PRT DIYALA: CENTER OF GRAVITY FOR IRAQ'S PROBLEMS

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003373

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I: A/S FELTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KTER PTER KDEM PINR PINS PHUM PREF
IZ, IR
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: CENTER OF GRAVITY FOR IRAQ'S PROBLEMS

REF: A. 09BAGHDAD 2937

B. 09BAGHDAD 3065

C. 09BAGHDAD 2844

D. 09BAGHDAD 3120

E. 09BAGHDAD 3178

F. 09BAGHDAD 3335

G. 09BAGHDAD 2367

H. 09BAGHDAD 2547

Classified By: OPA Director Greta Holtz for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Diyala message.


2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT With its long border with Iran,
Diyala remains a strategically vital focal point for some of
Iraq's most pressing problems, yet its Provincial Government
remains ill-equipped to confront the challenges facing it.
Although Diyala is no longer the haven for Al Qaida and other
insurgents that it once was, continuing USG assistance is
vital to stabilize Diyala and to prevent ongoing tensions
there from spreading to the adjacent disputed internal
boundary (DIBs) areas. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


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VULNERABILITY TO IRAN
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3. (C) Strategically located between Iran and Baghdad,
Diyala remains vulnerable to Iranian economic and cultural
influence, as well as Tehran's apparent support for insurgent
groups and attempts to manipulate local officials. Diyala is
a major transit point, with more than 50 percent of the
fruits and vegetables in Diyala imported from Iran, along
with many other goods on their way to Baghdad. Diyala is
also a major gateway for Iranians traveling on religious
pilgrimages to places like Karbala and Najaf. In meetings
with PRToffs, provincial officials, including the Governor,
Dr. Abd-al-Nasr Muntsir al-Mahdawi (Sunni-Tawafuq) and the
Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Abd-al-Talib Muhammad Hasan
(Kurd) openly note the importance of cooperating with Iran to
improve Diyala,s economic future. Facing the current
drought conditions, the Governor made a trip to Iran in
September 2009 to ask for the release of water into the Wand
River in Khanaqin. As part of the negotiations for the
subsequent release of the water, Mahdawi signed a cooperation
agreement with the neighboring Iranian province of Kermanshah
on areas including security, trade, water, customs duties,
and cultural exchanges. (Note: This is notable for the
numerous subjects covered by the agreement that are clearly
within the central government,s sphere of authority. End
note).


4. (S/NF) Governor Mahdawi and other provincial leaders tell
us that Iranian agents and special groups are supporting
various insurgent and political groups in Diyala, undermining
the economy and provoking sectarian tension. The perception
of Iran's interference appears to exist on multiple levels,
for example, PC member Abdullah Jabbouri told PRToffs that
Iranian agents are manipulating the Muqdadiyah City Council,
while other PRT interlocutors have reported that Diyala's
Deputy Governor, Furat Muhammad (ISCI),recently traveled to
Iran to receive funds for the upcoming national parliamentary
elections. Diyala shares a 250 mile-long border with Iran,
and the Governor, multiple Provincial Council members, and
other local leaders claim that Iranian agents have many
members of the Iraqi security forces on their payroll -
including border forces - thus enabling the smuggling of
goods, including weapons and explosive devices, into Diyala.

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SIMMERING SECTARIAN TENSION
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5. (C) Diyala continues to face the serious potential for
increased sectarian violence. While many contacts, including
the PC Chairman and the district head of Muqdadiyah, estimate
that more than 90 percent of AQI in Diyala has now been
Qthat more than 90 percent of AQI in Diyala has now been
destroyed, the Shi'a-Sunni tensions that developed over the
past years of struggle have not fully disappeared. The
perceived imbalance in the implementation of rule of law in
favor of Shi'a groups is exacerbating those tensions. Sunni
groups say they are being targeted for arrest and
assassination by the Shi'a-dominated Fifth Division of the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),especially the Iraqi Police (IP)
(ref A). (NOTE: Among IA divisions, The Fifth has the highest
percentage of Shi'a troops. END NOTE.) This perception is
strengthened by the fact that approximately 90 percent of the
prison population in Diyala is Sunni, as stated by Governor
Mahdawi and prison officials. (NOTE: the population breakdown
in Diyala is roughly 50 percent Sunni, 35 percent Shi'a, and
15 percent Kurd. END NOTE). During a recent Provincial
Council session, PC member Amir Thamir (Allawi) and others
openly accused Shi'a tribes of coordinating with the IP on
the arrest of several Sunni leaders in the Mansouriyah area
of Muqdadiyah to retaliate against their Sunni tribal
neighbors. Thamir also claimed that the Prime Minister's
office was behind these arrests.


