SOUTHERN POST-ELECTION ALLIANCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000387

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN POST-ELECTION ALLIANCES

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 306

B. B) BAGHDAD 251

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John Fox for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Prime Minister Maliki's Da'wa-led State of Law
coalition list, which won a plurality of votes in nine of ten
Shi'a-majority provinces, holds a commanding position as it
negotiates with rival parties to develop coalitions and
assign top provincial government positions. Da'wa and the
Sadrist Tayar al-Ahrar slate appears to be the strongest
local alliance; Da'wa's relationships with the slates of
ex-Prime Ministers Ibrahim Jaafari and Ayad Allawi are more
ambiguous and subject to local variation. Initial readouts
indicate Maliki's slate will not partner with ISCI/Badr on
any provincial council, but may support moderate ISCI
officials for secondary leadership positions in some
provinces. Da'wa may concede key positions, including
governorships, in a few provinces where it ran strongly.
With varied levels of support by province, and with its eyes
on leading a broader Shi'a/nationalist coalition for upcoming
parliamentary elections, Da'wa appears to be showing
flexibility in the early stages of post-elections
negotiations. End summary.

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Results
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2. (C) While Da'wa/State of Law won a plurality in every
Shi'a-majority province except Karbala (the only one in which
it held the governor's position),its winning vote-count
varies from nearly 40 percent in Baghdad and Basra to barely
over ten percent in Babil and Muthanna (ref A). The
mathematical idiosyncracies of provincial seat allocation
will tend to inflate the advantages of the winners, since
many votes -- in provinces such as Maysan and Babil, over
40 percent of the total -- were spread among parties that did
not win enough votes to gain representation. Final vote
counts and seat allocations will not be decided until late
February, but it appears, based on the initial results on
February 5, that State of Law has won an outright majority on
the Basra Provincial Council (PC) and roughly half the seats
in Baghdad, Diwaniyah, Dhi Qar, and Wasit. Seat allocation
will be much more dispersed in Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf,
Karbala, and Babil -- though Da'wa still holds a clear
advantage in the last.


3. (C) ISCI, formerly the dominant party in the south,
finished second in six provinces through its Shahid al-Mihrab
list, but will only be on a near-equal footing with Da'wa in
Najaf, Muthanna, and Maysan. The Sadrist Tayar al-Ahrar
finished second in three provinces (Baghdad, Maysan, Dhi Qar)
and won at least two seats in each of the Shi'a-majority
provinces. Jaafari's Islah party appears to have won
representation -- two to four seats -- in seven provinces.
Allawi's list, which performed well in the Sunni-majority
provinces, only won representation in five Shi'a-majority
provinces (Baghdad, Basra, Babil, Diwaniyah, Wasit) and never
placed in the top three in any province. Fadhilah will be
barely represented at the provincial level, having eked out
just two seats in each of Basra, Dhi Qar and Diwaniyah.
Independent coalition lists will play a strong role,
especially in Karbala, where one-man list Yusef al-Haboubi
defeated a province-specific list spearheaded by ex-Da'wa
dissidents. Independent lists in Najaf, Babil, Basra, and
Muthanna also figure to play strong roles in the next
government.

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Alliances: The Da'wa-Sadrist relationship
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4. (C) Post-election coalitions have not been announced, and
future alliances will likely be developed
Qfuture alliances will likely be developed
province-by-province. Consensus among contacts holds,
however, that a Da'wa-Sadrist alliance across the provinces
is likely given the lengthy discussions between the two
sides, which have included talks of amnesty for Sadrist
detainees (ref B). Da'wa's clear but not always overwhelming
victory, combined with the Sadrists' respectable and
consistent performance, increases the incentive for the two
sides to work together. Ministry of Interior official Adnan
al-Zurfi, leader of the Loyalty to Najaf slate and a close
confidante of the Prime Minister, told Senior Advisor Gordon
Gray on February 10 that he expected a three-way Najaf
alliance of State of Law, the Sadrists and his party, which
would account for about 17 of the 28 PC seats in that

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province. While Adnan is uneasy about working with the
Sadrists given his past conflicts with Jaysh al-Mahdi, he
stated, "We are under pressure from the Prime Minister to
forget the past and move on." Da'wa CoR member Sami
al-Askari told poloff on February 7 that his party would seek
alliance with the Sadrists in "every province where it makes
sense." Da'wa provincial representatives in Basra and Babil
recently told the PRTs that they expect to work with the
Sadrists on the new PC.


5. (C) The Sadrists, for their part, are happy with the
surprisingly strong performance by their Tayar al-Ahrar list,
and ready to align with the Prime Minister. In a February 4
meeting with poloff, Sadrist CoR member Baha al-Araji
emphasized that 'Ahrar' had no money, made no organized
effort to campaign, and did not seriously use the image of
Muqtada al-Sadr -- yet still finished about even with ISCI.
He said that a "judicial committee" comprised of Sadrists and
the PM's representatives has been reviewing provincial
detentions and arrest warrants, and will dismiss warrants no
longer valid or based on unsubstantiated information. Araji
stated that he had met with the PM three times in the
previous two days, and that PM Maliki had spoken with Muqtada
about Da'wa-Sadrist reconciliation. Araji saw cooperation
with Da'wa as a first step in forming a reconstituted Shi'a
alliance in advance of the CoR elections later this year.

