MEK/CAMP ASHRAF UPDATE: MINISTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000420

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS: PTER PHUM PINR PREF PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: MEK/CAMP ASHRAF UPDATE: MINISTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS
SEEKS TO BALANCE NSA PUSH FOR ACTION; MEK AIR GRIEVANCES

Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Michael H.
Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: As the Iraqi National Security Staff and
some of the internal security forces agitate for rapid
movement against the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) at Camp Ashraf,
Minister of Human Rights Widjan Salim has moved to a more
prominent position on the GOI Ashraf Committee. She visited
Camp Ashraf and met with residents February 1 and co-chaired
a bilateral USG/GOI meeting regarding Camp Ashraf with
National Security Advisor (NSA) Mowaffaq al-Rubaie February
5, during which the GOI considered (but did not set in
motion) actions such as separating the leadership by force or
moving the camp residents to other locations in Iraq. USG
officials told the GOI and the MEK leaders that U.S. forces
will complete the transfer of security authority of the camp
on February 20 and move to a monitoring role. Two of the
most prominent MEK grievances are the GOI's restrictions on
family visits and logistics for the camp. SEPTEL lays out
the Embassy and MNF-I's strategy for dealing with the Camp
Ashraf issue as the GOI considers its options. End Summary.

-------------- --
Minister of Human Rights Returns to Camp Ashraf
-------------- --


2. (C) Minister of Human Rights Wijdan Salim led the GOI
Ashraf Committee to Camp Ashraf February 1 to meet with Camp
Ashraf residents (CAR) to attempt to reach out to residents
and reassure them of the GOI's position and offer
opportunities for those who wished to leave. Salim was
insistent on addressing "all" the residents at Ashraf, but
the MEK leadership instead arranged a meeting at one of the
female units with about 150 female residents in attendance.
The group was emotional and Salim's message was drowned out
by well-orchestrated but seemingly sincere outbursts - which
included denunciations, insults, and demands. After leaving
the hall in protest, Salim allowed herself to be convinced to
return by some of the residents (who promised to let her
speak) despite the apparent reluctance of her GOI colleagues.
On her second attempt to address the residents, Salim was
able to get her message across, although she was periodically
interrupted by shouts and denunciations.

--------------
Rubaie Calls Joint Ashraf Committee Meeting
--------------


3. (S/NF) NSA Rubaie called a joint USG/GOI Ashraf Committee
meeting February 5 in Baghdad. The primary purpose of the
meeting was to review options for dealing with the Camp
Ashraf situation. Representatives from the Ministries of
Defense, Foreign Affairs, Displacement and Migration, Human
Rights, and Interior; as well from the Prime Minister's
National Operation Center and the National Security Council
(NSC); attended the meeting co-chaired by Rubaie and Salim.
Pol-Mil MinCouns and Commanding General (CG) Task Force 134
(TF-134) led a U.S. delegation. Rubaie reviewed the
situation at Camp Ashraf and reviewed options for dealing
with the Camp. He allowed the National Security Staff to
present a number of requests for the USG and the CAR, notably
requests for:

-- the USG to pass to the GOI all database information,
including biometric data, and any other intelligence the U.S.
side had on the MEK and its members. The U.S. side noted
Qside had on the MEK and its members. The U.S. side noted
that we had already provided a list of names and some general
data on the residents of Ashraf to the Ministry of Human
Rights (MoHR),this was all the USG had but would determine
if additional information could be found and shared.

-- the USG to provide identities of the 50-100 top leaders of
the organization present at the camp. Rubaie noted that the
GOI wanted to attempt to "separate" the top leaders from the
rest of the population. The U.S. side noted that it only had
information on representatives who had regularly met U.S.
officials and could not categorically identify the "leaders"
in the camp. When advised that attempting to remove the
leaders from the camp would lead to a catastrophic reaction
by the other camp members, Rubaie stated that perhaps a means
could be found to physically isolate them from the rest of
the camp residents.

-- the USG to provide information gained from the 2004-2005
USG interagency (FBI, DOS, CIA, DHS) investigation. (Note:
The MEK often refer to this investigation as "proof" that
they are not terrorists and that they should be de-listed
from the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization listing. End

BAGHDAD 00000420 002 OF 003


note.)

-- the CAR to agree to the GOI conducting a "good-will"
survey under the supervision of the MoHR. The survey,
intended to determine identity and desire to repatriate
voluntarily to Iran or another third-country and/or
facilitate defections from the group. The survey was to
start on February 7 and finish by March 7. Rubaie ordered
the Ministries of Interior and Defense representatives to
provide 10 trailers for the survey and temporary shelter for
those that wish to defect. The first to be surveyed are "the
1015 residents with ties to third countries." (Note: As of
February 18, trailers had not been delivered and the survey
had not begun. End Note.)

-- the GOI to conduct a census of the camp. Rubaie said that
the GOI plans to conduct a census under the supervision of
the Ministries of Interior and Planning. Rubaie wanted the
census to be conducted simultaneously with the survey, but
Minister Salim said the survey would be conducted separately
as she did not understand the purpose of the census and did
not believe it conformed with humanitarian approaches to the
camp. US reps advised Rubaie that such a census would have
to be conducted sensitively in order to gain the cooperation
of the residents (who had agreed only to the MOHR survey).
International Organization monitoring might be a way to
ensure a humanitarian approach. Rubaie suggested asking the
ICRC to observe the process and said he would be in touch
with ICRC to see if they would help.

