Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD559
2009-03-04 15:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

THE U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONSHIP IN 2009: THE VIEW FROM

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0559/01 0631526
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD39B3BA MSI4557-695)
P 041526Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1978
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000559 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY FOR TEXT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: THE U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONSHIP IN 2009: THE VIEW FROM
THE PROVINCES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 519

B. BAGHDAD 507

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor John Fox for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000559

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY FOR TEXT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: THE U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONSHIP IN 2009: THE VIEW FROM
THE PROVINCES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 519

B. BAGHDAD 507

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor John Fox for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Provincial-level contacts throughout Iraq, while
excited about the prospect of full Iraqi sovereignty, hope
and expect that the U.S. will continue to provide development
and security assistance and maintain a role in internal
dispute resolution over the next year. The U.S.-Iraq
Security Agreement (SA) enjoys wide support among Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) contacts, including many affiliated
with parties who voted against it in parliament. Few Iraqis
know about the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA),but they
have rising expectations for favorable bilateral economic,
educational, and scientific relationships. While
increasingly confident about their ability to handle upcoming
national elections, most Iraqis, especially Kurds, believe a
strong U.S. presence during 2009-2010 elections is essential.
Few express specific ideas about what the U.S. should
prioritize in the next six months. Sunni and Shi'a show
similar expectations for the U.S.-Iraq bilateral
relationship, while Kurds are much more focused on using U.S.
influence to help resolve internal boundary disputes and its
relationship with the central government. Iraqis have not
yet entirely realized that we will be reducing our military
presence quickly, and it will be difficult to manage the
expectations of those who expect a greater U.S. role in
providing basic services. End summary.

Security Agreement Broadly Supported
--------------


2. (C) PRT meetings with leading Iraqi contacts carried out
during late February indicate strong support for the SA among
Iraqi professionals, elected officials, religious authorities
and tribal leaders. While PRT contact samplings are
admittedly self-selecting and biased toward the relatively
moderate, nationalist, and pro-American, many emphasize that
the hard-fought SA negotiating process went a long way to
relieve their concerns -- and broader Iraqi worries -- about
the agreement. Najaf Governor Abu Gelal (ISCI) told Senior
Advisor Gray that "several U.S. concessions" were needed to

gain SA support from the maraj'iyah and the Shi'a political
establishment (ref B). An independent Shi'a COR member from
Karbala who wavered before voting for the SA recently told
poloff that he is much more confident about his vote now.
"People don't know what concessions we gained from the
Americans. I don't even know everything. But they know we
were able to make changes, especially on immunities, and
people take pride in that." Kurdish support for the SA is
also strong, but most wish the U.S. had made fewer
concessions and had agreed to stay longer.


3. (C) Sunni and Sadrist contacts also expressed support
for, or at least acquiescence in, the SA, despite their
reservations with the Prime Minister and/or the U.S. Sunni
sheikhs and former Baathist military officers in the outer
Baghdad communities of Tarmiyah, Tayi and Abu Ghraib told the
ePRT recently that they expect Sunni support levels will be
very high if/when a referendum on the SA is held this year.
Like other Sunnis, they hope the U.S. will apply pressure on
the GOI for reinstatement of qualified officers as part of
the political reform amendment that passed in parliament
alongside the SA. Basra Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS)
representative Sheikh Mohamed al-Furaji, in sentiments
echoing other Sadrists, did not endorse the SA but told the
REO that it created needed space for reform and training of
QREO that it created needed space for reform and training of
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Furaji also focused on
reconciliation of former Baathists as a means of
professionalizing the ISF. Sunnis and Sadrists expressed a
common theme shared by virtually all Iraqis: U.S. partnership
with Iraq under the SA must focus on preparing the country to
secure its borders with Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria
and Saudi Arabia.

