PRT KIRKUK: ARAB NATIONAL PARTIES SEEK FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000470

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2024
TAGS: PGOV EMIN KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT KIRKUK: ARAB NATIONAL PARTIES SEEK FOR
PARTNERS TO COMPETE IN KIRKUK ELECTIONS

REF: 08 BAGHDAD 3845

Classified By: PRT Kirkuk Leader Howard Keegan for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

THIS IS A PRT KIRKUK REPORTING CABLE.


1. (C) Summary. While outside political parties continue to
wield the most power and influence in Kirkuk, three Arab
national parties are now attempting to get a foot in the door
to compete in Kirkuk's elections. Since 2005, Kirkuk's Arab
leaders have remained independent with minimal direction from
the Iraqi Republican Gathering (IRG) based in Baghdad. In
order to compete with the likes of Kurdistan-based Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) and Turkey-based Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF),Sunni
Arabs are contemplating with whom they can form alliances.
In 2008, some IRG members formed the Kirkuk-based Arab Unity
Bloc (AUB). The AUB is actively negotiating with Saleh
Mutlak's Iraqi National Dialogue Front (INDF) that has large
Arab support. The newly established National Movement for
Reform and Development (NMRD) is considering the AUB as a
coalition partner. However, VP Tariq al-Hashemi's Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) is unlikely to find a dance partner since
it maintains close ties to the Kurds, did not perform well in
the provincial elections and adheres to its non-secular
views. End Summary.

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Arab Unity Bloc
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2. C) Five of the six Arabs currently serving on Kirkuk's
Provincial Council (PC) were elected in 2005 as part of the
Iraqi Republican Gathering (IRG) list put together by
Baghdad-based Saad Asim Janabi. The IRG pursues an "Arab"
aQ@QX(Qnew political party that is slowly starting to gain
traction in Kirkuk. NMRD General Secretary Dr. Jamal Nasser
founded the party and currently resides in Amman, Jordan.
The NMRD Chairman Faisal Mahmoud Karbuli and Public Relations
Officer Aseel Abdulwahed al-Yaseri meet with the PRT monthly
to discuss political developments. According to Aseel, the
NMRD has a membership of 15,000 people in Kirkuk and they are
growing. Surprisingly for an Arab party, the NMRD claims
that forty percent of their membership is women. Much of
their outreach through Aseel (female) is meant to galvanize
Arab women in Kirkuk to become a factor in government. Other
NMRD priorities include a focus on reconstruction,
eradication of corruption, illegal Assayish detentions, and
University outreach. The NMRD readily admits that some of its
members previously engaged in insurgent activities shortly
after the USA invasion. However, they say these people have
realized the error of their ways and now want to join the
political process. Dr. Jamal Nasser himself previously spent

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some time in Coalition Forces detention.


5. (C) The NMRD, being a new party, has no members at the
provincial level in Kirkuk. According to Faisal and Aseel
the party performed "as expected" in provincial elections,
and "better than expected" in Anbar province where they will
likely pick up four or five seats on the provincial council.
In particular, they are pleased with their performance in
Diyala and Salahuddin winning where they expect to receive at
least one seat in each of those provinces. Aseel admitted
the NMRD was disappointed they did not get any seats in
Ninewa, but they learned some lessons from their approach
there and hope to apply that knowledge successfully in Kirkuk.


6. (C) The AUB is well aware of the NMRD in Kirkuk, and
negotiations over a possible coalition between the two
parties have continued off and on since October of 2008. The
NMRD's respectable performance in provincial elections could
give these negotiations new life. A common concern voiced by
AUB leaders including Abu Saddam, Mohammed Khalil, and Sheikh
Abdullah Sami al-Assi about the NMRD is the source of their
funding. The NMRD appears to have significant financial
resources in relation to their size. AUB leaders state that
when they query the NMRD on the source of these finances the
NMRD is only able to give vague answers - namely that Dr.
Jamal Nasser is a rich man and owns many businesses. In
response to the same question from the PRT, Faisal and Aseel
stated that Dr. Jamal Nasser owns several import-export
businesses and is able to finance his party through these
businesses. The AUB is rightly concerned over getting
entangled with a party whose membership contains
ex-insurgents and has shady financial backing. If the NMRD is
unable to form a coalition with the AUB it expects to run a
separate list in Kirkuk the same as it did in the surrounding
provinces. In this scenario the NMRD can realistically
expect to win a one or two seats in the provincial council.
This outlook could become rosier if the NMRD manages to woo a
well known Kirkuki Arab to their side or if they manage to
expand their membership by focusing their financial resources
in Kirkuk.

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Iraqi National Dialogue Front
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7. C) Saleh al-Mutlaq's INDF may be the largest Arab
national party in Kirkuk and the one most likely to make an
impact when Kirkuk holds its next provincial elections.
According to INDF Kirkuk-based representatives Ahmed Mawlood
Salih and Hassan Obeidi, INDF has been a behind-the-scenes
player in Kirkuk politics since 2005 when they supported the
IRG. Obeidi claims seventy percent of the Arabs support INDF
in Kirkuk province. This claim may be political rhetoric,
but the January provincial elections bear out that the INDF
does receive broad support from Sunni Arabs in the
surrounding provinces. The priority issues include joint
administration in Kirkuk, removal of the Assayish, removal of
illegal Kurdish trespassers, and the end of assassinations by
Kurdish sponsored groups (likely another reference to the
Assayish). The INDF currently operates offices in Hawija and
Abassi with a new one to open shortly in Kirkuk City.


