also presented the opportunity either to gain
leverage over the United States by offering its neutrality or
support, or to bleed U.S. forces by directing and supplying
insurgent proxies -- or both. Under Saddam since the end of
the Iran-Iraq war, relations with Baghdad had been frozen and
hostile. Now, however, Iraq's Shi'a majority, for the first
time in Iraqi history, had come to power. Two of the most
powerful Shi'a organizations, the Supreme Council for an
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, now renamed ISCI) and its
associated Badr militia, had been founded in Iran during the
Iran-Iraq war, and Badr had been trained and supplied by the
Revolutionary Guards.


4. (C) ISCI's senior leader, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, has
received frequent care for his cancer at an Iranian hospital,
and some senior ISCI figures, such as Shaykh Human Hamudi,
have family members still living in Iran. (ISCI and Badr
leaders, however, have always been very open to receiving
American Embassy and military visitors. With us in private,
they underline that they want good relations between Iraq and
Iran, and between Iraq and the United States.) Nor are ties
between Iraqi politicians and Iran limited to Shi'a.
President Talibani's home political base in eastern Iraqi
Kurdistan is next to the Iranian border, and he has had long
QKurdistan is next to the Iranian border, and he has had long
good relations with Iran. Talabani in private will note with
a wry smile that Iraq must deal with its eastern neighbor,
but he too emphasizes that good relations with the U.S. are
essential for Iraq's future.

Iraq views Iran: Nationalism or Shi'ism?
--------------

5. (SBU) In Iraq, relations with Iran are, of course, a
controversial matter with origins reaching back at least to
the first century of Islam. With the resurgence of the
religious schools of Najaf since 2003, and of the pilgrimage
sites both there and in Karbala, another dimension of the
Iraq-Iran rivalry has been reawakened. It is common,
especially among Sunnis, to hear accusations that the GOI is
a willing tool of the "Persians." Even the greatly respected
Ayatollah Sistani is not free from suspicion of his Iranian
origins. Numerous western journalists have argued that the
GOI is heavily influenced by Iran, or even little more than
its puppet. Those who assert this cite not just religious
affinity and the origins of ISCI/Badr, but also the public

BAGHDAD 00000575 002.3 OF 003


defense of strong relations with Iran by Shi'a politicians
and Iranian payments to Iraqi officials and parliamentarians.
(Of course, accusations of excessive affinity with Iran come
not only from Iraqis and Iraq-based journalists, but also
from Sunni-majority Arab countries -- often with greater
vehemence.)


6. (C) Whatever merits such claims might once have had,
over the past year Iraq's relationship with Iran has evolved,
much to the advantage of the United States. Prime Minister
Maliki's successful series of military offensives, beginning
in Basra in March 2008, have stoked historical Iraqi
nationalism. The fact that many of the targets of these
offensives were Shi'a militias has defused (although not
entirely removed) the suspicion that Maliki is a purely
sectarian politician. And the good showing in provincial
elections by secular parties -- including Da'wa's success in
re-branding itself as secular -- over religious parties such
as ISCI, has dealt a blow to any idea that religious affinity
with Iran would trump Iraqi nationalism (an -ism which, in
its anti-Iranian version, unites Sunnis, Kurds and many
Shi'a, making it one of the glues binding Iraq together).

Baghdad pushes back
--------------


7. (C) Maliki's strengthening and the resurgence of secular
Iraqi nationalism have, in turn, led Baghdad to assert itself
increasingly in its relations with Tehran. The passage of
the Security Agreement (SA) in November 2008 is an important
example. The Iranian government had strongly pressured
visiting Iraqi leaders to reject the agreement, and had
ceaselessly condemned it in public. In the end, however, the
SA passed the Iraqi parliament easily, including with the
support of the "pro-Iranian" ISCI and Badr. In the difficult
diplomacy leading up to the passage, the biggest obstacle we
had to deal with was not Iraqi fear of Iranian opposition,
but rather leaders' fear that they would be attacked as not
sufficiently nationalistic if they supported an agreement
legitimizing even the temporary presence of Coalition forces
on Iraqi soil.


8. (C) Once the SA had been approved, Iran changed tack
almost immediately. It began hailing the SA as a triumph for
those wishing to rid the region of Coalition troops. More
importantly, Iraqi leaders tell us that they have been
treated with increasing respect by the Iranians. Relations
have become more pragmatic, with a more normal (if, as in the
case of disputes over the border along the Shatt al-Arab,
sometimes potentially explosive) bilateral agenda (see Ref
A). While relations have improved, examples of Iraqi
wariness toward Iran abound. Ref B reported discomfort among
some clerics in Najaf about Iranian influence in Iraq, since
Najaf wants to displace Qom as the uncontested center of
Shi'a learning. Most recently, the current visit of former
president Hashimi Rafsanjani has triggered protests from
Sunni Arabs, including the Vice President's Iraqi Islamic
Party. Press reports on March 5 indicated that Ayatollah
Sistani would refuse to receive Rafsanjani during the
latter's visit to Najaf on March 5. The fact is that, over
the past year, Iran has lost the strategic initiative in
Iraq. At least until it decides how to try to regain ground,
Tehran appears much more willing than in the past to treat
Baghdad as an equal, more or less normal, partner.

The yin and yang of Iraq-Iran relations
--------------
Q --------------


9. (C) And much of the Iraq-Iran relationship is normal.
Iranian investment and trade with Iran are increasing, as is
the flow in both directions of pilgrims and tourists. A
bilateral technical team has been working since last Fall to
resolve border issues, including along the Shatt al-Arab.
All this will help make Iraq more prosperous and thus more
stable. And deeper, mutually beneficial relations may also
provide a buffer against conflict in the future. We do and
should encourage the development of these activities. Given
the nature of the Iranian government, however, its approach
to Iraq must continue to have a dark side of subversion. The
Iraqi banking system is vulnerable to Iranian abuse. We have
noted a recent increase in the number of Iranian-origin
Explosively-Formed Penetrators entering Iraq. And we must
assume that Iran will continue to seek to influence events in
Iraq through arming and training extremist groups to conduct
targeted assassinations of political figures and security
officials, through attacking the Iraqi security structure in
order to undermine the GOI in the eyes of its people, and
through launching news-making attacks on Coalition forces.

BAGHDAD 00000575 003.3 OF 003


But here again, we agree with the GOI on opposing these
activities. We cooperate closely in doing so, and doubtless
will into the future, since countering the sinister aspects
of Iranian influence is an enduring common interest.

Iraq: Partner to the U.S., not fellow-traveler to Iran
-------------- --------------


10. (C) For the United States, a nationalistic Iraq intent
on maintaining a wary independence from Iran while pursuing
good neighborly relations with it will be a solid and crucial
partner in our dealings with Tehran. We will not agree on
all details, and can expect that Iraq, which must forever
live next to Iran, will often be keener than we would prefer
to maintain cordial relations with its eastern neighbor. We
would be mistaken, however, to take that behavior for
subservience to Tehran, or to believe that Iraq's interests
must be strategically aligned with those of Iran. Indeed,
the greater number of factors, including re-emerging history,
point in the opposite direction.
BUTENIS