Strategic Framework Agreement Unknown
--------------


4. (SBU) In contrast to the SA, the SFA is virtually unknown
among Iraqis and more needs to be done to inform both elected
officials and the general public about the agreement so that
appropriate partnerships can be developed. Iraqis
nevertheless have strongly-held ideas about specific topics
outlined in the SFA, including economic/energy and
educational cooperation. Access to American post-secondary
education is a particularly high priority among educated
Iraqis. As our bilateral relationship normalizes, PRTs

report more complaints from Iraqis about a related issue
mentioned in the SFA: the need to facilitate visa
applications for educational and cultural exchanges.


5. (C) Some provincial leaders, such as current Anbar
Governor Ma'amoun Sami Rasheed, are already familiar with the
priorities and programs detailed under the SFA. Ma'amoun
himself participated in the International Vistors program in
2007, and upon return has pressed for greater cooperation
with Texas A&M University in the fields of agriculture and
engineering. He has expressed clear ideas on a range of
USAID programs and about the potential American role in
promoting trade and expediting exploration of Anbari natural
gas fields. Unfortunately, most local leaders are not as
well-informed as Governor Ma'amoun about the range of tools
available under the scope of the SFA. Tribal leaders, in
particular, are accustomed to military assistance programs
and not well informed about civilian goals, programs and
initiatives. This lack of knowledge, combined with the
considerable turnover created by the recent provincial
elections, presents opportunities for us to build
relationships with Iraq's emerging local leaders, most of
whom will be looking for SFA-focused civilian assistance as
they move into a governing role.

Assistance, Dispute Resolution, Consultation
--------------


6. (SBU) With regard to economic and energy cooperation,
Iraqis have not reconciled their expectations with the
reality that the U.S. will be reducing its military presence
soon. From poor Shi'a communities in Maysan to relatively
affluent Kurdish communites in Irbil and Kirkuk, contacts
regularly ask for U.S. assistance in big-ticket
infrastructure projects, including electricity, oil refining,
road, and telecommunications upgrades. While these requests
may be bargaining ploys rather than a reflection of true
expectations, many strongly believe that the U.S. has an
obligation to build Iraq's infrastructure before departing.
Foreign investment is considered crucial -- to the point that
Anbar Provincial Chief of Police MG Tariq Yousel al-Thiyabi
told the PRT that "trade is more important than security."
However, specific economic goals outlined in the SFA -- such
as Iraqi membership in the WTO and access to the
Export-Import Bank programs -- are unknown, esoteric issues
to all but a few officials, businessmen, and academics.


7. (C) While taking pride in greater sovereignty, many
Iraqis see a U.S. role for mediating internal disputes as
part of future bilateral political and diplomatic
cooperation. Kurds are especially eager for the U.S. to be a
strong intermediary, hoping that the American emphasis on
maintaining a united but federal Iraq will lead us to
pressure Prime Minister Maliki to accept concessions to the
Kurds on key issues related to internal boundaries,
federalism, and Kirkuk. Shi'a and especially Sunni are less
enthused about a strong U.S. role on Arab-Kurdish issues;
many contacts, such as Salah-ad-Din Turkoman PC member Ali
Hashim, have complained in SFA-related discussions about our
alleged pro-Kurd bias as a mediator.


8. (C) Sunni and Shi'a are much more welcoming of mediation
on non-Kurdish issues, however. Local notables in Babil,
Diwaniyah, and Dhi Qar provinces, all formerly run by the
recently-defeated ISCI party and its Badr militia, have
expressed the need for the U.S. to maintain communication
with ISCI/Badr so that it does not backslide toward
intra-Shi'a violence. Sunni contacts in Baghdad and Anbar
have also made clear that Sons of Iraq transition, fair
Qhave also made clear that Sons of Iraq transition, fair
treatment of internally displaced persons, and Baathist
reconcilation require some degree of American managing and
intermediation. While Sunnis are frustrated by the rise of
PM Maliki, we are not hearing from contacts about any
potential for renewed Shi'a-Sunni violence.


