CDA, CG AND PM DISCUSS CONTRACTS, RECONCILIATION,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000442

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR PTER IZ
SUBJECT: CDA, CG AND PM DISCUSS CONTRACTS, RECONCILIATION,
THE MEK AND ARAB-KURD TENSIONS

Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister Counselor Michael H. Corbin for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: In their regular weekly meeting with Iraqi
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on February 19, Charge d'
Affairs Butenis and Commanding General MNF-I Odierno pressed
al-Maliki to get GOI action on critical, long-delayed civil
aviation contracts, emphasized that Iraq should be aware of
the international political cost of mishandling the
Mujaheddin e-Khalq at Camp Ashraf, and sought the PM's views
on tensions between the GoI and KRG. The PM raised his
desire to see a Sons of Iraq (SoI) leader detained, and
mentioned some former insurgents he believed were ready to
reconcile with the Iraqi Government. The PM reiterated his
complete commitment to GOI assurances on the treatment of the
MeK and said inflammatory statements against the MeK were not
the position of the GOI. On Kurd-Arab tensions, he said he
was not going to react to extreme statements by KRG officials
and that although he had serious constitutional issues with
the behavior of the KRG, he was not going to act impulsively
or suddenly against the KRG. End Summary.

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Civil Aviation Contracts Lapse
--------------


2. (S/NF) CG Odierno told the PM that the U.S. had worked
hard with the Minister of Transportation to get him to
execute a number of civil aviation contracts that had lapsed,
providing for critical maintenance and training for civilian
airspace management. The Minister had been unwilling to sign
the contracts for months despite the fact it was not a
question of money, as there were sufficient funds available,
the CG said. The CG remarked that the Minister of
Transportation had said he needed authority from the PM to
sign the contracts. The PM replied that he was unsure why
the Minister had not executed the contracts, as the Minister
did not need the PM's approval to act. He said he understood
the importance of this issue and would direct the Minister to
execute the contracts immediately.

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Arrest of SoI Leader
--------------


3. (S/NF) PM Maliki raised the issue of Adel Mashadani, a
former SoI leader, who he said was deeply involved in the
insurgency and was acting with impunity between Taji and
Baghdad. The PM said he wanted the Iraqi Security Forces to
arrest him as soon as possible. The CG advised that he had
received the PM's information on Mashadani's behavior and
would devise a plan for Coalition Forces to call him in and
to arrest him. This would take a couple of days to arrange.
The PM agreed fully with this course of action, stating it
would be "much better" than ISF arresting him, given the risk
of trying to apprehend Mashadani on his own ground.

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Reconciliation Efforts
--------------


4. (S/NF) PM Maliki noted that he had been in contact with
Abu Azam (Tamimi),a former insurgent, and that he had agreed
to reconcile with him. "I am ready to take him back and
forgive the past," the PM said. The PM asked the CG to
contact the local military commander to assist in aiding Abu
Azaam's transition back into favor with GoI. In illustrating
his sincerity to reconcile with former Iraqi insurgents, the
PM said he was willing to reconcile with any group in Iraq if
they were willing, just as he was ready to act against any
group that continued violence. This was proven by his
willingness to take on the Sadrists after they refused to
renounce violence, Maliki emphasized. Additionally, the PM
Qrenounce violence, Maliki emphasized. Additionally, the PM
noted that he had been in discussions with Sheik Jabouri, a
former AQI spokesman. The PM stated that he had accepted
Jabouri back and asked that U.S. forces not arrest or detain
him.

-------------- --
Completion of Security Handover at Camp Ashraf
-------------- --


5. (S/NF) The CG told the PM that the U.S. will complete the
transfer of Camp Ashraf and the MeK to Iraqi security forces
on February 20. The CG told Maliki that he was concerned
that Iraq not take actions that would lead the MeK to react
in a way that would spur international criticism and
criticism of the GOI and the USG. He said that he feared
that the residents of Camp Ashraf would try to instigate
incidents with Iraqi Army units guarding the camp, especially
if the GoI attempted to serve warrants or otherwise move MeK

BAGHDAD 00000442 002 OF 002


residents.


6. (S/NF) The PM assured the CG that there would not be any
instigation by the GoI and that he would take things slowly.
The MEK have killed more Shia'a Arabs and Kurds in Iraq than
people realize; nevertheless, the GoI will abide by its
written humanitarian assurances to the U.S. and its public
statements that it will not forcibly return any of the Ashraf
residents to Iran, Maliki stated. The CG encouraged the PM to
take a measured approach to this issue to avoid potential
problems. The PM reiterated his commitment and said the USG
should not pay attention to some statements from members of
the GOI, the policy was set by the PM.

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Tensions between GoI and KRG
--------------


7. (S/NF) The Charge asked the PM about tensions between the
GoI and KRG and specifically asked him about how his meeting
with President Talabani had gone the day before. The PM
immediately noted that the media was reporting that he would
send 200 new police to Kirkuk. Nothing could be farther from
the truth, the PM emphasized. He had made no such order and
this was evidence of the misinformation on the Kurd-Arab
issue. The PM remarked that President Talabani understood
the situation very well. He said that President Talabani was
not comfortable with actions the KRG was taking that were
contrary to the Constitution and Iraqi law. Specifically he
complained about the KRG opening "Embassies" abroad and
moving with a Norwegian company to develop oil fields that
could produce up to 200,000 barrels a day. The KRG sought to
sell this oil and gain all the proceeds in addition to the 17
percent of the national budget it already received. Maliki
said that since the KRG does not give money to the central
government this was unfair to the rest of Iraq. "How can
they sell our oil and not give the money back to the
government," Maliki asked rhetorically.


8. (S/NF) Maliki said that the Kurds do not recognize the
Iraqi Army. They still view them as the old Saddam-era IA,
Maliki said. They must recognize that the IA has been formed
in accordance with a constitutional process. They don't
allow the IA into some areas outside of the KRG. We can't
let them be against our army that was created according to
our constitution and has complete right to enter any part of
Iraqi territory, he said. Despite these issues, Maliki said
he was prepared to meet again with President Talabani upon
the President's return from an official visit to S. Korea, in
an effort to address these issues.


9. (S/NF) The Charge thanked the PM for his patience in the
matter, noting that his concerns were well understood. The
Charge encouraged the PM to avoid actions that could
jeopardize the progress that had been achieved in Iraq
including the international appreciation for the successful
conduct of the recent provincial elections. The PM told the
Charge that the Kurds were extremely critical of him in the
media, calling him names and comparing him to Saddam Hussein.
Despite these outrageous statements from Kurdish leaders he
said that he would continue to be patient and would not act
impulsively. He noted that his only response to Kurdish
attacks had been two articles in his defense in the Dawa
party newspaper. Even these articles in his political party
newspaper had been met with a storm of protest from the
Kurds, and so he had committed not to publish any further
articles defending himself. "I will not engage them in the
media," he said.
Qmedia," he said.


10. (S/NF) The CG noted that he was traveling to the KRG and
would meet with President Barzani to discuss the situation
and encourage all parties not to escalate tensions. The CG
asked if the PM would still send a planned Dawa party
delegation to the KRG for talks. The PM said that after
Nijervan Barzani's strong statements in the U.S. against the
Iraqi government, he had decided to let things settle down
for a time. The delegation could travel in the future, he
said.


11. (S/NF) The PM concluded that he wanted the same rights
for all Arabs and Kurds. He said that he would not allow
anyone to suppress the individual rights of Iraqi citizens,
this included Christians and the few remaining Jews in Iraq.
Iraq was rich in resources and there is enough for everyone,
he said.
BUTENIS