Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD2980
2009-11-10 13:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI WATER RESOURCES NEGOTIATOR DESCRIBES WATER

Tags:  EAGR ECON IZ PBTS SENV TNGD TPHY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4399
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGB #2980/01 3141324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101324Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5402
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002980 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: EAGR ECON IZ PBTS SENV TNGD TPHY
SUBJECT: IRAQI WATER RESOURCES NEGOTIATOR DESCRIBES WATER
TALKS WITH IRAN

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2800

B. BAGHDAD 2899

C. BAGHDAD 2930

Classified By: Classified by EMIN John Desrocher for reasons 1.4 b and
d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002980

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: EAGR ECON IZ PBTS SENV TNGD TPHY
SUBJECT: IRAQI WATER RESOURCES NEGOTIATOR DESCRIBES WATER
TALKS WITH IRAN

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2800

B. BAGHDAD 2899

C. BAGHDAD 2930

Classified By: Classified by EMIN John Desrocher for reasons 1.4 b and
d


1. (C) SUMMARY: During Iraq-Iran bilateral negotiations on
water resources held October 23-25, Iraqi negotiators
confronted their Iranian interlocutors with unclassified
photographs of Iranian river blockages and diversions
provided to the GOI by Embassy Baghdad, Ministry of Water
Resources General Director of Planning and Followups Salar
Bakr Sami told USG personnel November 2. Over Iraqi
objections, the Iranian negotiators insisted that resolution
of water issues between the two countries follow the
provisions spelled out in the 1975 &Treaty Concerning the
State Frontier and Neighborly Relations between Iran and
Iraq8 that calls for an equal splitting of flows from three
rivers and a sharing of four others based on previous
agreements and custom. The negotiations did not result in
any agreements from the Iranian side to increase water flows.
The GOI has requested USG aid in contracting with and
funding an international water expert to assist in developing
the GOI negotiating strategy for the next round of
discussions with Iran. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Embassy ESTH Officer, ITAO senior consultant for
water, and military liaison (CJ-9) met GD Salar Bakr Sami in
early November to discuss recent water talks with Iran that
occurred from October 23-25. Salar described the trip as a
successful step in continuing negotiations with Iran over
water issues that have become more critical in the last
several months. Salar stated that that he was Iraq's primary
negotiator with Iran's General Director of Water and Dams,
who noted that his Iranian interlocutor did not have the same
latitude that he (Salar) had been authorized and had to
obtain continuous guidance from higher authorities to
determine negotiating positions and responses. Salar also
stated that acting Iranian Energy Minister Namjou --

reportedly an old friend of Iraqi Minister of Water Resources
Rashid -- was not in a position to finalize binding bilateral
agreements. According to Salar, the Iranians were unhappy
with recent negative press stories on water, and Minister
Namjou accused Iraq of trying to deflect the blame for water
shortages from Turkey and Syria to Iran.


3. (C) Salar stated that during the negotiations, Iraq would
identify areas in dispute and the Iranians would respond with
expressions of surprise and denial. Salar said he brought up
flow reductions in the Karun, Karkh, Galal Badrah, and Sirwan
Rivers, and specifically accused the Iranians of diverting
the Karun. When the Iranians denied the charge, Salar said,
he showed them photographs showing diversion canals on the
Iranian side of the border, low water conditions at the mouth
of the Karun River as it emptied into the Shatt Al Arab, and
low water levels near the Abadan refinery. He stated that he
requested that Iran immediately release 200 cm/s into the
Karun River as an emgergency measure. Salar also said he
accused the Iranians of blocking the Karkh River with a sand
berm, which the Iranians also denied. Salar said he again
produced photographs, this time showing a sand berm
constructed along the Iranian border and the resultant
devastation of Iraq's Al Hawaza marsh. He stated that he
also raised the 1971 Ramsar Treaty for the preservation of
wetlands of international importance for water fowl to
bolster his argument for more water. According to Salar, he
requested that 120 cm/s be immediately released into the
Qrequested that 120 cm/s be immediately released into the
Karkh River for Iraq's use. Salar also said he accused the
Iranians of blocking or diverting rivers flowing into the
north of Iraq, which normally feed into the Iraqi Dokan and
Derbendikahn Dams located in Kurdistan near the Iranian
border. When the Iranians denied blocking the rivers, Salar
said he presented daily dam inflow data showing drastic
reductions in flow. He requested that the Iranians
immediately release six cm/s for the Galal Badrah River and 2
cm/s for the Sirwan River (a tributary of the Diyala River
that flows into the Derbendikahn Dam). Salar told us that
while the Iranians did not specifically agree to any
increases in river water flows, they had been surprised at
the Iraqi's level of knowledge on bilateral water issues.


4. (C) According to Salar, Iran,s chief negotiating
position was to propose the resolution of water disputes and
issues based on provisions contained in the 1975 Treaty
Concerning the State Frontier and Neighborly Relations
between Iran and Iraq. (Note: The 1975 treaty designates
rivers whose flow will be shared equally between Iran and
Iraq and other rivers whose flows will be divided based upon
the 1914 Commission on the Delimitation of the
Iranian-Ottoman frontier and in accordance with custom. End

BAGHDAD 00002980 002 OF 002


note.) Salar told us that this treaty was negotiated during
the time of Saddam Hussein and that the treaty was
deliberately slanted towards punishing Kurdistan. Salar told
the Iranians that the Iraqi Minister of Water Resources did
not accept the 1975 treaty as a basis for future water
negotiations, but would be open to forming a technical
committee to discuss water issues. (Comment: Ironically,
the 1975 treaty specifically calls for the creation of a
permanent joint technical commission composed of an equal
number of experts from both States to conduct technical
studies and to supervise matters relating to contiguous and
successive watercourses. End comment)


5. (C) COMMENT: The GOI has requested USG assistance in
contracting with and funding an internationally recognized
water expert, Dr. Jon Martin Trondalen of the Compass
Foundation in Geneva, to help prepare Iraq's position for the
next round of water negotiations. Post is exploring ways to
support the GOI request. END COMMENT
HILL