6. (S/NF) Moreover, Sunni leaders believe that the IP is also
working with the support of Iranian groups, and possibly at
the behest of, or at least with the support of, Iranian
groups. For example, in August 2009 the son of PC member
Najim Harbie (al-Mutluq) was alleged to have been
assassinated with IP collusion at the direction of Harith
Sa'dun, a well-known Jayesh Al Mahdi Special Groups (JAM-SG)
leader with ties to al Quds Force. (NOTE: U.S. military
direct intelligence report IIR 6 069 1143 10-DOI 20091116
from evaluated sources indicates that the vehicle used in the
kidnapping belonged to the Director of the Major Crimes Unit
of the IP. END NOTE). Despite this background, after his
arrest by ISF in November 2009, the Deputy Provincial Council
Chairman, Sadiq Ja'far Abdullah Muhammad (ISCI) approached
the PRT to press for Harith's release. In addition, Sunni
leadership asserts that a Shi'a-biased IP is not only
supported by Iranian special groups, but also by the central
government itself. Diyala's Sunni leaders blame the central
government for helping to perpetrate sectarian and
politically biased arrests and assassinations of Sunni
leaders - both civilians and Sons of Iraq (SOI). As
previously reported, a significant number of the Sunni
(Tawafuq) provincial government leadership either have
outstanding arrest warrants or are currently in jail (ref B).
Diyala's Sunni leadership believes this is a concerted
effort by central government powers to undermine their
authority and set the stage for Shi'a dominance in the
province (ref C).

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SUNNIS COULD TURN TO VIOLENCE
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7. (C) If the arrests, intimidation, and growing
disenfranchisement of Sunni groups in Diyala continue, some
PRT contacts in Diyala believe that some Sunnis, particularly
Sons of Iraq (SOI) or other groups vulnerable to new Ba'ath
party messaging, may resort to armed conflict as their best
perceived option to regain power against a Shi'a-led
government. Diyala is the second largest source of
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraq, second only to
Baghdad. Approximately 240,000 people of both Sunni and
Shi'a ethnicity have been displaced, roughly half of whom
reside in Diyala, and half in other provinces. Working with
Embassy and international partners such as USAID, UNHCR,
United States Institute of Peace, and International
Organization for Migration, the GOI's Implementation and
Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) has
developed a special Diyala Initiative to enable and encourage
IDPs to return home (ref D). Early results are encouraging;
UNHCR reports that around 50,000 IDPs returned to Diyala in

2009. But such progress is not yet consolidated, and
shortages of jobs, housing, and essential services, as well
as security concerns still loom as roadblocks. Local
citizens in Diyala report that some Sunni families who tried
to move back into Shi'a dominated areas such as Khalis were
Qto move back into Shi'a dominated areas such as Khalis were
threatened with violence that they believe is condoned by
local Shi'a IP. For now, these incidents have remained
isolated, but if they become more widespread and the
perception of IP support grows--both real possibilities--it
could spark wider violence from within the Sunni community.
And in the event that Diyala Sunnis do resort to arms in a
large numbers, it would heighten the risk of similar actions
in neighboring provinces due to close tribal connections.