8. (C) Currently INDF has no seats on Kirkuk's PC. They
claimed that they are in talks with several of Kirkuk's
leading Arabs about membership. Hassan claimed that on 15
February PC member Mohammed Khalil was in Baghdad meeting
QFebruary PC member Mohammed Khalil was in Baghdad meeting
with Saleh al-Mutlaq to discuss this very topic. Hassan also
claimed other possible converts are AUB Chairman Abu Saddam
and PC member Sheik Abdullah Sami al-Assi. Hassan stated
that INDF will not offer Deputy Governor Rakan Saeed because
of his poor performance (NOTE: By most accounts Rakan is a
popular and well respected Arab leader who has done a good
job as Deputy Governor with limited powers offered him by the
mainly Kurdish leadership. END NOTE). Hassan also stated
that Sheik Burhan al-Assi would never be allowed in the INDF
due to his recent provocative activities.


9. (C) According to Hassan and Ahmed, the INDF is interested
in forming a coalition with the AUB. AUB Chairman Abu Saddam
conceded that if INDF did well in provincial elections and
they do have significant support in Kirkuk. He said he would
like to create a grand coalition that would include the NMRD
and the INDF so the Arab vote in Kirkuk could be
consolidated. According to Abu Saddam, the main hold up is
the fact that AUB senior and influential member Ahmed Obeidi
has "personal issues" particularly with the INDF. Abu Saddam
is planning on setting up a meeting in with both the NMRD and
the INDF to iron out these differences so the stage can be
set for this coalition to occur. Few doubt that the INDF
will play a significant role in a future Kirkuk government.

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IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY
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10. (C) Of the three Arab national parties, IIP has the
smallest footprint in Kirkuk and the bleakest outlook for
future elections. In a 15 February meeting with the PRT, IIP
Head Izzadeen Anwar claimed that the IIP has 3,000 members in
Kirkuk province along with "many other followers." IIP does
not have any representatives in Kirkuk's provincial
government. Recognizing IIP's limited size, Izaadeen said
that IIP is more than willing to form a coalition with other
parties that share the same goals. According to Izzadeen,
the IIP has a "good relationship" with the AUB, however they
have not engaged in serious discussions about a coalition.
Izzadeen admitted that the IIP will not likely to win any PC
seats unless they form a coalition. Izzadeen characterized
that IIP performed "fairly well" in Diyala, Anbar, and
Salahuddin during January's provincial elections with the
exception of Ninewa province. He stated that the main
strategy for Kirkuk is to pursue tribal relationships and
support; an area they consider to be neglected by the other
political groups. In addition, Izzadeen stated that the IIP
supports the implementation of Article 140, demonstrating a
sharp break from the majority of the Kirkuk's Arab political
leadership who often refer to Article 140 as "dead." Another
policy initiative is to expanded ties with the U.S.


11. (C) Arab provincial leaders in Kirkuk seem to have an
indifferent attitude towards the IIP. Some of this dates
back to a July 2008 visit to Kirkuk by Iraqi Vice President
and senior IIP member Tariq Hashimi. During this visit
Hashimi held a closed door meeting with Arab members of the
KPC. When several Arab KPC members raised complaints against
the Kurds, Hashimi allegedly dismissed the complaints in a
rude manner while making a comment to the effect that if the
Arabs didn't like it they should have voted in 2005.
Additionally, most Arabs in Kirkuk appear to prefer a secular
government and tend to shun the Islamist parties. Neither
the AUB nor any other political party present in Kirkuk has
mentioned a possible coalition with the IIP to the PRT.
Without such a coalition the IIP will likely remain an
outsider in Kirkuk politics.

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COMMENT
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12. (C) Kirkuk's Arab leaders have long prided themselves as
the only ethnic group in the province that isn't influenced
by outside forces. With provincial elections complete and
Kirkuk still up for grabs this could change. The importance
of Kirkuk is not lost on the national political parties that
cater to Sunni Arabs. The PRT believes it will be difficult
for the AUB to remain viable as the main Arab political force
in Kirkuk unless it joins forces with one or more of these
political parties. The AUB with Ahmed Obeidi as its main
financier will not have the resources to compete with the
national parties who, with elections complete throughout the
rest of the country, can afford to focus their efforts in
Kirkuk. The most likely coalition partner for the AUB
appears to be the INDF because there are no significant
ideological differences between the two. The INDF has a more
anti-American bent, but this will likely be a non-factor as
American forces prepare to depart Iraq. The NMRD is a less
convenient fit. The NMRD is a new party and still carries
many unknowns. Their financial resources are tempting, but
right now there are too many unanswered questions for the AUB
Qright now there are too many unanswered questions for the AUB
to take the plunge. The NMRD, although interested in a
coalition, appear to be content to go it alone if the deal
isn't right. They believe they will gain representation in
Kirkuk with or without a coalition. The secular views of
Kirkuk's Arabs along with the perceived ineptitude of the IIP
in the central government since 2005 give the party minimal
chances for success in Kirkuk.
BUTENIS