Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD368
2009-02-12 15:02:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

MAKHMOUR REFUGEE CAMP: A WAY FORWARD THROUGH NEW

Tags:  PREL MARR IZ TU 
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VZCZCXRO0312
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0368/01 0431502
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121502Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1671
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0574
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 0055
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0107
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000368 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR IZ TU
SUBJECT: MAKHMOUR REFUGEE CAMP: A WAY FORWARD THROUGH NEW
IRAQI-TURKISH COOPERATION?

REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 907

B. 07 GENEVA 988

C. 08 ANKARA 158

D. 08 BAGHDAD 317

E. 08 BAGHDAD 983

F. 08 ISTANBUL 156

G. ANKARA 100

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is a joint cable from Embassy Baghdad and Embassy Ankara

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000368

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR IZ TU
SUBJECT: MAKHMOUR REFUGEE CAMP: A WAY FORWARD THROUGH NEW
IRAQI-TURKISH COOPERATION?

REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 907

B. 07 GENEVA 988

C. 08 ANKARA 158

D. 08 BAGHDAD 317

E. 08 BAGHDAD 983

F. 08 ISTANBUL 156

G. ANKARA 100

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is a joint cable from Embassy Baghdad and Embassy Ankara


1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraqi responsiveness to increased Turkish
involvement in Iraq (both with the KRG and Baghdad) may
present an opportunity for progress on the longstanding
humanitarian and political objective of facilitating the
voluntary return to Turkey and possibly other durable
solutions for 11,000 Turkish Kurdish refugees at the Makhmour
refugee camp in northern Iraq. The new atmosphere, which
includes Turkish commitment to a trilateral process on the
PKK involving the KRG and a recent comment to the Ambassador
by Turkish Special Envoy Murat Ozcelik that Turkey eventually
may be prepared to look again at this issue, suggest a
possible opening to re-engage the GoT on a way forward after
Turkish local elections at the end of March. The KRG will
need Turkish commitment to fair treatment of returning Kurd
refugees, but may be prepared to consider closing the camp as
part of increasing KRG-GOT cooperation. END SUMMARY.

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MAKHMOUR -- 11,000 PEOPLE IN LIMBO
--------------


2. (U) Iraqi Kurdish authorities established the Makhmour
refugee camp in 1991 to support Kurdish refugees from Turkey
and subsequently turned the camp over to UNHCR as larger
numbers of Turkish Kurds arrived in the mid-1990s amid claims
of repression by the Turkish government.


3. (C) The district and city of Makhmour - which is about 90%
Kurdish and 10% Arab - and the camp on its outskirts are in
the governorate of Ninewa, but get virtually no aid from the
capital, Mosul. Most public financing comes from the KRG in
Erbil and it is likely that the district will be formally
incorporated into the KRG when Article 140 boundary issues in
the disputed areas are resolved. Erbil, in the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG),gives the town and the camp some
assistance such as providing teachers for their schools,
tanks of water, and electrical transformers, and permits the

camp's youth to attend universities in the KRG. Camp
residents have frequently stated their desire to return to
their homes in Turkey (ref A),but to do so they frequently
add they would need amnesty from the GoT and compensation to
rebuild their homes and villages. At the end of 2008, UNHCR
listed the population of Makhmour at 10,626. There are
approximately 5000 Turkish Kurd refugees in other locations
in northern Iraq.


4. (C) We believe it is in the interest of the U.S., on
humanitarian grounds, to seek an agreement whereby the
residents of the camp feel comfortable returning to Turkey,
with the promise of better living conditions and educational
opportunities. Moreover, cooperative development and
effective implementation of an agreement that would see the
camp closed could be a powerful confidence building measure
for Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil. We believe the time is right
for the GoI, GoT, and UNHCR to work together, with the U.S.
in support, to eliminate a bilateral irritant, address
security concerns head on, and find durable solutions (if not
return to Turkey) for the refugees.


