Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD413
2009-02-17 11:30:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

NEGOTIATING WITH IRANIANS: THE MEK IN IRAQ AS A

Tags:  PREL PTER PINR IR IZ 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000413 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATING WITH IRANIANS: THE MEK IN IRAQ AS A
CASE STUDY

REF:

A. 09BAGHDAD113

B. 09BAGHDAD3

C. 08BAGHDAD4006

D. 08BAGHDAD3796

E. 08BAGHDAD3556

F. 08BAGHDAD3445

G. 08BAGHDAD2773

H. 08BAGHDAD2304

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Military Affairs Michae
l Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000413

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATING WITH IRANIANS: THE MEK IN IRAQ AS A
CASE STUDY

REF:

A. 09BAGHDAD113

B. 09BAGHDAD3

C. 08BAGHDAD4006

D. 08BAGHDAD3796

E. 08BAGHDAD3556

F. 08BAGHDAD3445

G. 08BAGHDAD2773

H. 08BAGHDAD2304

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Military Affairs Michae
l Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (S) Summary: In a case study of significant face-to-face
dealing with Iranians, the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MeK) at Camp
Ashraf in Iraq have been exasperating negotiators during six
months of talks with Embassy and Multi-National Force ) Iraq
(MNF-I) interlocutors on their future in Iraq. We believe
the group,s negotiating style and tactics may provide some
useful pointers for dealing with Iranians: the senior
members of the group at Camp Ashraf are Iranian to the core,
part of a generation that opposed the Shah and helped lead
the country in the early days of the Islamic revolution.
While they broke violently with the theocrats and hard-line
clerics, we believe their lingering Marxist leanings and
cult-like attributes have not diluted their "Iranian"
approach to negotiations and their tactics may still be
present in Iranian ruling circles. We have seen that
approach manifested through hidden power relationships,
detailed preparation for each session, hollow legal
argumentation, tedious repetition of points of contention,
and use of multiple tools to influence negotiations such as
political lobbying, the media, street protests and recourse
to international law to sway the discussions, all in an
extravagantly hospitable, exaggeratedly friendly,
culturally-attuned manner. End summary.

--------------
Background:
--------------


2. (S) For the last six months, Embassy PolMil MinCouns and
the Commanding General in charge of MNF-I's Task Force 134
have met on a regular basis with the Iranian Mujahedin
e-Khalq (MeK) leadership at Camp Ashraf to discuss the
transfer of security responsibility for the Camp from the USG
to the GoI, linked to the January 1 entry into force of the
U.S.-Iraq security agreement (reftels). The leadership of

the group (numbering 3400) seeks to continue to function at
Camp Ashraf for the indefinite future. Both the Iranian and
Iraqi Governments are resolutely determined to remove the
group from Iraq. The USG interest is to assure humanitarian
treatment of the residents of Camp Ashraf, while
acknowledging Iraq,s right to manage this issue, and Embassy
has obtained written GOI assurances to this effect. During
the last five months, we have met the Camp Ashraf leadership
on an almost weekly basis, more recently along with GOI
representatives.


3. (S) While the MeK began its existence as a Marxist
student group opposed to the Shah, and has progressively
become more cult-like in its segregation of men and women and
devotion to shadowy MeK leaders Massoud and Mariam Rajavi, we
believe the leaders at Camp Ashraf (unlike the younger
recruits who make up the majority of the camp population)
share much in common with the generation of negotiators the
Iranians might put forward in dealings with the U.S. in terms
of their negotiating style and tactics, although
philosophically they fundamentally oppose the thinking of the
Qphilosophically they fundamentally oppose the thinking of the
theocrats and hard-line clerics that guide the Iranian
government. The group also shares some of the Iranian
Government's well-developed tools: extensive networks of
informants and a history of using intimidation and terrorism
for its ends; coupled with an extremely sophisticated
international media and lobbying apparatus.