9. (SBU) On key SA implementation issues, Iraqis are
increasingly vocal about requiring consultation and
notification before the U.S. moves forward with decisions.
While provincial leaders praised the U.S. for its
consulatation at the local level, many contacts expressed
doubt that the same occurs at the national level. Shi'a
contacts consistently repeated that the U.S. will need to
consult with Prime Minister Maliki about the details of its
upcoming American military troop reduction plans. Sunni
contacts of ePRT Fallujah, still bitter about unfulfilledQ~0EDk\}UBqRQ"hjTQX
bpjK|Z|ws on many points,
Kurds, Turkomen and Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk and Mosul all
expressed desire for a strong U.S. voice on issues related to
Article 23 and 140. Representatives from all these groups
stated that a robust U.S. presence will be needed until at
least 2011, and that the U.S. must play a role in
facilitating provincial and national elections. Kirkuk
Turkomen Bloc member Dr. Torhan Mudhir Mufti and several Arab
and Turkomen district council members also emphasized to the
PRT the need for the U.S. to provide training on Provincial
Powers Law (PPL) implementation and the need to apply
pressure on the central government to apply the PPL properly.


Regional Feedback and Priorities: South
--------------


12. (C) Southern Shi'a Iraqis, with fewer pressing
security-related or sectarian issues to worry about, are
generally more sanguine about Iraqi ability to manage
upcoming national elections, PPL implementation, and security
concerns without U.S. troop presence. Though generally
suspicious of U.S. motives with regard to Arab-Kurdish
issues, representatives from all the major Shi'a parties have
recently told PRTs that some U.S. backstopping is helpful in
managing intra-Shi'a tensions. (Contacts from Karbala and
Basra also noted that the U.S. presence would discourage a
vote in parliament or even a coup attempt against Maliki.)
Leaders in Southern Iraq are still very worried about Iranian
influence, and believe U.S. troops will pull out of Iraq
before the ISF are ready to stand on their own. While all
contacts (including Sadrist politicians) appreciate technical
assistance to the ISF, we hear differing views on how
Americans should intervene with an ISF widely viewed as
politicized. In an oft-heard sentiment, Basra independent PC
member Seyid Ahmed Jamal Deen called for the U.S. to support
efforts by the Prime Minister to purge the ISF of Badr and
militia-friendly elements. Others, especially
ISCI-affiliated leaders in the south central region, called
on the U.S. to apply pressure on the Prime Minister to take a
less active role in appointing ISF leaders.


13. (SBU) While reasonably confident about their ability to
handle security and elections, southern Iraqis are
particularly adamant that the U.S. has a responsibility to
fix Iraq's shattered infrastructure. Some contacts frame
Qfix Iraq's shattered infrastructure. Some contacts frame
their requests in a way that suggests partnership, such as
one Karbala judge who called for establishment of a joint
U.S.-Iraqi-funded technical/engineering "consultancy," which
could facilitate technology transfer. Others, especially in
poor provinces such as Maysan and Dhi Qar, continue to ask
the PRTs and USAID for increased assistance on big-ticket
items when funding is simply not forthcoming (ref A).
Several PRTs report that local officials expect the PRTs to
last beyond 2011. While requests of this nature may reflect
bargaining positions rather than real aspirations, southern
journalists and politicians advise the perceived lack of
American delivery on services may be damaging to our
interests. Basra ISF and PC contacts, in particular, stated
that militias would attempt to regroup as U.S. forces prepare
to leave, and that lack of services would be their prime
organizing tool.

Regional Feedback and Priorities: Center and Baghdad
-------------- --------------


14. (C) Though many Sunnis in parliament voted against
approving the SA, Sunni provincial contacts generally support
the broad outlines of the agreement. Most advise a gradual


10. (C) Among Iraqis, Kurds not only express the strongest
desire for a muscular U.S. role in Iraq but also specify most
clearly what they think our priorities should be. In an
answer widely reflective of Kurdish sentiment, KDP Kirkuk
Provincial Council member Sherzad Adil (KDP) listed four
areas in which the U.S. should place its emphasis: 1)
resolving the federal structure within Iraq, by which he
means brokering a shared GOI-KRG agreement on the
relationship of the central government and the Kurdish
Region; 2) resolving Kirkuk and the other disputed internal
boundaries areas consistent with Article 140 of the
constitution; 3) resolving tensions between the Iraqi Army
and the Peshmerga over who has the right to conduct
operations in specific parts of northern Iraq; and 4)
promoting progress between the KRG and Baghdad on key
economic issues currently in negotiation, chiefly
hydrocarbons and government revenue. Article 140 and Article
23 concerns are of such importance to Kurds that it was
difficult for PRTs to elicit any opinions from them on other
aspects of the SFA. On economic matters, most Kurds
emphasized U.S. help in modernizing electrical plants, oil
facilities, and other infrastructure.