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ARAB-KURD TENSIONS
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8. (C) Arab-Kurd tensions in the disputed internal boundary
(DIBs) areas of Diyala could also reverberate in the adjacent
Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). While the majority of the
Khanaqin area in northern Diyala may be Arab, Kurds claim it
should be part of the IKR. (ref E). In a recent meeting
with NEA A/S Feltman (ref F),Governor Mahdawi noted that
tensions had improved in the DIBs area with the involvement
of the Iraqi Army, but the situation was far from stable.
Kurdish leaders in Khanaqin claim increased tensions between
Arabs and Kurds are a result of intimidation from ISF and
Ba'athist forces. On the Sunni side, some tribes in the area
want to seek revenge for persecution at the hands of
Peshmerga forces that controlled the area from 2003 to 2008.
This resentment continues to surface in the form of
assassinations, bombings, and other violence along ethnic
lines, especially in areas such as Jalula and Saadiya.
Moreover, this area continues to be used as a base of
operations for Sunni insurgent groups such as Naqshbandi
(JRTN) and, increasingly over the past six months,
pro-Ba'athist groups such as al-Awda and al-Hadba, which are
now spreading into other parts of Diyala (ref C). (NOTE:
While the extent of the pro-Ba'athist activities is not
entirely clear, there is a real fear and perception of a
Ba'athist resurgence. END NOTE).


9. (C) The ongoing struggle between the KRG and central
government for control over the disputed areas in Khanaqin
has also undermined the capacity of the local civilian
leadership, especially with regards to financial resources in
areas including Jalula and Saadiya (ref C). For example,
when the PRT recently sought to provide support for
developing an education program in a disadvantaged part of
Khanaqin, Assistant Governor for Technical Affairs Ghadban
Taha Ismail asked why the provincial government should fund
the effort, claiming "the KRG takes care of Khanaqin." In
the end, the failure of central and provincial authorities to
provide essential services has left communities vulnerable to
other groups, including insurgents that could exploit the
dissatisfaction to ignite ethnic tensions.

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PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ILL-PREPARED FOR CHALLENGES
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10. (C) The provincial government continues to be
ill-prepared to address these challenges, due to a lack of
administrative and technical capacity and weak power dynamics
vis--vis the central government (ref F). Only within the
past year has Diyala seen significant improvement in the
security situation, and as such has not had the chance to
develop a professional civil service with expertise to
implement or execute a provincial development plan. The
province remains woefully behind many others on essential
services and governance. In addition, many members of the
provincial government believe that the central government is
systematically undermining their ability to provide essential
services to their people by delaying the release of budgetary
funds. A case of note for members of the Diyala Provincial
Council is their July 2009 vote to terminate the Diyala
Director General (DG) for the Administration of Petroleum
Products for professional malfeasance. PC members believe
that the central government's refusal to accept their action
and remove the DG is a direct cchallenge to the provincial
council's authority and illustrative of the central
government's sectarian bias, i.e. protecting the DG of Oil
because of his close connections to ISCI and Iran (ref G).


11. (C) In public statements and private conversations with
PRToffs, a wide range of provincial officials ranging from
Governor Mahdawi to PC officials and mayors cite the ongoing
need for PRT guidance in order to promote stability and
national unity and prevent the province from slipping back
into sectarian turmoil. Hazim Serraj of the Iraqi Red
Crescent, for example, recently appeared on Iraqi TV praising
the PRT's work in creating jobs and promoting national unity
by at the Aruba Market in Muqdadiya. Once one of the largest
Qby at the Aruba Market in Muqdadiya. Once one of the largest
Iraqi public markets outside of Baghdad, virtually all
economic activity ceased in 2006-2007 as AQI and Coalition
Forces battled for the market. But over the last six months
the PRT has created a business development program that has
helped over 500 shops reopen and create 2,000 jobs (septel).
"The PRT has been instrumental in restoring life to the
market and the city," Serraj said. "The program is bringing
Sunnis and Shi'as back to the market to live and work
together, and giving people hope for the future. But we
cannot do it alone and need the PRT to help us maintain this
progress." Diyala may not be the violent haven for AQI and
like-minded groups that it was two years ago, but the gains
made by the USG in helping to stabilize the area are not yet
consolidated.


12. (C) COMMENT: Diyala's simmering ethnic and sectarian
tensions make it fertile ground for various agents of
instability, including Sunni insurgents, Ba'ath elements, and
Iranian special groups units. Together with its
ethno-sectarian issues, Diyala's location between Baghdad and
Iran, and along the fault line between the IKR and the rest
of Iraq, make it strategically important to U.S. interests in
Iraq. We will need to work for more equitable treatment of
all groups in the province to help preclude the possibility
that disenfranchised Sunnis will increasingly revert to
violence as a means to redress their grievances, potentially
sparking broader problems in adjacent provinces. END COMMENT.
FORD