--------------
Hidden lines of authority:
--------------


4. (S) A major observation we draw from our dealings with
the leaders is what seems a favorite Persian tactic of
obscuring lines of authority. While a nominal MeK "vice
president" leads the team for discussions, and is apparently
deferred to by the leadership group, her relationship with
the MeK leaders in Europe is kept vague, and we have seen
signs that others in the Camp may have much more influence
than they ever reveal. The Vice President has never
acknowledged that she was appointed by or receives any
direction from MeK leadership abroad, but works off notes
that may have been sent to her as very precise instructions
for each negotiating session. The group's talking points --
at the table, in side conversations on the margins, or
follow-up phone calls and e-mail -- are always identical.
But there is no clear chain of authority, and we are unable
to directly address or even fully understand the concerns and
interests of those who are formulating the positions
presented to us. The tactic seems to be to blur lines of
authority to provide the most favorable position for the
Iranian side.

--------------
Intensive preparations and research:
--------------


5. (S) We also note the group,s detailed preparation for
each discussion with minute attention to detail, including
studying biographies of interlocutors and relying on
networks of informants to gain information on the internal
deliberations of those across the table. The MeK attempts to
identify and exploit disagreements within the USG. For a
group isolated in a camp in the Iraqi desert of Diyala with
tightly controlled comings and goings, the group,s use of
the Internet and an international network of supporters to
constantly check the latest news, including searches of USG
websites for tidbits of information, is impressive. The
group always seeks to table last-minute information, clearly
seeking to catch interlocutors off-guard. They also use a
cadre of Iranian lawyers purportedly trained in international
law and well-paid foreign lawyers to scrub international law
for favorable (though usually inapposite or highly strained)
interpretations of every aspect of discussion. The group
demonstrates a marked reliance on legal arguments, although
they appear unwilling to actually engage in legal debate.
Rather, they rely on legal opinions purportedly issued by
independent international lawyers and politicians; these
opinions often appear to have been drafted by the group
itself. When faced with a counterargument, the group simply
repeats its talking points. This combination of intense
preparation, coupled with an unwillingness to deviate from
script when faced with rebuttal arguments, is a hallmark of
the group. On the one occasion when they were caught
off-guard ) when a senior GOI representative came to Camp
Ashraf unannounced ) the nominal leader seemed so deeply
uncomfortable that she had no scripted response, she was
almost lost for words. Our attempts to prepare information
on our interlocutors have been frustrated by their intensive
attention to opsec preventing information gathering, and
Qattention to opsec preventing information gathering, and
careful control within the leadership over who is empowered
to speak to outsiders.

--------------
"Red lines" that are not:
--------------


6. (S) In terms of negotiating format, the group goes to
elaborate lengths to place talks in a formal setting. There
is no recourse to one-on-one or small group meetings before
the formal sessions or sidebars to discuss thorny issues.
All substantive discussions are carried on at the table.
Members of the team are proficient in apparently casual
discussions away from the table but these are invariably used
to reinforce talking points or pump interlocutors for
information. Discipline in the group across the table is
clear, and no matter how upsetting the news, they typically
present a controlled, unified front. The group uses
negotiating tactics such as establishing "red lines" but
interestingly, what they claim is a matter of the highest
principle can be conceded when expedient without a backward
glance. The group also sometimes abandons arguments when it
is pointed out that they are untenable. We have also
observed a tactic by which the group makes unexpected but
carefully thought-out concessions in a manner that makes it
difficult for the other party to take advantage of, such as
the unexpected delivery of information the Iraqis had been
seeking at a time when the U.S. and GOI least expected it.
Finally, like other regional negotiators, we sense that even
when things are going the group,s way, great efforts are
made to make the other party think that the group is being
sorely disadvantaged.