-- the USG to provide communications equipment for the IA BN.
Zainal Abbu, a representative from the NSC, noted that the
IA BN at Camp Ashraf does not have sufficient communications
equipment to communicate with Baghdad. The U.S. side said it
would look into the request.

-- the GOI to conduct a search of the camp. Rubaie said that
"intelligence" has indicated that the MEK might have buried
weapons in the camp. He indicated his intention to search
the camp, but acknowledged this would be a difficult task and
deferred consideration of how to go about it.

-- the GOI to regulate family visits. Rubaie noted that in
the past, the MEK leadership had been selective in regard to
who is allowed to visit the camp residents. Minister Salim
remarked that the current system put in place by the GOI,
whereby all visitors must first report to the MoHR to check
names, relationship, and legal status, was too cumbersome and
needed to be simplified. Rubaie then said the IA BN at the
camp could conduct the same checks. Rubaie said family
visits would be restricted to first-relation relatives
(parents, siblings, and children). Trailers would be set up
near Grizzly Checkpoint (GCP) for the visits. Residents not
wishing to receive visits from family members would have to
sign statements to that effect and personally deliver them to
their family members at the GCP. (Note: Following
discussions with EmbOffs, the Minister Salim decided to
deploy two MoHR representatives to Camp Ashraf to monitor and
manage family visits. They had not arrived as of February

17. End Note)

-- a date for when the transfer to the IA would be completed.
After an Iraqi police representative from Diyala at the
meeting complained that he wasn't allowed to enter the camp
when he wanted by TF-134 Military Police (MP) forces, Rubaie
asked for the date when the transfer to full IA control would
Qasked for the date when the transfer to full IA control would
be complete. When told that date would be February 20,
Rubaie said he would alert the Prime Minister. From that
date, Rubaie told the group, "We are in control; we'll do
whatever we want."

-- the GOI to develop proposals to disperse residents to
other locations. Rubaie noted the camp was located near the
Iranian border and questioned the ability of the IA forces to
protect the camp after the U.S. forces withdraw. As such, he
suggested the committee study the feasibility of transferring
the residents to two or three other locations in the western
part of the country and away from "Iranian rockets and
mortars." He noted that the GOI does not have extra forces
to protect the camp and that "99 percent of the residents are
innocent."

--------------
Bilateral USG/MEK Meeting February 12
--------------


4. (S/NF) Embassy and MNF-I representatives visited Camp
Ashraf February 12 to review MEK positions on the GOI

BAGHDAD 00000420 003 OF 003


approach. GOI representatives chose not to accompany the
U.S. side for the visit, noting that the committee had just
met in Baghdad. U.S. representatives pressed the MEK to
learn to work with the GOI and noted the stressed that
instead of calling the Embassy or MNF-I every time there is a
problem, they must learn to reach out formally to the GOI.
The U.S. side encouraged the MEK to write letters to
committee members as well as to Prime Minister (PM) al-Maliki
to explain each problem they are encountering as well as
offering possible solutions, copying the U.S. Embassy. He
stressed it will take time to build trust in their
relationship with the GOI, as it did with the U.S. in 2003.
(Note: Camp Ashraf leadership drafted a letter addressed to
the PM airing their grievances February 15 and "family
members" of residents drafted a letter to Minister Salim
February 17. End Note.)


5. (S/NF) CG TF-134 informed MEK leadership that on February
20, U.S. Army MP forces at FOB Grizzly would transition into
a monitoring role and turn control of the GCP over to the IA,
with regular checks being made by the U.S. forces. At this
announcement, only one of thirteen MEK leaders sitting at the
table even flinched, and they admitted to having known about
this change in advance. After hearing the details of the
change, they moved on to other business.


6. (S/NF) MEK leadership presented two primary concerns at
the meeting. The first was family visitation problems: the
IA would not permit family members inside the camp. Visitors
had to remain in a trailer at the entrance to the camp, which
was complicated because of gender issues. The second issue
was logistics: the IA and Iraqi Police (IP) are making it
increasingly difficult for suppliers of the camp,
specifically eight food vendors, to enter through road
blocks. In the past, drivers would spend the night at the
camp after a long drive, but the IA is no longer permitting
this.


7. (S/NF) Progress was made on one issue - that of the survey
of Ashraf residents by the MoHR. Madame Parsaie, Vice
President and spokesperson of the MEK, quickly agreed to
provide trailers so the process could begin. Minister Salim
agreed February 14 to use trailers provided by the MEK, as
long as they are swept for monitoring devices and are placed
where she desires.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (S/NF) Some of the GOI Ashraf Committee members are
pushing hard for more movement on Camp Ashraf. Minister
Salim (despite an unfortunate reception at the hands of the
residents) continues to press the Ashraf Committee to take a
humanitarian responsible position on the camp. SEPTEL
provides joint Embassy/MNF-I thinking on the way ahead as GOI
increasingly enforces its control over Camp Ashraf and the
CAR look for ways to dramatize their situation.
BUTENIS