BAGHDAD UPDATE: WHAT'S AHEAD AS TROOPS DRAWDOWN?

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SUBJECT: BAGHDAD UPDATE: WHAT'S AHEAD AS TROOPS DRAWDOWN?

Classified By: Deputy Polcouns John G. Fox, reasons 1.4 b/d.

(U) This is one in a series of messages intended to provide
background for policy-makers on Iraq.


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: As Iraq's capital, Baghdad is inherently
important. It is home to a large and diverse population
(approximately six million of Iraq's estimated 28 million
total),with increasing numbers of Internally Displaced
People (IDPs) returning to mixed neighborhoods. Baghdad's
political scene encompasses the entire spectrum of parties
and actors. PM Maliki did well in the Baghdad provincial
elections, and is well placed to develop it further as a key
part of his political base and centralizing ambitions.
Throughout our planned reduction of troops, Iraq's capital
will necessarily remain a top political-military focus for us
and for Iraqis, even if the country's largest current
flashpoints lie elsewhere. END SUMMARY.

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POLITICS: ELECTIONS MATTER;
MALIKI UP, ISCI DOWN
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2. (SBU) The January 31, 2009, Provincial Council (PC)
elections shifted Baghdad politics dramatically. Candidates
associated with PM Maliki (i.e., those tied to the Da'wa
party) did especially well, winning 28 of 57 seats. Da'wa's
rise was at the expense of candidates associated with the
formerly dominant Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).
While internal politicking over PC leadership roles
continues, contacts report that it is likely Maliki and Da'wa
will cement a strategic partnership with the Sadrists. Both
parties have spoken publicly of such a deal, which we are
seeing replicated in the southern, Shi'a-dominated provinces.
The prospect of a Da'wa-Sadr alliance has alarmed other
parties, including Baghdad Sunnis who speculate that such an
arrangement might empower the more extreme Sadrists and their
supporters, including some with a role in past Shia militia
activity in the capital.


3. (C) New PC members, although not yet officially seated,
reportedly have been touring Baghdad to assess the most
urgent infrastructure priorities, including in the vast Sadr
City district. If the new PC coalition is able to deliver
better services, Da'wa's momentum may carry into
parliamentary elections set for the end of 2009 or early

2010. In prior years, Baghdad residents voiced concerns
about too much Iranian influence in the capital (in large
part owing to ISCI's ties to Tehran). Today, some are
signaling a different worry: that a consolidation of power
by Maliki, whose electoral mandate in the PC election
demonstrated that his "tough but fair" mantra has found a
supportive audience among Baghdad voters. The Sadr City
district chairman, however, has implied that any new
Maliki-Sadrist partnership could include "side deals" that
hinder wider political reconciliation and exacerbate
inter-party suspicions.

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SECURITY: TROOP DRAWDOWN;
OUR LAST GAMBLE?
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4. (SBU) Baghdad benefited first, and perhaps the most,
from the U.S. troop surge. In 2006 and into 2007,
sectarianism exploded in the capital's mixed neighborhoods.
Today, in comparison, those same streets are mostly quiet.
The presence of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has grown within
QThe presence of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has grown within
the city, alongside U.S. Joint Security Stations (JSSs).
Some contacts have reported that displaced Shia residents
have been quicker to return to mixed neighborhoods than are
Sunnis. Ironically, they often cite the success so far of
the "Sons of Iraq" (SOI) program, comprised largely of
Sunnis, as the primary reason. Several Baghdadis have said
that they fear that Shia militias, in contrast, appear to
have only gone underground rather than abandon the fight
altogether.


5. (C) The departure of U.S. combat units from the capital
will test this calm. Security remains fragile. A Coalition

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focus on ISF development should help lessen residents' fears
that incompetent (or complicit) ISF will allow for a return
of the militias and lead to a repeat of the past cycle of
Shia-Sunni bloodletting. The transitional presence of U.S.
forces will allow us to test the extent to which the ISF can
increasingly stand and operate on its own and in a
non-sectarian fashion. (Many Iraqis found President Obama's
emphasis, in his February 27 speech, on continued U.S.
support for a non-sectarian ISF to be particularly
reassuring.)


6. (C) As national political leaders work through their many
political disagreements -- most prominently and urgently
those involving Kurdish-Arab relations -- PM Maliki will
continue to seek to consolidate his emerging Baghdad
electoral base. Cutting a deal with the Sadrists makes
short-term political sense for him, but he may have to cast
his net wider, perhaps including ISCI, in order to repeat his
success in national elections. Iraq's historical political
culture is one of a strong centralized government, a model
Maliki is seeking to reassert. To the extent he succeeds in
making all political roads lead to Baghdad, the capital will
become even more important. In tension with this ambition,
however, is a desire by the Kurdistan Regional Government and
many provinces for stronger local powers. The Prime Minister
is popular in Baghdad today and, with the Provincial Council
electoral mandate in hand, he is well-positioned to solidify
the capital as a key part of his political base.
BUTENIS