--------------
"Taqiyya" and just talking:
--------------


7. (S) Whether in keeping with the Shi'a doctrine of taqiyya
-- concealment of the truth in extreme circumstances -- or
simply as a negotiating tactic, our Iranian interlocutors
have not hesitated to dissimulate. One town-hall meeting
with Ashraf residents and GoI representatives degenerated
into group chants and shouts that drowned out the Iraqi
Government speakers. Although the protest was clearly
pre-planned and scripted, the Ashraf leadership assured us it
was a spontaneous outpouring of popular outrage that they
only barely managed to contain. When speaking to the Iraqis,
for example, they inevitably describe them as brothers, but
when the Iraqis are out of the room, they immediately accuse
the same individuals as being the malevolent agents of the
Iranian regime. When it suits their tactical purposes, they
feign a lack of ability to understand English. The Vice
President, for instance, holds an advanced degree from a
California university and clearly understands our
presentations, but uses only minimal English on the margins
of the meetings to exchange pleasantries. As an example of
the lengths to which the group will go, we have seen it
routinely exaggerate or invent support from international
organizations ) including ICRC and UNHCR ) for their claims
to international legal protections as "refugees," "protected
persons," and even residents of a "diplomatic enclave" within
Iraq. The group seems willing to make claims that are
patently false, without concern that doing so will harm their
credibility or imperil future negotiations.


8. (S) Talking for the sake of talking is a favorite tactic
of the group, as long as such talks delay hard decisions or
distract from unpalatable choices. The group is willing to
talk about almost any subject at great length (we have never
had a session in which the Iranian side has felt they had
"enough time" to finish presenting their case) as long as
that discussion does not lead them to have to implement a
change in behavior.

--------------
Bringing everything to bear:
--------------


9. (S) Our Iranian interlocutors bring every possible point
of pressure to bear to influence talks. Our discussions at
Camp Ashraf have only been a part of a full-court MeK press
involving multiple pressure points and political theater:
Qinvolving multiple pressure points and political theater:
demonstrations by supporters in Western capitals, cadres of
lawyers working on legal positions and challenges,
sophisticated media campaigns and political lobbying. The
group,s focus on the media allows them to distract from
difficult decisions by focusing on media statements
(carefully choosing the most unreliable reports which their
understanding of the media makes clear they realize are
suspect). Within Iraq, the group has gone to great lengths
to manipulate seams among Iraqis, such as quiet but active
soliciting of support of Sunni tribal leaders and anti-Iran
politicians (who send letters to the Embassy in support of
their Iranian brothers at Camp Ashraf). They reach out to
European parliamentarians and U.S. Congressmen to make their
case. And even in the course of a meeting, they seek to
create fissures in the team across the table. While their
tactics are always subtle, in one recent incident an Ashraf
lawyer let his guard down when he brushed aside the
intervention of the senior Embassy representative and looked
to the MNF-I representative with the remark, "We want to talk
to the General."

--------------
Killing with Kindness:
--------------


10. (S) In keeping with the finest Persian traditions, our
Iranian counterparts are invariably hospitable and disarming
to their USG interlocutors, presenting honor guards and
serving food ) generally cakes and tea ) with precision and
flourish. And they have clearly gone to great lengths to
understand the cultural background of those across the table.
On our last meeting before Christmas, after an hour of
airing grievances and dire warnings, they ended the session
with an unexpected presentation of Christmas gifts and cards
to the Embassy and MNF-I principals. On New Year's Eve, they
offered enthusiastic New Year's greetings, while cheerfully
pointing out that January 1 corresponds to neither the
Islamic nor the Persian New Year. The strategy of disarming
hospitality has extended to the local Iraqi Army commander
who they provided with a prefab trailer as an office, Iraqi
guards to whom they have provided space heaters, and their
Iraqi neighbors in Diyala, who they provide jobs, utility
service, and emergency health care.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (S) The MeK leadership at Camp Ashraf is an isolated
ideological Iranian group in a dire situation with limited
options. The Iranian government has deployed more
sophisticated tactics in multilateral settings, but some of
the roots of the Camp Ashraf group reflect currents still
present in the ruling circles of today,s Iran. We believe
our extensive contact with Camp Ashraf offers a window into
an undiluted strain of Iranian negotiating style and
tactics*some elements of which could well be found across
the table in any bilateral dealings with the Iranians.

BUTENIS
BUTENIS