CDA, CG AND PM DISCUSS DRAWDOWN OF U.S. FORCES IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000515

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR PTER IZ
SUBJECT: CDA, CG AND PM DISCUSS DRAWDOWN OF U.S. FORCES IN
IRAQ, INTERCEPT OF AN IRANIAN UAV AND ARAB-KURD TENSIONS

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (S) Summary: In a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki on February 26, Commanding General MNF-I Odierno
briefed the details of the new Administration's plan for the
responsible drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq. U.S. Forces
will cease all combat operations, except for counterterrorism
missions in coordination with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),by
August 31, 2010, the CG advised. There are currently 5
Division Headquarters and 15 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in
Iraq, including UK forces, performing counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations, in addition to ongoing training
and civil capacity missions. The Multi-National Force Iraq
(MNF-I),Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) and Multi-National
Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I) will combine into
one headquarters, U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I) between 15 March
2010 and the Change of mission. By the time of the change of
mission on August 31, 2010, the Force will be comprised of 2
Division Headquarters and 6 Advisory and Assistance Brigades
(AABs). The role of U.S. forces beyond 31 August 2010 will
be to: 1) train, enable and advise the ISF; 2) support civil
capacity; 3) provide force protection for U.S. military and
civilian personnel; and 4) continue with withdrawal of U.S.
forces in accordance with the U.S. - Iraq Security Agreement.


2. (S) Summary Continued: PM al-Maliki's response to the plan
was measured, as he cautioned against the hastened withdrawal
of U.S. forces, noting he had previously discussed his
concerns with President Obama. The PM said that "a principle
must be established," according to which the drawdown would
proceed, wherein U.S. forces will withdraw from troubled
areas last. The CG advised that he would work closely with
the PM to coordinate the drawdown of U.S. forces.
Additionally, he informed the PM that U.S. forces had
intercepted and shot down an Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) in Iraq yesterday and that, in a separate incident; an
Iranian helicopter had strayed into Iraqi air space. Lastly,
the CG commented on his recent trip to Erbil where he urged
KRG President Barzani to avoid inflammatory comments in the
media and to resolve any differences with the GoI
politically. End Summary.

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Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq
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3. (S) In their regular weekly meeting with Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki on February 26, Charge d' Affaires
Butenis and Commanding General MNF-I Odierno briefed the
Administration's plan for the responsible drawdown of U.S.
Forces in Iraq. The CG told PM al-Maliki that he would walk
him through the plan in advance of a call from President
Obama later in the day. The PM confirmed that he planned to
speak with President Obama at 1700. (Note: The phone call
was later changed to 1830 Baghdad time on 27 Feb; end note.)
The CG asked the PM not to discuss the plan openly prior to
President Obama's public address on February 27. The PM noted
the recent leaks to the U.S. media and jokingly remarked that
his silence would come at a price.


4. (S) According to the Administration's plan, U.S. forces
will cease all combat operations, except for counterterrorism
missions in coordination with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),by
August 31, 2010. There are currently 5 Division Headquarters
and 15 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Iraq, including UK
Qand 15 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Iraq, including UK
forces, performing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
operations, in addition to ongoing training and civil
capacity missions. The Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I),
Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) and Multi-National Security
Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I) will combine into one
headquarters, U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I) on or about March 15,

2010. By the time of the change of mission on 31 August 2010
the Force will be comprised of 2 Division Headquarters and 6
Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs). (Note: The PM
interjected that after July 31, 2009 only U.S. forces would
remain in Iraq and, therefore, the term "Multi-National
Forces" would no longer be appropriate; end note.) The role
of U.S. forces beyond 31 August 2010 will be to: 1) train,
enable and advise the ISF; 2) support civil capacity; 3)
provide force protection for U.S. military and civilian
personnel; and 4) continue with withdrawal of U.S. forces in
accordance with the U.S. - Iraq Security Agreement (SA).


5. (S) The U.S. currently operates approximately 350 bases in
Iraq. We plan to reduce the number of bases to around 30 by
August 2010, the CG advised. These bases will be spread out
across Iraq and will be located outside of the cities, in
accordance with the SA. The PM, seeking to clarify,
reiterated that U.S. forces would no longer be present in
cities after June 30, 2009 and that the new plan called for

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approximately 30 U.S. bases spread across Iraq, located
outside of the cities. The PM commented that this was "good."