5. (C) The last formal discussion of Makhmour involving
Turkey, Iraq and UNHCR, with the U.S. as an observer, which
QTurkey, Iraq and UNHCR, with the U.S. as an observer, which
took place in April 2007 in Geneva, yielded no progress as
Turkey -- after driving the process for more than 2 years --
decided at the political level not to discuss repatriation
and Iraq was unwilling to discuss local integration of more
than a small percentage of the refugees inside Iraq.
Privately, the GoI told USDEL on the margins of the April
2007 meeting that Iraq could consider local integration of a
few thousand refugees as long as Turkey accommodates return
of most. UNHCR does not view third country resettlement as
viable because it doubts that countries would agree to
resettle them. In the last two years, repeated efforts by
the USG to encourage Turkey and Iraq to take positive steps
on the Makhmour Refugee Camp have not succeeded (refs B-D)
because neither side was prepared to do what the other asked
and resolving Makhmour was not a high priority for either
government.

BAGHDAD 00000368 002 OF 003




6. (C) Embassy Ankara notes, however, discussions within the
GoT have moved steadily away from a focus on "purely
military" solutions to the PKK problem and more toward a
comprehensive approach that takes into account long-standing
complaints of the ethnic Kurdish minority in the country's
southeast region. Evidence of this shift has become more
public in recent weeks, including the January 1 institution
of Turkey's first Kurdish-language television station on
state-owned Turkish Radio and Television 6, and discussion of
establishing Kurdish-language and literature faculties at
universities in Ankara and Istanbul. Heretofore, closure of
Makhmour has remained far down any Turkish agenda, pending
substantial progress in GoT/KRG/GoI cooperation against the
PKK (refs E, F). Embassy Ankara has continued to raise the
issue on a regular basis with senior GoT officials (Ref G)
but has usually been met with a similar response: the time
is not yet ripe, GoT concerns about the security situation at
the camp remain unaddressed, and the political risks for any
politician to push for the camp's closure and a de factor
amnesty and return package for its residents too great to
bear. With increasing Turkish-Iraqi cooperation in
countering the PKK presence in northern Iraq, Turkish
politicians may indeed become more amenable to taking the
risks involved in fashioning a domestic resettlement program
and trilateral agreement on the camp's closure through which
it would agree to accept back to Turkey thousands of PKK
fighters and supporters. However, it is extremely unlikely
such flexibility will become evident until after March 29
local elections in Turkey, which the ruling AKP has turned
into a de facto nationwide referendum on its administration.



7. (S) The GoI and the KRG are now participating with Turkey
in the Iraq-Turkey-U.S. Trilateral Security Dialogue to
counter the KGK/PKK. Indications are that recent Turkish
military moves (including pressure on the PKK in Northern
Iraq) has hurt PKK morale, and hundreds of former PKK members
have reportedly surrendered in Turkey in recent months.
Separately, the Turks have worked with the KRG and have seen
some progress in KRG approaches to the problem, including
public statements by Talabani and KRG participation in the
Iraqi delegation to the Trilats. Ozcelik told Ambassador
Crocker January 18 that Turkey wants to work more closely
with Iraqi Kurds on a number of issues. As a result of his
meeting in the KRG with KRG President Masoud Barzani, both
sides agreed that they need to develop a reasonable approach
to resolving PKK-related issues. We believe that Barzani
would need some level of guarantee from the GoT that
returning refugees would be treated fairly. In general
however, we think he would welcome a solution that allows the
camp to close and the refugees to return home as part of the
wider negotiation with the GoT on the PKK and the overall
improvement in GoT-KRG relations.



8. (C) UNHCR remains concerned about PKK influence in the
camp, but UN security rules have not permitted UNHCR to
maintain a permanent presence there or undertake frequent
visits. UNHCR attempted to carry out a survey on camp
services and intentions of the population in October-November
2008, but it yielded standard responses that were not useful.
To improve its ability to monitor conditions in the camp,
UNHCR in late 2008 contracted the International Rescue
QUNHCR in late 2008 contracted the International Rescue
Committee (IRC) to implement programs for health, gender
based violence, safety, and youth activity in the camp.
These programs have an underlying goal to empower residents
to make decisions on their own. IRC began implementation in
January with an AmCit project manager, who resides in Erbil,
but spends 3-4 days per week in the camp. IRC plans to bring
a second international project officer on board soon. IRC
will also be able to share quietly with UNHCR their
observations on PKK presence and activity in the camp.


9. (C) UNHCR has also been contacting GoI and GoT officials
to determine potential for restarting discussions of a
tripartite agreement. UNHCR Iraq briefed us on UNHCR Turkey
Representative Gaude's December 18 meeting with MFA Acting DG
for Security Inan Ozyildiz to discuss media reports of GoT
plans to repatriate "under UN auspices" PKK defectors who had
not been involved in violence against Turkish interests. The
press reports had indicated a possibility of using the
Makhmour refugee camp as a temporary transit facility for
persons who might be repatriated.