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Allawi, Jaafari, Fadhilah
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6. (C) PRT contacts and media reports from Basra, Najaf and
Dhi Qar indicate that Fadhilah and the lists headed by
Ayad Allawi and Ibrahim Jaafari have formed their own local
alliance. While members of this bloc (a variation of the
July 22 bloc) have been mentioned as possible provincial
partners for the PM's list (septel),personal relationships
with Maliki, combined with the weak and inconsistent
performance of these parties across the south, will make
alliance-forming problematic. Allawi has been especially
critical of Maliki since the elections and has made overtures
to ISCI, even though an ISCI-Allawi alliance would be
powerless everywhere without additional partners. Askari
told poloff that Jaafari will be approached for an alliance
in provinces where it will make a difference -- presumably
including Maysan, Muthanna, and Najaf -- but that it is
difficult to predict what Jaafari will do.


7. (C) Fadhilah would be more amenable to an alliance,
though it has little to offer at this point. Fadilah CoR
Bloc Leader Hassan al-Shamari told poloff on February 11 that
the party was in discussion with Sadrists aimed at creating a
45-seat bloc (30 Sadrist, 15 Fadhilah) in parliament, while
conducting separate discussions with the PM toward rejoining
the UIA. PM advisor Askari predicted to poloff in a separate
conversation that Fadhilah would rejoin the UIA in advance of
the next round of parliamentary elections. Fadhilah support
for rejoining the UIA also appears at the local level.
Fadhilah members, including Basra Governor Wa'eli, two Sadr
City district council members, and PC members in Dhi Qar all
told us shortly before the election that they strongly
support Maliki. Perhaps not coincidentally, all of them are
now looking for jobs in Baghdad.

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ISCI-Da'wa
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8. (C) Many Da'wa and Da'wa-leaning contacts have told us
that their lists will not align with ISCI in any province.
The electoral math helps in this cause; in provinces where
ISCI came close to Da'wa, such as Najaf and Maysan, the
Sadrists also fared well, limiting ISCI's coalition-making
QSadrists also fared well, limiting ISCI's coalition-making
possibilities. In Zurfi's perhaps overstated words, "ISCI
has no chance to make a coalition with anyone." In a
February 9 meeting with poloff, Babil-based CoR member Haider
al-Suweidi, who backed an independent slate in the elections
but considers himself a Maliki supporter, said that Da'wa
will block ISCI from gaining any governorships and will act
quickly to remove ISCI/Badr-affiliated officials from the
Iraqi and local police. He surmised that ISCI members
without strong Badr ties would be accepted by Da'wa as PC
Chairman or Deputy PC Chairman in many provinces, with the
Sadrists gaining a few PC Chairman slots from their deals
with Da'wa. Askari also emphasized that the Prime Minister
would target police reform in ISCI-run provinces, mentioning
Diwaniyah specifically. All these contacts (and many others)
emphasize, however, that Maliki will likely bring ISCI back
into a reformulated Shi'a alliance before the CoR elections
-- in part because of the security ramifications of not
reining in the Badr Organization.

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Negotiations
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9. (C) Limited information is available about what various
parties want from Maliki in return for their support. In
Dhi Qar, a Sadrist candidate told the PRT shortly after the
elections that his party is angling for the PC Chairmanship
and that it wants to control the portfolios of municipalities
and health. They would like to hold these positions to
demonstrate that Sadrists can effectively deliver services to
the people. The candidate believed that they should not have
difficulty striking a deal, since his party finished second
to Da'wa, which wants the governor's seat. Sheikh Amir
al-Fayez, leader of the Justice and Unity party, which
finished third in Basra, told Senior Advisor Gray on February
10 that his recent discussions with the Prime Minister's
representatives and other parties have focused on the
governorship and general principles. Discussions about
specific ministerial and security force positions would come
later.

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Letting Go Governorships?
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10. (C) While State of Law won a plurality in nine provinces,
the Prime Minister may not emphasize putting a Da'wa
candidate in the governor's seat in every province. As
Suweidi put it, "independents with compatible philosophies"
will be supported in some cases. In Basra, Sheikh al-Fayez
said that he had been in negotiations with the Prime
Minister's representatives earlier in the day about being
appointed Governor. Zurfi also said that Maliki was pushing
him to return as Governor in Najaf, given the coalition
dynamics there. (Note: current Najaf Governor Abu Gelal, a
nominal ISCI member but also a strong rival of ISCI Deputy
Governor and party leader Abtan, also stated recently that
Da'wa had approached him about staying in office. End note.)
In Wasit, current independent Governor Latif al-Turfa, a
Maliki supporter, hopes to keep his position. Many of these
dreams of governorships are surely overstated. Yet Da'wa
recognizes that it may need additional support, since Maliki
was the face of State of Law and few of the slate's winning
candidates are well known in the provinces. In February 3
meetings with Senior Advisor, Basrawi Da'wa representatives,
including leading candidate Dr. Chaltag Abud, gave little
indication that they were interested in the governorship even
though they were ecstatic to win over half the seats on the
Basra PC (septel).

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Comment: The Big Picture
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11. (C) Looking toward the national CoR elections, Prime
Minister Maliki can seek to lead either a primarily Shi'a
but cross-sectarian coalition, or a reconstituted Shi'a
alliance along the lines of the UIA, but with a more
nationalist identity. Contacts such as Zurfi and Askari
suggest that he is angling toward the latter option, and
suggested that the Prime Minister's February 4 visit to Grand
Ayatollah Sistani gave him additional impetus down that path.
Reconstituting a broad Shi'a alliance while trying to
maintain nationalist, non-sectarian credentials will be
tricky. These competing interests will probably preclude any
exclusive multi-party coalition from being formed across the
provincial councils, since the PM will want to keep lines of
communication open to all potential partners. In any case,
the close relationship between Da'wa and the Sadrists will
place increased pressure on ISCI to accept a reduced role in
both the Iraqi Security Forces and in any new Shi'a coalition
to come. End comment.
CROCKER