6. (S) The CG commented that this drawdown was, in fact, a
continuation of the post-Surge drawdown. It is consistent
with the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Iraq
based on equal partnership between two sovereign nations, the
CG said. The change in missions, from combat to assistance,
in August 2010 reinforces Iraq's anticipated progress and
continued stability. Lastly, the CG noted, the drawdown and
location of U.S. forces will be closely coordinated with the
GoI.


7. (S) The PM asked when and how the drawdown would begin.
The CG noted that the White House would soon announce the
withdrawal of approximately 15,000 troops from Iraq. The
withdrawal would take place over the next six months and
would be a combination of forces from throughout Iraq, but
would include two Marine battalions currently located in
Anbar Province and a brigade located in Diwaniyah. The PM
expressed concern over the security in Anbar, to which the CG
replied that we would have the flexibility to move U.S. Army
units to Anbar to ensure al-Qaida does not return to Anbar
Province. The PM cautioned the hastened withdrawal of U.S.
forces from "hot spots" such as Anbar. He said "we should
agree upon a principle," that U.S. forces are withdrawn last
from the troubled areas, like Anbar. GEN Odierno assured the
PM that the plan provides him the flexibility to do just that.

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U.S. Forces Engage Iranian Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV)
-------------- --------------


8. (S) U.S. forces identified, tracked and shot down an
Iranian UAV in Iraqi territory on February 25, the CG told PM
al-Maliki. The PM asked if the UAV entered Iraq
"intentionally or by accident," to which the CG noted that it
had been flying in Iraq for three hours prior to being shot
down. The CG said that the UAV might have been conducting
surveillance of Camp Ashraf. He advised that the UAV had
been recovered by U.S. forces. The PM said that he will
lodge a formal complaint with the Government of Iran about
this matter. He noted that President Talabani was currently
visiting Iran and suggested that, perhaps, he (President
Talabani) might raise the issue there. Additionally, the CG
noted, an Iranian helicopter had strayed into Iraqi territory
on February 25. The helicopter was spotted by U.S. forces
located in a border outpost. The CG told PM al-Maliki that
he believed that the helicopter likely entered Iraqi
territory by accident, after the pilot became disoriented.

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CG's Trip to Erbil and Tensions in the Disputed Areas
-------------- --------------


9. (S) Commenting on his recent trip to Erbil, the CG said
that in a meeting with KRG President Masoud Barzani on
February 22, he urged Barzani to engage with the GoI in
Baghdad to resolve disputes politically. The PM replied that
if Barzani was serious about resolving issues politically, he
should stop making inflammatory statements in the media. We
discussed that, the CG said, and President Barzani assured me
that he had counseled his party not to make such comments.
The PM remarked that as long as Barzani did not make
comments, he did not care what the other members of this
party did. The CG said that Barzani had promised to come to
Qparty did. The CG said that Barzani had promised to come to
Baghdad after his trip to Europe, to which the PM replied
that Barzani was always welcome.


10. (S) The CG told the PM that he had traveled to Kirkuk the
day before. He said that he met with the Provincial
Committee, and that the Provincial Committee said that the
CoR-appointed Article 23 Committee was not doing its job.
The PM replied that it was difficult for them, as they had
received threats and that their inaction could delay
elections there. The CG said that he would do whatever was
necessary to create an environment conducive to allowing the
Article 23 Committee to perform its job safely.


11. (S) Lastly, the CG mentioned that U.S. forces outside of
Kirkuk, in the disputed area along the KRG border, came
across an Iraqi Battalion that was flying the old Iraqi flag
and which had "long live Saddam" displayed in graffiti on a
concrete wall near one fighting position. The CG warned that
this type of behavior could add additional tension between
the Arabs and Kurds, owing to the sensitivity of the
situation in the disputed areas. This is the kind of thing
that causes problems, he said. He told the PM that the U.S.
forces had asked the Iraqi Army unit to take down the flag
and cover over the graffiti, which they had done. The PM
said that he was appreciative, but was visibly upset by the

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news of the Grafitti and the flag.
BUTENIS