10. (C) Ozyildiz told UNHCR that prospects for repatriation
of PKK defectors are far from being a reality and
characterized the reports as wishful thinking about progress
toward disarming and eradicating the PKK from northern Iraq.

BAGHDAD 00000368 003 OF 003


However, he suggested that at some point circumstances might
allow Turkey receive ex-PKK members with no history of
violence. Likewise, he added that there are no concrete
plans to implement returns of the residents of Makhmour camp.
In that context, however, he noted that the Ministry of
Justice had been looking at how existing legislation might
allow the return of PKK defectors. Both Ozyildiz and Ozcelik
have previously described to Embassy Ankara ongoing
discussions within the GoT of establishing a cadre of
specially trained prosecutors who would be dispatched to the
Iraq-Turkey border with explicit instructions to process
cases of PKK defectors, returning Makhmour residents, etc.
interpreting Turkey's current repentance law as broadly and
liberally as possible to enable in essence all who wish to
return to Turkey to do so. It will remain politically
difficult for any political party to endorse an explicit
"amnesty" absent cessation of hostilities, but the hope is a
liberal interpretation of existing law from which hundreds of
former PKK fighters have already benefited will suffice to
attract the vast majority of the remaining fighters who
remain in northern Iraq. Whether the same law is utilized to
offer assurances of non-prosecution to non-combatant
supporters of the PKK, as the vast majority of Makhmour
residents are, or such assurances are otherwise provided in
the trilateral agreement on the camp's closure, remains to be
seriously discussed within GoT circles, but clearly will have
to be tackled. Ozyildiz spoke positively about continuing
high level contacts between Turkey and Iraq, including the
KRG, following the Turkish PM's visit to Baghdad in July. He
viewed these contacts, the establishment of the Trilateral
Security Dialogue and a bilateral military cooperation
agreement as reflecting a new positive atmosphere and desire
to solve the longstanding problem of PKK presence in Iraq.


11. (C) UNHCR Iraq Representative Daniel Endres discussed
Makhmour in separate meetings in January with Minister of
National Security, Deputy Minister of Interior and a Director
General from the Ministry of Human Rights. National Security
Minister al Waeli had recently visited Mahkmour and asked to
see UNHCR to express his concerns about conditions and
services in the camp and discuss prospects for repatriation
of the residents. Endres observed that the new
U.S.-Turkey-Iraq security process had refocused some
attention on Makhmour and that both the U.S. and Iraq desired
to restart discussions with Turkey on repatriating the
residents. Endres commented that the GoT is conditioning
resumption of negotiations on assurances that the camp is
civilian in nature.


12. (C) Waeli noted the importance of confidence building and
commented that the GoT and GoI both view UNCHR's new
implementing partner, IRC, as independent and neutral. Waeli
expressed satisfaction that one area of IRC's focus would be
youth activities, which were lacking. UNHCR's other GoI
interlocutors stressed the importance of maintaining the
civilian nature of the camp and minimizing PKK influence and
recruitment. Waeli urged UNHCR to re-convene the tripartite
process (Iraq, Turkey, UNHCR, with U.S. as observer),which
last met in April 2007. After Endres suggested that a
tripartite meeting would need careful preparation and willing
Turkish participation and reminded him of MFA leadership of
the process, they agreed that a useful next step would be a
Qthe process, they agreed that a useful next step would be a
U.S., UNHCR, Iraq meeting, including MFA and KRG Interior
Minister Sinjari.


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RECOMMENDATION
--------------


13. (C) New security cooperation arrangements among Turkey,
Iraq (including the KRG) and the U.S. offer a new opportunity
to address the underlying issues which have prevented the
parties from resolving Makhmour. We will consult with the GoI
and UNHCR in the coming weeks on enhancing security and
monitoring of the camp, with a view toward making it easier
for the GoT to look again at accepting thousands of PKK
fighters and supporters for reintegration once elections have
passed in Turkey and political pressure eases somewhat on
decision makers. We will also need to work with UNHCR and
the GoI/KRG to find other durable solutions for those camp
residents who either cannot or do not wish to return to
Turkey.
CROCKER