11. (SBU) While holding opposing views on many points,
Kurds, Turkomen and Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk and Mosul all
expressed desire for a strong U.S. voice on issues related to
Article 23 and 140. Representatives from all these groups
stated that a robust U.S. presence will be needed until at
least 2011, and that the U.S. must play a role in
facilitating provincial and national elections. Kirkuk
Turkomen Bloc member Dr. Torhan Mudhir Mufti and several Arab
and Turkomen district council members also emphasized to the
PRT the need for the U.S. to provide training on Provincial
Powers Law (PPL) implementation and the need to apply
pressure on the central government to apply the PPL properly.


Regional Feedback and Priorities: South
--------------


12. (C) Southern Shi'a Iraqis, with fewer pressing
security-related or sectarian issues to worry about, are
generally more sanguine about Iraqi ability to manage
upcoming national elections, PPL implementation, and security
concerns without U.S. troop presence. Though generally
suspicious of U.S. motives with regard to Arab-Kurdish
issues, representatives from all the major Shi'a parties have
recently told PRTs that some U.S. backstopping is helpful in
managing intra-Shi'a tensions. (Contacts from Karbala and
Basra also noted that the U.S. presence would discourage a
vote in parliament or even a coup attempt against Maliki.)
Leaders in Southern Iraq are still very worried about Iranian
influence, and believe U.S. troops will pull out of Iraq
before the ISF are ready to stand on their own. While all
contacts (including Sadrist politicians) appreciate technical
assistance to the ISF, we hear differing views on how
Americans should intervene with an ISF widely viewed as
politicized. In an oft-heard sentiment, Basra independent PC
member Seyid Ahmed Jamal Deen called for the U.S. to support
efforts by the Prime Minister to purge the ISF of Badr and
militia-friendly elements. Others, especially
ISCI-affiliated leaders in the south central region, called
on the U.S. to apply pressure on the Prime Minister to take a
less active role in appointing ISF leaders.


13. (SBU) While reasonably confident about their ability to
handle security and elections, southern Iraqis are
particularly adamant that the U.S. has a responsibility to
Qparticularly adamant that the U.S. has a responsibility to
fix Iraq's shattered infrastructure. Some contacts frame
their requests in a way that suggests partnership, such as
one Karbala judge who called for establishment of a joint
U.S.-Iraqi-funded technical/engineering "consultancy," which
could facilitate technology transfer. Others, especially in
poor provinces such as Maysan and Dhi Qar, continue to ask
the PRTs and USAID for increased assistance on big-ticket
items when funding is simply not forthcoming (ref A).
Several PRTs report that local officials expect the PRTs to
last beyond 2011. While requests of this nature may reflect
bargaining positions rather than real aspirations, southern
journalists and politicians advise the perceived lack of
American delivery on services may be damaging to our
interests. Basra ISF and PC contacts, in particular, stated
that militias would attempt to regroup as U.S. forces prepare
to leave, and that lack of services would be their prime
organizing tool.

Regional Feedback and Priorities: Center and Baghdad
-------------- --------------


14. (C) Though many Sunnis in parliament voted against
approving the SA, Sunni provincial contacts generally support
the broad outlines of the agreement. Most advise a gradual

American drawdown, as exemplified by Salah-ad-Din Deputy
Governor Abdullah Hussein Jebara's (Sunni, ex-Baathist) call
for U.S. military presence to last until one year after the
national elections. Contacts note ongoing security needs in
Sunni and mixed areas. Outgoing Anbar Deputy PC Chairman
Khamees Abtan reiterated support for U.S. military presence
in the province in order to prevent tribal influence over the
police from erupting into acts of inter-tribal violence.
Police training and rule-of-law programs also received high
priority. When asked about the U.S.-Iraqi bilateral
relationship, many Sunnis turned immediately to discussion of
the Arab-Kurdish topic and the need for the U.S. to support
national Iraqi unity. Former Baathists in Anbar, SaD, and
Baghdad, focused on Iranian influence and their own
reintegration into the ISF, consistently expressed support
for the SA. Sunni and Shi'a represenatives from these
provinces said the U.S. must be active in ensuring both fair
national elections and proper application of the PPL.


15. (SBU) As elsewhere, local knowledge about the SFA in the
central provinces is very low -- though the Da'wa
representative in Tuz (Salah-ad-Din Province) was well aware
of the SFA and showed the PRT 1,000 copies of the agreement
he had ready to distribute. Knowledgeable of the SFA or not,
PRT contacts have expressed ideas about the type of economic,
cultural, and education initiatives envisioned within its
scope. Anbari business leaders believe that Iraq's biggest
challenge for the next five years will be rebuilding its
infrastructure. They have proposed to the PRT a "Marshall
Plan" for development projects, including debt forgiveness by
Iraq's creditors. Economics professors at Anbar University
say that they look forward to normal relations with the U.S.,
meaning easy access to visas, conventional commercial ties,
correspondent relations between U.S. and Iraq banks, and
access to Ex-Im credits and USDA commodity-export programs.
In general, they want to emulate what they perceive to be the
more developed economic policies of the Kurdish Regional
Authority. Contacts also cited the need for trade-credit
facilities to relevant Iraqi banks, pointing to GOI
arrangements with Iran, Syria, China, and Turkey as examples.

Next Six Months
--------------


16. (SBU) Iraqis express strong opinions about our bilateral
relationship but rarely offer specific answers to questions
about what U.S. priorities should be in the next six months.
Provincial contacts universally believe that the U.S. needs
to remain in Iraq through national and sub-provincial
elections in order to manage conflicts, but (outside of the
Kirkuk issue) rarely give advice on how the U.S. should
approach upcoming elections from a policy perspective. The
expectation is for American backstopping and facilitation,
not American direction. While few know of the SFA, there is
near unanimous sentiment for the U.S. to pursue the type of
increased cooperation outlined in the agreement, and
satisfaction upon hearing of specific bilateral mechanisms
that will be developed to start implementing it this year.
In upcoming months, PRTs will be planning conferences to
spread awareness of the SFA. If Joint Coordination
Committees can be established and tangible goods under the
SFA can be delivered in first six months -- such as
educational exchanges and removal of some Chapter 7
obligations -- the public relations benefit would be
significant.

Comment
--------------


17. (C) As Iraq assumes greater sovereignty, its people have
Q17. (C) As Iraq assumes greater sovereignty, its people have
grown more comfortable with the idea of a temporary American
presence to provide background support in security,
development assistance, and management of internal political
issues. While sampling of opinion through PRTs can be
biased, it is evident that Iraqi anxieties about our
impending departure are rising, a sentiment shared by our
national leadership contacts. Most provincial contacts
believe that the U.S. has a continuing role to play in Iraq
to help resolve outstanding issues that relate to them (such
as SOI integration for Sunnis). Sunni and Shi'a Arabs are
much less comfortable with American mediation on Kurdish-Arab
disputes, although they are coming to realize that
Kurdish-Arab issues have the potential to destabilize the
country, especially during an election year. Sunni and Shi'a
do not see their own pet issues, such as de-Baathification,
as related to resolution of Kurdish-Arab debate. As we work
in 2009 to develop the bilateral U.S.-Iraqi relationship
through SFA implementation and support to upcoming national
elections, great care will need to be taken to manage Arab
and Kurdish expectations as we build toward establishing
durable solutions to internal political issues. End comment.
BUTENIS